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How to become morally virtuous? Among the students of Aristotle, it is often assumed 
that the philosopher does not have a fully worked-out theoretical answer to this 
question. Some interpreters (e.g. Burnyeat 1980, most recently Curzer 2012) have, 
however, recognised that Aristotle may have a comprehensive theory of moral 
development. However, even those interpreters have made only scarce attempts to 
study Aristotle’s theory in connection with the questions about his moral psychology. 
Unlike Aristotle’s theory of moral development as such, several of those questions are 
among the most debated issues in current Aristotle scholarship⎯for example, whether 
we need reason to identify good actions or whether habituated non-rational affects 
suffice; what makes us responsible for our actions, and how the philosopher conceives 
the relationship between phronesis and moral motivation. In my thesis, I aim at 
connecting these important questions with Aristotle’s theory of moral development. I 
hope to show that this approach will yield a picture on which Aristotle’s theory is 
divisible into two steps that one has to choose to take in order to become morally 
virtuous. I argue first that identifying good ends, and actions, requires reason. In order 
to become morally responsible, a person has thus to develop a rational ability to 
identify good actions. I show that Aristotle’s term for such ability is synesis. The first 
step to virtue, I conclude, is to use this ability well, to choose to become virtuous and 
habituate one’s character into acting well. The second step is to acquire phronesis, 
understanding why good actions are good, to complement a habituated character. 
Developing of phronesis requires both considerable experience in acting well and 
philosophical teaching about ethics, but it is necessary for moral virtue. Although a 
finely-habituated person is invulnerable to akrasia with regard to pleasures even if he 
did not have phronesis, Aristotle allows, I show, that he might still be prone to 
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We study ethics not so that we may know what virtue is,  
but so that we may become good.1 
 
How to become morally virtuous according to Aristotle? This is often taken to be a 
question to which he does not have a fully worked-out theoretical answer, in spite of 
declaring that becoming good is what we study ethics for.2 The merits of his practical 
considerations about character development in Nicomachean Ethics are, however, 
widely acknowledged: for example, the centrality of habituation and the emphasis on 
virtue instead of rules.3 Education theorists and psychologists have recently elevated 
these and many other Aristotelian topics to the forefront of their research, but often 
without a profound interest in studying if the philosopher had a worked our theory of 
character development, or, only a collection of views they can shape into a theory. 
 There are, however, some contemporary interpreters who have recognised that 
Aristotle might have a worked-out philosophical theory of the development of virtue, 
which connects moral development with the development of the ‘rational’ and ‘non-
rational aspects’ of the soul⎯concepts that are not used by contemporary education 
theorists and psychologists. The first of these interpreters was Myles Burnyeat in the 
1980s.4 His interpretation has since become the standard answer to the question, only 
further specified by latter interpreters.5 Only recently has Howard Curzer challenged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 EN 2.2 1103b28–9. Translated by Ross 1923. In the footnotes of my thesis, Ross is abbreviated as 
(R) and another translation of EN that I use, Bartlett and Collins 2009, as (B&C). If the translation is 
my own, there is no abbreviation. Whether I quote from (R) or (B&C) or use my own translation is 
determined partly by the accuracy and readability of translations, and partly by terminological 
consistency, i.e. so that the translations for key terms such as phronesis (moral understanding), logos 
(reason) or prohairesis (choice or rational choice) stay similar across quotations.  
2  E.g. Kristjansson 2013 concludes his survey article (p. 64): ‘Aristotle’s corpus is teeming with ideas 
on how to achieve [virtue] … [but] those ideas are not co-ordinated or synchronized into a systematic 
[…] methodology.’ Sherman 1997 (p. 88) calls Aristotelians to construct such a theory on the 
philosopher’s behalf: ‘The absence of explicit discussion in [Aristotle’s] ethical treatises of the idea of 
character development … does not mean there isn’t room for such a story in a more worked-out 
version of his view.’ I will argue, however, that Aristotle has a worked-out theory of character 
development. We do not have to aim at expanding and improve his views, but only recovering them.  
3 E.g. Kristjansson 2013, and Lapsley and Narvaez 2006, Ch. 1.  
4 Burnyeat 1980. 
5 E.g .Sherman 1991, p 158, admits that her aim is to only expand Burnyeat’s interpretation. Also e.g. 
Nussbaum (1989), Reeve (1992), pp. 51-4, Whiting (2002), p. 173, Lorenz (2009), p. 190, and Moss 
(2012), p. 37, offer interpretations very similar to it.  
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this interpretation.6 However, neither of these interpretations answers the question in 
a very thorough way. Neither addresses the much-debated issue of whether we need 
to use our reason to discern good ends or not, although this problem is of paramount 
importance to both interpreters since their interpretations presuppose an affirmative 
answer to it. Moreover neither Burnyeat nor Curzer study how their conclusions, if 
correct, would affect the way we should interpret two further issues that are closely 
related to moral development: how we become responsible for our actions according 
to Aristotle, and how reason, if it can affect to our moral motivation, can affect to it. 
 In my thesis, I aim to show that provided that we study Aristotle’s account of 
moral development while bearing in mind its connections to the above key questions 
about his moral psychology, we shall come to a more thorough and philosophically 
promising theory of moral development that neither Burnyeat nor Curzer have 
discovered.7 I also believe that this approach might yield a novel understanding of 
the reasons why Aristotle regards us as responsible for our characters, and of how he 
conceives the relationship between the development of the rational aspect of our 
soul, the habituation of our desires, and the improvement of our moral motivation. 
 Aristotle thinks that our becoming morally virtuous must start from our natural 
virtue⎯our desire to act well.8 Everyone has it by birth, but this foundational 
motivation⎯I aim to have shown by the end of the four chapters of my thesis⎯has 
to first be complemented by an ability to rationally identify which actions are good, 
then by the habit of acting well, and finally by understanding why certain actions are 
good. Virtually everyone is expected to be able identify good actions (praxeis), and 
we all have the potential to direct our natural virtue at the right ends and to choose to 
act well or not. This makes us responsible for our actions and capable of choosing to 
take steps to becoming virtuous. Since all, even bad people, undergo this 
development, it is, however, not yet a step towards virtue. I propose that habituation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Curzer 2002 and 2012. 
7 The principal sources of my interpretation is EN, and to lesser extent De Anima. I do not use EE in 
the same extent as EN, because Aristotle does not discuss as much about moral and cognitive 
development in that work and whenever he discusses, his claims are often similar to those in EN. 
Whenever I find that he says something that either differs from, or adds to, EN in EE, I mention it.  
8 See the beginning of EN 6.13 1144b3–8 (quoted on p. 50 below), in which Aristotle states that we 
have an inclination to be virtuous by nature⎯natural virtue⎯even before we know what is good. 
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(ethismos) to using our natural potential properly, for acting well, is the first step to 
becoming morally virtuous.9 During this step, natural virtue becomes capable of 
resisting contrary, non-rational desires. The second step to virtue, I argue, is when 
virtue becomes the sole motive of our actions. I attempt to show that only acquiring 
an understanding of why certain actions are good, and ability to deliberate on the 
basis of it (phronesis), can make a finely-habituated (epieikes) person invulnerable to 
akrasia⎯conscious acting against the human good. For not all akratic conduct is due 
to bad non-rational desires, but also impetuosity can result it. The state of habituated 
character that is impervious to both types of akrasia, I conclude, is moral virtue.10 
 I begin Chapter 1 of my thesis by discussing whether Aristotle thinks that we need 
thinking (nous) to identify good ends⎯that is, good actions. For according to 
Aristotle, good actions should be considered ends in themselves,11 and thus good 
ends and actions are ultimately synonymous for him. I will defend the established 
interpretation that a person needs to think (noein) in order to identify good actions, 
that is, to use nous, and not only to rely on habit.12 A significant minority of 
interpreters have however, traditionally argued that we do not need nous to identify 
good ends.13 These anti-rationalist interpreters tend to take EN 2.1, in which Aristotle 
says that moral virtue, unlike the virtue of thought, results from habit, and his 
statements in EN 3.5 that we do not deliberate about the ends of our desires, to show 
that this is the case. Instead, the ends of our desire improve only through habituating 
our desire for pleasure⎯which does not result from deliberation⎯to acting well. 
Although good acting is not often immediately pleasant, a child can be habituated to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although my thesis is not primarily about the pedagogical content of Aristotelian ethismos, I will 
attempt to unpack some that content during my thesis, especially in the course of Ch. 2. I can warn, 
however, already that this concept, just as e.g. phronesis, evades any precise definition: it consists of 
acting, thinking, imitating, learning from mistakes, being punished and rewarded, etc., in brief, of 
whatever it takes for a person to come to act well. See Sherman 1989 Ch. 5 for more discussion.  
10 One may think that akrasia (with enkrateia) is the end-state of character development just as virtue. 
However, in EN 10.9 1180a1-4, Aristotle says that the law and custom (nomos) habituates grown men 
further, which implies that not all moral development has to take place in youth, which implies further 
that even the grown up akratic can hope to become better by observing nomoi. According to Aristotle 
(1180a15-25) nomoi mix reasoning and compulsion, stimulating people to act rationally. 
11 Aristotle states that a virtuous person performs good actions for their intrinsic nobility (to kalon) in 
EN 2.4 1105a29–b5 and EN 4.1 1120a23–4 (See footnote 44 on p. 22 below for more analysis). This 
reflects his view about the equivocality of acting well and human good in EN 1.4 1095a19–20. 
12 E.g. Cooper 1975, Dahl 1984, and Irwin 2007 support this interpretation. 
13 E.g. Walter 1874, Zeller 1896, Aubenque 1965, and recently Moss 2011.  
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associate good actions with pleasant experiences, and eventually such conditioning 
will enable him to discern good actions through the pleasure that ensues from 
anticipating them. Therefore discerning good actions may not require nous. On the 
anti-rationalist interpretation, pace my rationalist interpretation, rational ability to 
identify good actions is not a prerequisite for developing the habit of acting well. 
 The reason why the anti-rationalist interpretation has, however, only ever been 
endorsed by a small minority of interpreters, is probably that in EN 1.13, Aristotle 
divides the human soul into rational (dianoetikon) and non-rational (orektikon) 
aspects. He seems to say that the rational aspect desires good ends, while the non-
rational aspect characteristically desires pleasure, thus differentiating the cognition of 
value from the sensation of pleasure. Moreover, in EN 6.13, the philosopher claims 
that one can be morally virtuous if and only if one has developed practical reason 
(phronesis): this would be a redundant claim if he thought that nous (which is 
constitutive of any rational activity) is neither needed for acting well nor discerning 
good ends. I cannot rely, however, solely on this standard defence any more. For 
Jessica Moss has recently attempted to rescue the non-rationalist interpretation by 
arguing that even if the above, rationalist reading of EN 1.13 was entirely right, it 
might nevertheless be that we discern value non-rationally according to Aristotle. 
 According to Moss, some of Aristotle’s claims in De Anima 3 show that cognising 
value belongs to the non-rational faculty of phantasia. One might therefore not need 
to rationally identify that an action is good so as to perceive it as good, but only 
receive the appearance of its goodness with phantasia, that is, claims Moss, imagine 
the action as pleasant. The task of the rational aspect of soul in moral cognition 
might be to only conceptualise those appearances: to enable a well-habituated person 
to associate pleasurable mental images with word ‘good’. Hence Aristotle’s views in 
EN 1.13 and EN 6.13 may not imply that identifying good ends requires any nous. 
 I think, however, that Moss’ interpretation is probably mistaken. I will present 
several considerations that lead to this conclusion. Probably the most important of 
these is that his interpretation cannot explain why Aristotle seems to think, in EN 3.5, 
that one’s becoming responsible for one’s actions presupposes a rational choice 
(prohairesis) regarding the direction of habituation, that is, whether one wants to 
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follow a virtuous example in one’s acting or not, made before one has engaged in 
following any example as long as one has acquired a certain moral character. For if 
identifying good ends did not depend upon nous, but was determined by how much 
enjoyment one received from non-rationally imagining various ends, as Moss argues, 
there would be no point in young people trying to rationally (i.e. with nous) choose 
whether to become virtuous or not. Their choice would be determined by their non-
rational phantasia. Therefore they would not be responsible for their actions either.  
 Provided we grant, then, on the basis of above, and two other considerations that I 
will present in Chapter 1, that we need nous to identify good actions, it would follow 
that thinking (dianoia) is also needed for the exercise of moral virtue. But why, then, 
does Aristotle say in EN 2.1 that moral virtue (ethike arête) is a matter of habituation, 
unlike the virtue of thought (dianoetike arête)? I shall deal with this question in 
Chapter 2. One reason for this claim might be that identifying good actions could 
require thinking, whereas the motivation to perform them comes exclusively from 
habituation⎯and Aristotle’s concept of ‘moral virtue’ may refer only to this latter 
component. However, the answer is not so simple, because in EN 1.4, Aristotle goes 
on to imply that habituation suffices to give one the ability to identify which actions 
are good. Therefore the motivational and intellectual components of moral virtue 
seem to be developmentally inseparable, which may make Aristotle’s position seem 
strange. For habituation to performing certain actions does not seem to bear any 
relation to enabling one to identify good actions by nous instead of by only routine.  
 However, Aristotle also says in EN 2.1 that moral habituation requires a teacher, 
and this may taken to indicate, as Burnyeat has argued, that since the purpose of 
moral habituation is not only to train people’s (presumably children’s) non-rational 
desires, but	   it	   involves	   also	   the	   development	   of	   thinking	   insofar	   as	   we	   need	   it	   to	  
identify	  good	  actions, someone (presumably a parent) is needed to teach them good 
actions.14 The non-rational desire of pleasure motivates children to act as they are 
taught to act, because performing good action naturally produces pleasure for them. I 
will argue, however, that Burnyeat’s interpretation is probably mistaken. One reason 
for my suspicion is that, according to EN 1.4 and 10.9, people can be receptive to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Burnyeat 1980.  
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moral instruction only if they already have good habits. Therefore it would be quite 
useless to employ a teacher to instruct unhabituated people about good actions. 
 To avoid this problem with Burnyeat’s interpretation, I will argue, following 
Curzer,15 that the moral teacher might not need to teach good actions to a moral 
student, but only punish and reproach him for bad actions, so that he may then learn 
good actions on his own. The punishments that ensue from acting badly can develop 
a sense of shame in the student, motivating him to avoid acting badly. Nevertheless, 
neither can Curzer’s interpretation avoid a problem with Aristotle’s account of moral 
responsibility. Both interpreters seem to think that we acquire our moral character 
through obediently following guidance that is provided to us from outside, either 
through punishments or teaching. This conclusion makes it seem mysterious how we 
could acquire the ability to choose which kind of behaviour to engage in before our 
moral character is determined⎯which what Aristotle regards as the condition for 
moral responsibility in EN 3.5. However, Curzer’s interpretation has space for 
avoiding this problem, unlike Burnyeat’s. Being instructed which actions to perform, 
and then ensuring that we perform them would take away any genuine opportunity to 
choose them, whereas avoiding bad actions is not yet choosing to perform good 
actions according to Aristotle. Curzer does not, however, give any interpretation of 
how he thinks we can come to identify good actions. Therefore it remains possible to 
argue that perhaps one could learn to identify good actions by his own means, 
without coming to learn everything about them through a teacher’s instruction.  
 After these conclusions, I will argue that Aristotle thinks that engaging in a 
normal social life will inevitably actualise the cognitive ability of synesis⎯the ability 
to correctly identify (krinein) good actions on the basis of other people’s opinions 
(EN 6.10)⎯in a person. By enabling people to identify good actions without 
habituation, synesis, while not presupposing that people are actually motivated to 
follow its guidance, enables them to identify good actions by considering what other 
people would think is good to do. Therefore synesis might be a basis for Aristotle’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Curzer 2002 and 2012.  
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account of moral responsibility, for his view is that we must choose to which kinds 
of actions we habituate ourselves before we gain the habits of acting in certain ways. 
 In Chapter 3, I first describe the operation of synesis in identifying good actions, 
and after that turn to the last step in moral development: the move from being a good, 
habitually well-acting person to the acquisition of phronesis and full moral virtue. 
With regard to the first topic, one may easily wonder how synesis can operate as I 
have characterised it above: given that different actions are good in different 
situations for different reasons, how does Aristotle think that someone could reliably 
identify a good action without being able to understand what makes certain actions 
good here and now? This is a question that supporters of the interpretation that only 
phronesis can identify good actions may pose.16 I will show, however, that Aristotle 
had resources for answering this question, although he nowhere explicitly answers it. 
Since the philosopher claims in Posterior Analytics that all knowledge, including 
moral knowledge, is acquired in the same way, by asking to dioti for to hoti, we 
could seek an applicable answer from David Charles’ seminal interpretation of 
Aristotle’s theory of coming to identify natural kinds.17 In his interpretation, Charles 
concludes that if we are uncertain about whether something is, e.g., gold, we can 
consult a master goldsmith to the grasp of to hoti. Whether he identifies that material 
as gold or not can be our epistemic basis for regarding it as gold or not, instead of 
having any reasoned premises to explain why it is gold. If people can reliably 
identify that something is gold only by consulting master craftsmen’s opinions, they 
should also be able to identify good actions by consulting opinions about good 
actions. In this case, we would need to assume that identifying good actions requires 
phronesis, which provides us with a understanding why those actions are good.  
 This is how synesis may serve as a stepping-stone in a life that eventually acquires 
phronesis, and full virtue, by enabling one to rationally choose how to habituate 
one’s character⎯badly or well. In the second half of Chapter 3, I shall study further 
how phronesis is acquired to complement synesis. We shall have established already 
in Chapter 2 that a person who has to hoti, who is competent in identifying good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 E.g. Vasiliou 1996, McDowell 2007, and Angier 2010.  
17 Charles 2000. 
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actions, is presumably virtuous once he has also acquired to dioti, an understanding 
of why certain actions are good, which have to go together in order to constitute the 
virtue of phronesis. In EN 1.4, Aristotle can be read as proposing that attending 
lectures on ethics may allow a well-habituated possessor of synesis to come know to 
dioti, at least at a theoretical level, which, as he argues by approvingly quoting 
Hesiod, helps to make him ‘the best’.18 To be the morally best, however, a person 
does not only need to know to dioti on a theoretical level⎯e.g. to memorise the 
proposition that acting well realises eudaimonia⎯but also needs to display his 
knowledge in his actions. Although phronesis is a virtue of thought, it is primarily a 
virtue of practical, action-related rather than theoretical thought.  
 Phronesis may come, I will propose, from learning that eudaimonia, the human 
good, is to act well by listening lectures in ethics, and simultaneously letting moral 
experience gradually build a disposition to act well for the sake of eudaimonia. As 
Aristotle puts it at EN 6.13, this is to act well with the involvement of right reason 
(meta ton orthon logon) as opposed to acting only in accordance (kata) with it, acting 
well because of some other reasons. Once one has learned that one should act well so 
as to realise the human good and satisfy one’s natural desire for the good, and then 
returns to one’s everyday life, consciously experiencing that acting well indeed 
makes one happy, one’s motivation to act well shall increase. Thus, one will be eager 
to study yet more about the human good⎯for example, about its relation to human 
nature as rational animal, about the importance of contemplation for good life, 
etc.⎯which, in turn, enrich one’s experience, thus motivating one to study more. The 
efficiency of such a virtuous circle of learning in developing understanding why 
certain actions are good, and thus also excellent deliberation, in brief, phronesis, that 
implies moral virtue, the state in which one constantly reaches the right decisions to 
act on the basis of right premises, might be why Aristotle thinks that phronesis is 
acquired by both teaching and experience to complement finely-habituated character. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18I shall use only masculine gender, because the terminology that refers to moral development 
(synetos, phronimos, agathos etc.) is exclusively masculine in Ancient Greek. Aristotle does not 
consider women capable of becoming phronimoi, as according to him, their deliberative faculty (to 
bouleutikon) is not sovereign (autarkon) (Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14), or, capable of rational choice.     
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 By the end of Chapter 3, we should thus have come to see how a finely- 
habituated person could acquire moral virtue. Since he acts habitually well, however, 
even before he is virtuous, it remains to be explained why moral virtue is the end of 
moral development in Aristotle. Provided that moral virtue, that is, finely habituated 
character plus phronesis, does not make any tangible difference to one’s acting, but 
only enables one to act well from the right reason⎯it may seem that what I call 
moral virtue is in fact only a virtue of thought that complements morally good 
character, and nothing ‘moral’⎯i.e. something that brings improvement in our 
acting⎯as such. Hence my interpretation may seem incoherent. I will address this 
worry, however, in Chapter 4, and argue that besides its intellectual benefits, only the 
combination of finely habituated character and phronesis can make one invulnerable 
to any form of akrasia, and therefore it merits the name of moral virtue. I think that 
Aristotle’s discussion of the motivational problems of those who lack phronesis in 
EN 7 shall make this clear. In that book, interpreting which is the focus of Chapter 4, 
Aristotle seems to think that all such people, regardless of how finely-habituated 
their desires, can be vulnerable to acting against their own rational choice (akrasia) 
in certain conditions, while only morally virtuous people are always invulnerable. 
 I think that Aristotle would admit that people who can accurately and attentively 
identify particular good actions could still simultaneously experience bad actions as 
(more) pleasant. I will thus first argue⎯pace Sarah Broadie⎯that akrasia does not 
have to involve any ignorance of particulars.19 An akratic person’s synesis can be 
fully operational, but, as Charles has argued, he may only lack confidence in 
performing the good action due to defective moral habituation of non-rational 
desires.20 If a person who can accurately identify good actions habitually succumbs 
to bad desires, he is akratic; if not, he is, enkratic.  There is, however, no reason why 
even people who, unlike the enkratic, have finely habituated non-rational desires, 
could not be vulnerable to occasionally surrendering to other bad, non-rational 
impulses, such as to anger (thymos). Since synesis plus fine moral habituation cannot 
thus necessarily prevent all varieties of akratic acting, I will suggest, and argue, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Broadie 1991. 
20 Charles 2006 and 2009. 
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perhaps only the addition of the virtue of phronesis could make a finely-habituated 
person invulnerable to akratic actions in any situation, even when he is very angry.  
 The last lines of EN 7.3, in which Aristotle purports to show how akrasia is 
possible by concluding ‘it is not when proper knowledge (kyria episteme) is present 
when akrasia occurs’, show, I think, that this is the philosopher’s view. So far, many 
interpreters have argued that here ‘proper knowledge’ refers to the akratic’s grasp of 
correct moral opinions, and perceptual knowledge to his discernment of their 
relevance to his particular situation; and that the akratic’s bad desire prevents him 
from using those beliefs.21 I will argue, however, that it is implausible to assume that 
Aristotle would call true moral opinions as kyria episteme⎯which is unchangeable 
by definition⎯since even true our moral opinions need to be revised from time to 
time. I will therefore suggest that the term ‘proper knowledge’ might refer 
specifically to the understanding why certain actions are good⎯ultimately, because 
they realise eudaimonia⎯which is probably the only moral belief that never needs 
revision. Since phronesis implies the complete possession of this understanding, in 
the presence of which akrasia, as Aristotle claimed, cannot occur, the philosopher’s 
conclusion seems to show that only phronesis can prevent all varieties of akrasia, 
even the anger-related, impetuous kind. This is the difference that acquiring 
phronesis to complement fine habits, that is, moral virtue, can make to one’s acting. 
 In the conclusion of my thesis, I hope to be able to give Aristotle’s answer to the 
question of how to become morally virtuous⎯namely by becoming able to identify 
good actions, then habituating character, and finally by acquiring phronesis through 
study and experience. The first step in one’s moral development is to come to see 
how parents’ preventive habituation relates to the opinions of other people, thus 
acquiring synesis⎯the ability to identify good actions. With synesis, one may 
reliably identify good actions, without thereby having knowledge as to why they are 
good. Acquisition of synesis allows the moral learner, who is now about to step from 
childhood into youth, to become responsible for his character. He can rationally 
choose whether to act well or not⎯a choice that shall determine his adult character. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See e.g. Dahl 1980, Destreé 2006, Irwin 2007, and Charles 2009. 
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If the student chooses well, his character becomes good. This is the ground for 
developing moral virtue, which comes as a result of acquiring phronesis to 
complement the already finely-habituated character. The aim of phronesis is to 
provide an identification of synesis with an understanding of why certain actions are 
good: on account of realising eudaimonia. Since phronesis requires not only learning 
facts good actions and the nature of eudaimonia, but also experience in acting, 
developing it takes both education and experience. Aristotle considers acquiring 
phronesis⎯the step from having a finely-habituated character to attaining moral 
virtue⎯as the final step in moral development, because only phronesis can guarantee 
that an agent is not vulnerable to any variety of akrasia. As long as people lack the 
kyria episteme that phronesis brings, the prospect of pleasure, or, in the case of 
finely-habituated people, the impulse of anger can lead them to act against their 
commitment to acting well. Depending upon their habituation, some⎯akratics⎯are 
more prone to such impulses than others. However, a morally virtuous person does 
not have even any potential to morally fail, because he clearly understands, at any 
moment, that all bad actions prevent the realisation of the end of the natural desire 
for the human good: eudaimonia. Since achieving such moral understanding difficult 
in extreme, morally virtuous people are few and far between. But their exceptionality 










THE COGNITION OF GOOD ENDS  
 
In this Chapter, I defend an interpretation of Aristotle according to which the rational 
aspect of soul is needed in discerning which ends of desire would be good.22 I argue 
that since not every potential end that we can desire is good, we have to discern good 
ends, and rational discernment (krisis) is required for this task. Without rational 
discernment, ability to focus on certain perceptions, we could not distinguish truly 
good ends from possibly pleasant, but ultimately bad ends. Since antiquity, 
authoritative commentators of Aristotle, including Aspasius, have supported this, 
rationalist line of interpreting his theory of value cognition, and it enjoys wide 
support even today.23 The rationalist interpretation has, however, recently faced a 
novel challenge from Jessica Moss, against which it does not have yet received a 
defence.24 She attempts to renew a now disregarded anti-rationalist interpretation, 
which emerged in the late 19th century, but was subsequently disregarded and which 
claims, in contrast to the rationalist interpretation, that even discerning good ends 
may not involve the rational aspect of soul, but only the habituation of the opposite, 
non-rational aspect to take pleasure from realising such ends.25  
 The 19th century anti-rationalist interpreters, whose arguments I will review in the 
first part of this chapter, argued for the non-rationality of value cognition by 
appealing in particular to EN 2.4, in which Aristotle says that moral virtue does not 
require knowledge, and to EN 3.3, which claims that we do not deliberate about the 
ends of our desires, but only about the means to them. Certain passages in EN 6 and 
7, in which Aristotle assigns the task for providing us with good ends to moral virtue, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I use the rational aspect of soul as an umbrella term for Aristotle’s concepts of to dianoetikon, to 
logikon and their variations such as to logou echon and to noetikon.  
23 The earliest known rationalist interpreter of Aristotle is a 2nd-century commentator Aspasius (see fn. 
12 below), who is also the earliest known commentator of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. A recent 
version of the rationalist interpretation can be found e.g. in Irwin 2007, pp. 158–97.  
24 I discuss Moss 2011 and 2012 in this paper. She has since revised her interpretation (2014a), but the 
main objection that I present in this chapter applies even to this revised version (see fn. 91 below).  
25 This interpretation comes from Walter 1874, and was later expanded in Zeller 1894. 
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may seem to reinforce these claims. The main reason for the scant following of this 
traditional anti-rationalist interpretation among later interpreters is, however, that in 
EN 1.13 Aristotle divides the human soul into rational and non-rational aspects, and 
claims that the non-rational aspect⎯in particular, its ‘desiring element’26⎯must 
‘obey’ (peitharchei) reason so as to desire good ends.27 In EN 6.13, the philosopher 
adds that a person can be ‘good in the strict sense (agathos haplos)’28 if and only if 
he has the intellectual virtue of phronesis, which, as he states in EN 6.9, has access to 
the ‘the true conception’ of end. 29 These Aristotle’s statements, which seem to signal 
that moral virtue involves reason, and that the rational aspect must play a part in 
value cognition, have rendered the traditional anti-rationalist readings of EN 2.4, 3.3 
and the selected passages of EN 6 and 7 to seem incoherent to many interpreters.  
 Moss has, however, challenged the widely endorsed assumption that returning the 
ancient rationalist line of interpretation is the most plausible alternative to the 
incoherent anti-rationalist interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. 
Instead, she has suggested a novel version of the anti-rationalist interpretation, by 
arguing, on the basis of certain passages of DA 3, that insofar as representing the 
ends for desire is the task of phantasia, or, imagination⎯and since phantasia 
cognises those ends non-rationally, by imagining (phantazein) them as pleasant on 
the basis of one’s past pleasurable experiences about reaching certain ends⎯the 
discernment of good ends does not presuppose reason.30 Habituation to realise good 
ends, so that one comes to enjoy from only imagining realising such ends, suffices 
for discerning which ends of desire are good. In value cognition, the task of the 
rational aspect of soul might only be to conceptualise pleasurable mental images 
(phantasmata) of ends: to label them as ‘good’ so as to enable us to use them in 
moral deliberation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 EN 1.13 1102b30 (R). Translated by Ross 1995. In the subsequent footnotes, Ross is abbreviated as 
(R) and another translation of EN that I use, Bartlett and Collins 2009, as (B&C). If the translation is 
my own, there is no abbreviation. Whether I quote from (R) or (B&C) or use my own translation is 
determined by the accuracy and readability of either translation.  
27 EN 1.13 1102b26. 
28 EN 6.13 1144b30 (R).  
29 EN  1142b33. For more discussion about Aristotle’s statement, see fn. 22 below.  
30 See section 1.2 below for references to Moss 2011 and 2012.  
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 I will study Moss’ challenge in the second part of the chapter, concentrating on 
her interpretation about phantasia as exclusively non-rational ability to cognise good 
ends, and on how that interpretation relates to the received interpretation of 
phantasia, according to which it is a capacity that entirely belongs neither to the 
rational nor to the non-rational aspect of the soul. In the third part, I will attempt to 
show a way for the rationalist line of interpretation to address her arguments. I 
believe Moss overlooks some serious problems to which her interpretation is 
susceptible, but which the rationalist interpretation can avoid, while, however, also 
providing us with a tried and tested account of Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. 
   
1.1 RATIONALIST INTERPRETATION 
Aristotle states that our desires are aimed at two types of ends: ‘[s]ome (ends) are 
activities (energeiai) others products apart from the activities that produce them’.31 
Only the former types can be said to be good without introducing any further 
qualifications, because ‘where there are ends apart from actions (praxeis), it is the 
nature of the product to be better than the activities.’32 For the activities undertaken 
only in order to gain a certain product (e.g. a flute, pleasure, money or honour) can 
be good only insofar as they help in bringing about that product, whereas only an 
activity, or, action (praxis) undertaken (also) for its own sake can be good as such. 
Since Aristotle also thinks that people do not need to use reason to pursue pleasure, 
at least⎯for non-rational animals can have this pursuit, too33⎯we do not need to ask 
if discerning the latter types of ends must involve the rational part of soul. However, 
the question is pertinent with the former types, as Aristotle nowhere explicitly states 
if it is needed in discerning an end as unqualifiedly good (agathos haplos). 
According to the rationalist interpretation, the philosopher’s position is, however, 
that discerning ends as unqualifiedly good⎯henceforth simply ‘good ends’⎯must 
require reason. This interpretation has ancient origins: for example, the earliest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 EN 1.1 1094a3–4 (R). 
32 Ibid. 4-5 (R). 
33 See e.g. EN 1.4 1095b13–20. 
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known commentator to EN, Aspasius, endorses it.34 The interpretation begins from 
EN 1.13, in which Aristotle claims that human soul is divisible into two aspects, 
rational and non-rational: ‘one aspect of [soul] is non-rational (alogon), another has 
reason (logos)’ and ‘reason […] exhorts [people] towards the best’.35 If the rational 
aspect desires on the basis of cognising value⎯discerning what is the best⎯then the 
non-rational aspect may not, and this can constitute the difference between the two 
aspects. The non-rational aspect is further divisible into purely vegetative pursuits 
and the desire that can be affected by the value cognition of the rational aspect.36 The 
desire that can be so affected (epithumia)⎯which I will simply call ‘non-rational 
desire’ from now on⎯has to characteristically do ‘with what is pleasant or painful’, 
as Aristotle specifies in EN 3.2, ‘unlike choice of good action (prohairesis)’ that 
results from the desire of the rational aspect (boulesis).37 As the cognition of value is 
thus not about pleasure, and non-rational desire is concerned especially with 
pleasure, it seems that good ends cannot be discerned without the activity of the 
rational aspect. Aristotle adds to this, in EN 1.13, that although the desire of the non-
rational aspect can be guided by the rational aspect, it nevertheless tends to ‘strain 
against’ the dictates of the rational aspect.38 Hence he must also hold that we can 
desire an end that we discern as good with our rational abilities independently of 
whether we anticipate that pursuing will be pleasant or not. 
If this interpretation is right, Aristotle’s division of human desires on the basis of 
their ends⎯excluding those desires that are only for the products of actions and the 
vegetative desires that bear no relation to value cognition⎯turns out to be as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See e.g. Aspasius, Comm. 40:5-15 (ad EN 2.2 1103b31-1104b3) for an explicit endorsement: even 
with virtuous people, it is the task of reason to say ‘that this must be done and that this must not be 
done’ and to justify why (alluding to Aristotle’s distinction between to hoti and dioti in EN 1.4). 
Aspasius comments to EN 1.13 (36:1-5) that in virtuous people, “the desiring and emotive part is said 
to partake in reason in that it ‘is heeding of it’ (cit. EN 1.13 1102b31), just as we also say that we take 
a certain account of our father.” According to Aspasius’ interpretation, we thus seem to require input 
of the rational part to discern good actions, to justify them, and even to be motivated to perform them.   
35 EN 1.13 1102a27–b18. 
36 Aristotle writes in EN 1.13 1102a31–1102b12 that we have non-rational vegetative desires of 
nutrition and growth that ‘are mostly displayed in sleep’ (i.e. that cannot be affected by value 
cognition) and do not differ between good and bad people. Therefore Aristotle concludes that we 
should ‘let them be’ while discussing virtue. Aristotle distinguishes them the desires that are non-
rational, but which can be affected by reason (logos) in 1102b13-14. 
37 EN 3.2 1111b17.  
38 EN 1.13 1102b21.  
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Rational desire (boulesis): Desiring to phi by discerning the goodness of phi-ing  
Non-rational desire (epithumia): Desiring to phi by anticipating (typically) the 
pleasure of phi-ing (there are probably also some other non-rational ends apart from 
pleasure, but Aristotle does not openly speak of them in EN 1.13, because for him, 
the desire of sensual pleasure is the principal opponent of rational desire39).  
Although Aristotle thinks that, provided that phi-ing is good, it should also feel 
pleasant,40 he also concedes that the two above desires are often directed to different 
ends. As he argues in EN 1.7 and 10.7, the best human end (to telos), the completion 
of which achieving any other good end (such as receiving rightful honours, just 
financial rewards, proper pleasures or constructing good flutes) advances, is the life 
of acting well in which contemplation has a central role, or, eudaimonia.41 Because 
the best end towards which reason exhorts us is thus highly abstract, pursuing it may 
not feel immediately pleasant, unlike the pursuit of some other ends, such as those of 
eating or drinking, which may not, however, help in realising eudaimonia, provided 
that they are excessive (or sometimes defective, see Aristotle’s famous doctrine of 
mean in EN 2.6). The conflict between the immediate pleasure of excesses and ends 
that bring us closer to eudaimonia is the source of our non-rational desire often 
straining against the rational one. Habituation to enjoy pursuing ends that advance 
eudaimonia should make acting well feel more and more immediately pleasant, 
eventually surpassing all excessive pleasures.42 However, only habituation does not 
suffice for virtue. In EN 6.13, Aristotle concludes that for this, also reason is needed: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Cf. EN 2.9 1109b7-8, in which Aristotle states we are the most inclined to go into excesses with 
regard to pleasure, and thus we should primarily guard ourselves against inappropriate pleasures. 
40 EN 10.5 1175a29 (B&C): ‘[F]or the pleasure proper to the activity helps increase it: those who 
engage in an activity with pleasure judge each particular better and are more precise about it. For 
example, those who delight in practicing geometry become skilled geometers […] and each of the rest 
will advance in their respective work because they delight in it’. Aristotle continues by arguing that 
enjoying good activities also makes those activities more permanent and better overall. 
41 See EN 1.7 1098a13–1 and 10.7.  
42 See e.g. EN 2.3 1104b3–13 (R): ‘[…] virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account 
of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from good ones. 
Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as 
to both delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought, this is the right education’. Similar 
statements can be found in, e.g., EN 3.12 1119b13ff and EN 10.9 1179a26–31. 
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Virtue is not only a characteristic that is in accord with right reason (kata ton orthon logon), but also 
the one that involves the right reason (meta tou orthou logou). […] It is clear, then, on the basis of 
what has been said, that it is neither possible to be properly virtuous (kyrios agathos) without practical 
reason (phronesis), nor it is possible to have phronesis without the moral virtue.43 
 
Because proper virtue (kyria arête) is acting that is not only in accordance with, but 
also involves the right reason (orthos logos), acquiring it is not only a matter of 
habituation to enjoy acting well⎯for example, abstaining from eating or drinking too 
much⎯until one immediately begins to enjoy this way of acting. This would be 
acting only in accordance with the right reason. Rather, proper virtue is acting well, 
because such acting brings about eudaimonia, not only insofar it would bring about 
pleasure.44 In order to act from the right reason, one needs, as Aristotle reminds in 
EN 6, to develop the intellectual virtue of phronesis, which has cognitive access to 
this ‘true conception of end’,45 and commands us to act on the basis of it.46 The same 
requirement is visible in the above conclusion of EN 6.13, that one does not have 
phronesis unless one is properly virtuous, acts kata ton orthon logon, and vice versa. 
 The above lessons drawn from EN 1.13 and 6.13 seem to imply that one cannot 
learn to pursue the that are good without qualification by habituation only, or without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 EN 6.13 1144b25–32. 
44 See EN 2.4 1105a29–b5 and EN 4.1 1120a23–4, in which Aristotle says that a virtuous person 
performs good actions because they are kala, or, noble. Since he also thinks that the human good 
consists in acting well⎯in EN 1.4 1095a19–20⎯it is generally accepted (and argued more extensively 
for by, e.g., Achtenberg 2002, pp. 8–9, and Irwin 2007, p. 207) that to kalon refers to the human good 
in this context. Aristotle also identifies the human good with the ‘noblest thing’ in EN 1.8 1099a24.  
45 In EN 6.10 1142b30-33, Aristotle writes: ‘if then, it is characteristic of phronimoi to have 
deliberated well, good deliberation (euboulia) will be correctness with regard to the means (pros) to 
the end (to telos), of which phronesis is the true conception (hypolepsis).’ The grammar of this passage 
permits that phronesis could be a true conception of either (1) ‘the end’ or (2) ‘the means to the end,’ It 
may seem that option (1) (adopted by Aquinas, Comm. ad loc., and later by Bostock 2000, p. 85, and 
Price 2011, p. 227) would allow us to make the passage to cohere with Aristotle’s specification in EN 
6.12 that phronesis is concerned with good ends, unlike cleverness (deinotes), which is only concerned 
with the means to various ends (see Berti 2008b, p. 49). The interpretative option (2) (formulated by 
Walter 1874, pp. 470-2, and later adopted by Aubenque 1965) might thus seem conflate phronesis with 
deinotes. I think, however, that we should not accept the option (1) to avoid the conflation, because 
there are also passages in EN 6 that preclude phronesis from grasping the end (EN 6.12 1144a7-9 and 
EN 6.13 1145a5-7, quoted on p. 24 below). Since in order to select the correct means to the end, 
phronesis has, however, to be nevertheless aware of the end, some faculty other than it has to provide 
it with the correct conception of the end (see Natali 2014, p. 194). The interpretative option (2) allows 
this, and can be specified to avoid conflating phronesis with deinotes. If only phronesis has cognitive 
access to the true conception of the end, only it enables one to deliberate well about how to bring about 
eudaimonia. Deinotes can be correct deliberation about how to realise ends other than eudaimonia. 
46 In EN 6.13 1144b28, Aristotle identifies phronesis with the right reason (orthos logos) and in EN 
6.10 1143a8–9, the philosopher tells us that phronesis issues commands (epitaktikon estin). 
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discerning that those ends are good⎯which requires phronesis. Many recent 
rationalist interpreters⎯e.g. John Cooper, Norman Dahl and Terence Irwin47⎯have 
given their support for this interpretation on the basis of these conclusions. The anti-
rationalist interpretation, introduced in the 19th century as an alternative to this 
ancient line, first by Julius Walter and then in an expanded form by Eduard Zeller,48 
has proved to be less enduring; as far as I know, no recent interpreter had endorsed it 
until Moss. The anti-rationalist interpretation, as presented by these scholars, is 
centred in EN 2.4, 3.3 and some passages in EN 6 and 7, which may indeed seem to 
present Aristotle as thinking that discerning good ends does not have to involve the 
rational aspect of soul. Let me quote those passages and show how an anti-rationalist 
reads them, and then how the rationalist interpreters could address these readings.  
 In EN 2.4, Aristotle, after remarking that acting well is not yet proper virtue, 
because we only become virtuous by acting well, lists the additional conditions of 
being a virtuous person. Someone is virtuous only if he, in addition to acting well: 
 
First, acts knowingly (proton men ean eidos), second, if he acts by choosing and by choosing the 
actions in question for themselves; and third, if he acts while being in a steady and unwavering state. 
But, when it comes to virtues, knowledge (eidos) has no, or little, force, whereas the other two 
conditions amount to not a small part of but rather the whole affair⎯the conditions that are in fact met 
as a result of doing just and temperate things many times.49  
 
If acting knowingly is unimportant for moral virtue, as Aristotle seems to say above, 
and if we become virtuous only through habituation, by coming to enjoy acting well, 
then it may seem that discerning good ends does not require having any conception 
of end, the acquisition of which⎯at least the correct one⎯presupposes reason. 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Cooper 1975, Dahl 1984, Irwin 2007. 
48 Walter 1874, Zeller 1896. 
49 EN 2.4 1105a29–b5 (B & C, ‘moderate’ replaced with ‘temperate’). 
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We deliberate not about ends but about the things towards (pros) ends (tele). For a doctor does not 
deliberate (boulein) whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman 
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his end. They put in 
place the end (themenoi to telos) and consider how and by what things the end is to be attained.50  
 
In above passage, Aristotle claims that just as doctors do not deliberate whether to 
heal or not, so it could be that we do not deliberate (boulein) about whether to pursue 
some good end or not, but we put our ends in proper places in some other way. The 
following passages in EN 6 and 7 clarify that it is neither phronesis nor even logos, 
but moral virtue that correctly discerns which potential ends of desire would be good: 
 
Virtue makes the end correct, phronesis the means to the end.51  
Choice (prohairesis) is not right without either phronesis or virtue: for the one makes us [to have] the 
[correct] end, and the other [to have] the [correct] means to it. 52 
It is not that reason (logos) is teaching about (didaskalikos) the starting-points, but either natural or 
habituated virtue teaches the right belief (tou orthodoxein) about the starting-point.53  
 
The anti-rationalist interpreters have traditionally taken the above claims of EN 3.3, 6 
and EE to imply together that habituated or natural virtue, instead of the rational 
aspect of soul, puts in place our ends, and at most we can use our phronesis to 
deliberate how to realise them. As Zeller famously concludes, ‘the natural basis of 
insight [phronesis] is the intellectual acuteness that enables us to find and apply 
proper means to a given end.’54 Hence it may seem that we do not need the activity 
of the rational aspect to discern good ends, but only to calculate how to realise them.  
 The problem with this interpretation, however, that none of the passages quoted 
above are incompatible the rationalist interpretation in the end. The passage of EN 
2.4 only denies the importance of one’s knowledge being eidos, or, form, for moral 
virtue. Even the rational discernment of good ends would not, however, involve 
eidos in any case, because, as Aristotle has explained in EN 1.6, that (even) things 
that are good in themselves (e.g. ‘phronesis, sight, certain pleasures and honour’) do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 EN 3.3 1112b12–16. 
51 EN 6.12 1144a7-9. 
52 EN 6.13 1145a5-7. 
53 EN 7.8 1151a17-19. 
54 Zeller 1894, p. 186.  
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not seem to have any common eidos that could account for their goodness.55 
Likewise, the passage EN 3.3 claims only that we do not deliberate (buolein) whether 
to pursue a certain end or not⎯a view with which many rationalist interpreters 
agree56⎯for Aristotle’s words, which leave open what puts our ends in place, does 
not preclude the rational aspect of our souls from discerning (krinein) good ends. 
Neither do the quoted passages from EN 6 and 7. Moral virtue can make the end 
correct, and not phronesis that has only a cognitive access to the end, but this does 
not amount to denying moral virtue from being rational. For virtue has a rational 
element even if we subtract phronesis from it: apart from this, deliberative reason, 
we have also another type of reason, nous. Aristotle claims in EN 6.11 that ‘[what 
discerns] both the first principles [i.e. the end] and the last things is nous.’57 The 
discernment of the end (krisis) by nous does not need deliberation; on the contrary, 
Aristotle speaks of it in DA as if such krisis were analogous to visual perception 
instead.58 Nous seems to be thus akin to intuitive reason.59 Hence the philosopher’s 
claim about virtue, and not phronesis making the end correct can only imply what it 
explicitly says, that phronesis is unessential for this task, not that also nous must be. 
 We can now see that the passages of EN that may initially seem to support the 
anti-rationalist interpretation are compatible with the rationalist interpretation. Since 
the former seems, however, unable to accommodate those Aristotle’s passages, in EN 
1.13 and 6.13, that seem to imply that discerning the good ends, and moral virtue as 
whole, presuppose rational abilities, the rationalist interpretation prevails today. 
 
1.2 MOSS’ ANTI-RATIONALIST CHALLENGE 
In her 2012 book, Aristotle and the Apparent Good, and in a paper published in 
2011, Jessica Moss has, however, challenged the conclusion that Aristotle must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 EN 1.6 1096b16-26. Aristotle uses the concepts of eidos and idea interchangeably in this passage. 
56 See e.g. Bowditch 2008, pp. 326–336 and Reeve 2013, p. 11. 
57 EN 6.11 I143a35-1143b1. This passage is discussed on pp. 45-6 below. 
58 See DA 3.3 427a19–22, the passage is quoted on p. 15 below. 
59 Cf. Aristotle contrasting nous and phronesis in EN 6.5 1142a24-31: ‘phronesis is concerned with the 
ultimate particular, since actions are of this nature’, but ‘nous is of the definitions.’ In order to reach a 
definition, also nous needs, however, grasp the last thing (see I143a35-1143b1 and pp. 45-6), just as 
phronesis has to have a cognitive access to the concept of the good in order to deliberate about actions.  
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rationalist on account of his views in EN 1.13 and 6.13. She suggests that Aristotle 
might only mean that reason is necessary for the pursuit of good ends⎯at least 
concepts, the use and formation of which requires reason, ‘help us determine the 
contents of our perceptions’⎯but nevertheless think that moral virtue does not 
presuppose the use of reason in discerning good ends as such.60 According to Moss, 
Aristotle can think that ‘we want our ends, because we find them good,’ but this does 
not have to mean that they are ‘what we rationally judge good.’61 So far, the anti-
rationalist interpretation, which did not recognise that these two views could be 
separated, that discerning a good end could be non-rational, while determining that 
the end is good require reason, has simply not looked for evidence in the right places. 
Moss thinks that evidence for Aristotle’s anti-rationalism is to be found especially in 
DA 3, in which the philosopher discusses phantasia, often translated as imagination.  
 Until now, most interpreters of Aristotle’s theory of moral cognition seem to have 
regarded phantasia as a cognitive capacity that cannot be classified as being entirely 
either rational or non-rational.62 According to current mainstream interpretation, one 
task of phantasia is to enable us to imagine the ends of desire, which is necessary for 
any kind of desiring. For in order to desire anything, we have to be able to imagine 
what would the realising the end of our desire be like: honourable, pleasant etc.63 
Aristotle thus writes in DMA: ‘phantasia suitably prepares desire; and phantasia 
arises through nous or through perception (aesthesis).’64 Now, imagining an end of 
desire (phantasma), call it x, the mainstream interpretation takes the philosopher’s 
statement to tell, requires either only perception (e.g. smelling a pleasant smell, 
seeing x emitting it), and at some other times also nous (e.g. discerning x as the best 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Moss 2012, p. 40. Moss does not clarify here what ‘determination’ of the contents of perception 
means. As we see on pp. 30 below, she must, however, mean determining our perceptions with certain 
concepts – making it explicit in words that ‘what I see is a good end (or ‘rose’ as on p. 30).’ 
61 Moss 2012, p. 158. 
62 Aristotle may seem to claim so in DA 3.9 432a27-b1: ‘we shall find parts [of soul] […] which 
cannot be classified as either rational or irrational […] (such as) the imaginative […]. However, he 
also adds (b2) ‘it is very difficult to say with which of the other [parts of soul] it is the same or not the 
same’, so his claim is not decisive. In the same context, he also says that bipartite division of soul is 
insufficient to describe the soul, because there are (a24) “in a sense infinity of parts.” Cf. EN 1.13 (see 
section 1.1 above), in which Aristotle seems, however, to agree with the bipartite division. 
63 E.g. Caston 1996, p. 42, Lorenz 2009, pp. 119–22 and Polansky 2007 ad loc. DA 3.9 428b10–429a9, 
in which Aristotle defines phantasia as that which enables motion on the basis of perception. 
64 DMA 702a18–19. 
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end to pursue among many possibilities). The discernment of good ends 
presupposes the rational aspect of soul not only according to the passage of EN 6.11, 
quoted on p. 10 above. Also in DA 3.11, Aristotle writes that rational (logistike) 
phantasia is necessary for this purpose, precisely for ‘measuring by one standard, for 
one pursues the superior [of various possible ends],’ and because such a measuring is 
needed ‘so that [we] are able to pick one [phantasma] from many possible 
phantasmata,’ 65  While perceptual (aisthetike) phantasia belongs to all animals 
capable of moving themselves on the basis of sense perception,66 the rational 
phantasia belongs exclusively to humans, for only their souls have rational aspect. 
Since human phantasia can thus involve either only sense perception or also the 
activity of the rational aspect of soul, it cannot be exclusively classified, according to 
the mainstream interpretation, as entirely either non-rational or rational faculty.  
Moss thinks, however, that there is an alternative to this interpretation. She points 
out that Aristotle states, for example, in EN 3.4, ‘without qualification and in truth 
the object of [rational desire] is the good, but for each person it is the apparent 
good.’67 As Aristotle seems to contrast here the object of rational desire with the 
apparent good, the apparent good (to phainomenon agathon) must refer the object of 
our perceptual, non-rational phantasia. Hence his statement may imply that everyone 
desires what she non-rationally perceives as good.68 In EE 7.2, Aristotle, Moss points 
out, elaborates his view and explains how we can non-rationally perceive good ends: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 DA 3.11 434a7–10. The passage is also quoted by Lorenz 2009, p. 122, to establish a similar point. 
His translations is that rational phantasia occurs ‘in animals capable of reasoning: for the decision 
whether to do this or that is already a task for reasoning; and one must measure by a single standard; 
for one pursues what is superior; hence one has the ability to make one out of many phantasmata.’ 
66 See for example DA 3.10 433b27-30 and 433b31-434a4, DA 2.2 413b21-3 cf. DA 3.10 428a10ff, in 
which Aristotle states, however, that ‘ants, bees or grubs’ do not have phantasia. 
67 EN 3.4 1113a23-4, also MA 700b23-9. Quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 4. 
68Moss 2012, p. 4. Cf. EN 3.5 1114b14 (R) ‘to both mean alike, the good and the bad, the end [good] 
appears and is fixed by nature.’ This claim may seem to support Moss, because if good is ‘fixed by 
nature,’ how could it be the object of rational desire? However, as usual, Aristotle adds a qualification 
to his claim: even if the way in which good appears to us were fixed by our nature, ‘it is by being 
persons of certain kind that we assume the end to be so and so’, and it depends on rational choice what 
kind of persons we are, i.e. whether our nature becomes oriented towards good or evil (1114a3-21). 
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The object of desire is either the good or the apparent good. And this is why the pleasant is an object 
of desire, for it is an apparent good, for some believe it is [good] and for some it appears [good] 
although they do not believe so. For phantasia and belief are not in the same part of the soul.69  
 
Provided that everyone desires what appears to them as good, the first sentence of 
this passage cannot mean (pace the rationalist interpreters) that we can sometimes 
desire only the true good, regardless of what our phantasia represents as good. 
Rather, it must only mean, as Moss argues, that apparent good⎯the end of our non-
rational desire⎯either or not corresponds with what we rationally discern to be a 
good end.70 The second sentence of the passage adds pleasure is the end of our non-
rational desire. Therefore pleasure is the apparent good.71 If something is not 
pleasant for us, it cannot appear as good for us, although we do not of course believe 
that everything that may appear as pleasant for us is good.72 Aristotle concludes the 
passage by stating that this disparity between belief and phantasia about the good is 
due to phantasia and belief residing not in the same part of human soul. Although 
Aristotle discusses also rational phantasia in DA 3.10, this discussion⎯since we 
have seen that all desire is based on perceptual phantasia⎯suggests Moss, can be 
only a description for certain ‘use which rational creatures can put the products of 
perceptual phantasia’, that is, referring to non-rational appearances in deliberation.73  
 Phantasia may seem, however, not only separate from the rational aspect of soul, 
but also opposed to it, just like the non-rational aspect is.74 For example, according to 
DA 3.10 ‘[m]any men their phantasia contrary to their knowledge, and in all other 
animals there is no thinking (nous) or calculation but only (alla) phantasia’75 On 
Moss’ view, instead of being outside the division of the aspects of soul, as we have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 EE 7.2 1235b26-29. Quoted by Moss 2012, on p. xi, 6, 8, 30, 36 fn. 2 and 48.  
Since this passage is from EE, and there seems to be no corresponding views presented in EN, one may 
reasonably doubt, however, whether the passage presents Aristotle’s final view about the issue. 
70 Moss 2012, p. ix. Cf. DA 3.10 433a27: ‘the object [of our non-rational desire] may be either the real 
or apparent good.’ Since non-rational desire is incapable of desiring the real good (eudaimonia) as 
such, this passage may be taken to signal, in favour of Moss, that Aristotle wants to establish only 
correspondence, that the real good can correspond with what appears good for our non-rational desire.  
71 Ibid., p. 30 and 36 fn. 2. 
72 See Moss 2012, pp. 106-112, in which Moss discusses illusionary phantasmata. 
73 Moss 2012, p. 146. 
74 Cf. EN 1.13 1102b21. 
75 DA 3.10 433a10-12. As quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 16 and 138. 
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seen the mainstream interpretation to claim, this passage shows that phantasia and 
reason are ‘mutually exclusive.’76 She also concludes that phantasia must be within 
the non-rational aspect of soul.77 Moss’ conclusion might seem right in the light of 
the previous quotation: if phantasia were outside Aristotle’s division of soul, then the 
philosopher would not have presumably described phantasia as if it were opposed to 
the rational aspect of soul, able to stimulate people to act against their knowledge. 
Provided that we thus take phantasia to belong to non-rational aspect of soul, as 
Moss advices, and since phantasia represents the ends of desires, then the ends of 
even our rational desires, good ends, would be perceived by the non-rational aspect 
of our soul, not by a faculty that is outside Aristotle’s division of soul.78  
 The apparently anti-rationalist passage of EN 3.3, claiming that we do not 
deliberate about our ends, and the passages of EN 6 and 7.8 that also preclude 
phronesis from setting them, support this conclusion. The conclusion would permit 
that good actions do not need to be performed in the knowledge (eidos) of their end, 
as Aristotle states in EN 2.4, for that end would now be a non-rational representation. 
Moss attempts, however, to show that apart from these passages traditionally cited by 
anti-rationalists, her interpretation, unlike the previous anti-rationalist interpretations, 
enables us to read also EN 1.13 and 6.13 anti-rationalistically, thus making the anti-
rationalist interpretation an overall plausible alternative to the rationalist one.  
 Before we can proceed to assessing Moss’ alternative readings of those passages, 
we need to clarify, however, what she thinks moral discernment (krisis) is. Moss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 According to Moss 2012, p. 138, DA 3.10 433a10-12 shows that ‘phantasia and intellect’ are 
‘mutually exclusive’. On p. 16, Moss argues the quoted passage (together with DA 3.10 4333a9 and 
b11) to show in addition that ‘desire moves [one to act] with the aid either of intellect or phantasia’ 
and ‘phantasia plays role roughly parallel to that of intellect’ in motivating action.  
77 See Moss 2012, pp. 64-6. For a more condensed and explicit account, see Moss 2011, p. 252. 
Although DA 3.10 433a10-12, as interpreted by Moss 2012 (see fn. 54 above), could have justified this 
claim, Moss 2011 does not cite it. Instead, she claims (p. 252, in fn.) that ‘for an outright equation of 
the ethical works’ non-rational passionate part with the perceptive and phantastic part of the 
psychological works see EE 2.1 1219b23.’ However, unlike DA 3.10 433a9-12, this passage does not 
clearly equate the non-rational part and phantasia: ‘for in sleep the vegetative part is more active, 
while the perceptive and appetitive are incomplete.’ For Aristotle does not say that ‘the perceptive’ and 
‘appetitive’ are the same part, but speaks of them in plural, thus possibly denoting different parts.  
78 Cf. DA 3.11 434a8–10 quoted on pp. 26-7 above. The passage does not, however, have to contradict 
Moss’ claim, because in it Aristotle does not exactly argue that ‘discerning one from many 
phantasmata’ could not be entirely motivated by non-rational phantasia, e.g. by receiving a supremely 
intense pleasure from focusing on just one particular phantasma among various phantasmata. 
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argues that we perceive good ends through pleasant sensations⎯we do not discern 
them⎯but we cannot simply perceive which potential pleasure-inducing phantasma 
is ‘the superior [of various pursuable ends], because that task requires picking out 
one perception from many, discerning it. In received interpretative use, choosing the 
end that one should pursue means bringing particular discernments under the general 
concept of good⎯building practical syllogisms such as in EN 7.3: ‘dry foods are 
good for men’; ‘I am a man’; ‘this food is dry’; therefore ‘this food is good for me’. 
Moss proposes, however, that although we of course can build syllogisms to discern 
good ends on the basis of our value perceptions, we do not have to do so,79 because 
non-rational phantasia, if it were only properly habituated, could receive perceptions 
in a way that already entails discerning of their value in relation to one another. 80   
 In the beginning of her 2012 book⎯before presenting her above proposal about 
the power of habituation to enhance the perception (aisthesis) of good ends into the 
discernment (krisis) of the most valuable available end⎯Moss focuses on Aristotle’s 
statement in DA 3.3 that ‘thinking (noein) and understanding (phronein) seem to be 
just like having a perception (aesthesis) of something, for in both cases the soul 
discerns (krinein) and recognizes something of the things that are’.81 Moss takes this 
brief statement to announce that, since even perceptions, which do not presuppose 
reason, because even non-rational animals have them, can be discernments (kriseis), 
discernments can be non-rational. ’There is’, states Moss, ‘nothing specially rational 
or intellectual about [krisis]: even a simple animal who lacks any mental powers 
more sophisticated than sense of touch counts as [discerner].’82 Or, as Moss put the 
same point in her 2011 article, since focusing on certain perceptions such as 
sensations of touch ‘is ‘available to animals as well as to people,’ making even 
discernments must also be available ‘to the non-rational part of human soul’.83 
Aristotle may seem to validate Moss’ views in DMA, in which he briefly remarks 
‘both phantasia and perception (aesthesis) hold the same place as nous, for all are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 For this particular claim, see Moss 2009, pp. 145–6. 
80 Moss 2012, p. 21.  
81 DA 3.3 427a19–22. As quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 3. Cf. 432a16 and DMA 700b17–20. 
82 Moss 2012, p. 3. 
83 Moss 2011, p. 252.  
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kritika’.84 Non-rational animals cannot of course learn concepts, which limits their 
discernments to the sources of certain sensations; but once we have learned a 
concept, for example, ‘rose’, Moss assumes, we can discern objects that cause certain 
familiar sensual perceptions for us (i.e. have certain shape, smell and colour) also as 
roses without each time conceptually determining that each such object is a rose.85  
 If we can discern, for example, roses on the basis of our memorized perceptions, 
without having the relevant concept always in mind, phantasia might equally allow 
discerning an end that cause certain familiar perceptions as good without necessarly 
attending to the concept of good, and hence without ‘thinking or understanding,’ i.e. 
the activity of the rational aspect of soul, being required for the task. Moss points out 
that, in the already quoted passage of DA 3.11, Aristotle states that humans are ‘able 
to pick one [phantasma] from many possible phantasmata.’ According to her, this 
implies that phantasia enables us to ‘synthesise a single image which represents one 
option as overall best’ from the various perceptions that we have memorised.86  
 Even if we could discern what is the ‘overall best’ with phantasia, considering 
value discernment as analogous to discerning roses, or any animal discernment, and 
therefore non-rational, would need, however, a further justification. While many 
animals can discern the sources of sensuous pleasure, and virtually every person with 
a healthy sense of sight and memory can discern roses, this is not the case with good 
ends. Discerning those ends, Aristotle says in EN 2.8, is ‘not for everyone nor it is 
easy.’87 According to EN 3.4, ‘a (morally) virtuous person discerns each thing (i.e. 
good end) rightly, and in each case the truth appears to (phainetai) him.’ Apparently, 
only a virtuous person discerns them rightly, ‘for distinctive things’, the philosopher 
continues, ‘are noble (kala) and pleasant according to (kata) each disposition.’88  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 DMA 700b20-21. As quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 10. 
85 Moss 2012, p. 40.  
86 Ibid. p. 148 Moss does not unfortunately explain how this process takes place.  
87 EN 2.8 1109a28-9. 
88 EN 3.4 1113a29–32. Moss (2011) presents her interpretation of the passage on p. 25: ‘If the virtuous 
person’s ability to perceive facts about value [moral cognition] is a matter of being pleased and pained 
in the right ways, or admiring and being disgusted by the right things [as the passage says], then this 
perception [moral cognition] is an operation of non-rational cognition’. Her 2012 book lists several 
additional passages in favour of this conclusion (pp.160-1), but this passage is her main support. 
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 Aristotle’s above conclusions may encourage a rationalist interpreter to argue 
that learning to discern good ends is ‘not for everyone’, because it must require some 
intellectual education, even if many other kinds of discernments would not. Moss can 
justify, however, her interpretation against such an argument. If the accuracy of 
discerning an end as good depends upon the sensations of pleasure that imagining 
(phantazein) it gives to a virtuous person, then most people could not reliably discern 
good ends on their own even if they had learned what is good for humans. Non-
virtuous people’s phantasia, as DA 3.10 tells us, is prone to mistakes, probably, 
because they only have not been habituated to enjoy performing the actions that 
contribute to the human good. ‘The road [to unqualifiedly good ends]’, writes 
Aristotle in EE 7.2, is ‘through pleasure: it is necessary for fine (kala) things to be 
pleasant.’89 In EN, he confirms this, argues Moss, for example, by writing that ‘the 
whole affair both in virtue and in the political art is about pleasures (hedone) and 
pains.’90 In these passages, Aristotle, according to Moss, does not claim as if coming 
to enjoy acting well would only help one in achieving moral virtue together with 
intellectual education⎯as a rationalist interpreter might like to say⎯but rather as if 
it would suffice for the task.91 Habituation gets us to associate acting well with 
experiences of pleasure, the memorising of which allows us imagine the pleasure 
ensuing from a certain virtuous action, having a pleasurable phantasma about a good 
end. And having such a phantasma, we have seen Moss to argue, is discerning the 
end as good. The rational aspect of soul has no role to play in value cognition. 
 Moss’ interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of value cognition thus implies that one 
can become able to discern which ends are good through only being habituated to 
enjoy acting well. If imagining a certain action produces pleasure to a well-
habituated, i.e., virtuous, person, then that action must be a good end. Since her 
interpretation, thinks Moss, holds true with any good action, we can now attempt test 
it with the kind of action that one could think as the most obvious counterexample to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 EE 7.2 1237a6-7, as quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 202. 
90 EN 2.3 115a10-12, as quoted by Moss, ibid.  
91 Ibid. However, the passages do not have to be read as making such a claim. They can also be read as 
only rhetorically stressing (for they employ rhetorical language) that learning to derive pleasure from 
acting well is essential for becoming virtuous, without excluding the need for rational development. 
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it: a heroically courageous action. According to Moss’ conception, even a heroic 
warrior, thanks to his habituated character, can discern that fighting until death in a 
battle is a good end only by having sensations of pleasure while imagining such a 
heroic death. Since acting well can often be physically painful⎯extremely so in this 
case⎯the pleasure that a virtuous warrior derives from imagining it relies on the 
synthesising ability of his phantasia to pick one possible course of action as the 
‘best’ among the perceptions that he has memorised. Even if also non-virtuous 
warrior could somehow imagine that a heroic death may, e.g., contribute to the future 
eudaimonia of his polis and is thus the best course of action available etc.,92 this 
awareness⎯since he is not habituated to derive sufficient pleasure from acting well, 
and thus from imagining herself engaged in such acting in difficult situations 
neither⎯would not suffice to drive her to prefer heroic death over running away.  
 Despite Moss’ interpretation seems to be able to provide a conceivable account of 
even heroically courageous acting, it might, however, still be difficult to conceive 
how perceiving an end as pleasant could be the same as discerning a good end⎯or, 
even, how perceiving a certain shape and colour could be the same as discerning a 
rose etc. One might think there is a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in any such an equation.93 
However, even if Aristotle did not consider it important to elucidate this matter any 
further, it would nevertheless be good news for anti-rationalist interpreters if the 
philosopher simply thought that good ends could be discerned non-rationally, as 
Moss reads him in DA 3. They could admit, as Moss does, that ‘[c]ertainly, Aristotle 
holds […] that we want our ends because we find them good’,94 and specify that the 
non-rational aspect of the soul, insofar as phantasia is non-rational, discerns their 
goodness in imagined pleasure. Hence they could hold that discerning good ends 
does not require the activity of the rational aspect of soul, provided that they could, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Kraut 1990, p. 122, thinks this is Aristotle’s justification for the virtuousness of a heroic death.  
93 One may of course also think that there is naturalistic fallacy⎯an equation of the good with natural 
features that cannot be shown to be synonymous to it⎯in Aristotle’s thinking in any case: even if he 
would not equate pleasure with the good, he would nevertheless equate eudaimonia with it. However, 
unlike pleasure ((a state resulting from satisfying a desire or being in the state of satisfaction (EN 7.12 
1152b33-1153a7 and 7.14) accompanied by the heating of body (DMA 701b33-702a1)) eudaimonia 
evades a naturalistic definition: eudaimonia is acting well in which contemplation has a central role. 
94 Moss 2012, p. 158. I have replaced the word ‘un-Humean’ with square brackets, since in this chapter 
I am not able to study the great question about the relation between Aristotle and Hume.  
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however, also plausibly deal with EN 1.13 and 6.13⎯the textual basis for the 
opposite rationalist interpretation⎯as Moss thinks her interpretation can.  
Moss points out that all the earlier anti-rationalist interpreters assumed, just as 
contemporary rationalist interpreters assume, that Aristotle’s division of soul in EN 
1.13 is between our cognitive (i.e. actively discerning) and non-cognitive (i.e. only 
passively perceiving) capacities.95 But since Moss has argued that the non-rational 
aspect of soul includes a cognitive capability⎯phantasia⎯she thinks that this 
hitherto unquestioned assumption must be revised: perhaps the only relevant 
difference between the aspects of soul is that the former discerns with concepts, the 
latter without.96 According to Moss’ suggested revision, the only task of reason in 
value cognition would be to label our non-rational discernments of ends with moral 
concepts (such as ‘virtuous’, ‘advantageous’ or ‘shameful’) which does not modify 
their content or causal efficacy, but only enables us to use them as starting-points in 
moral reasoning.97 She presents the passage of EN 7.8 that we have already seen, to 
support her conclusion: ‘neither indeed in [mathematics] is the logos instructive of 
the starting-points nor in [the practical case], but virtue, either natural or habituated 
[is instructive] of the right belief about the starting-point.’98 Moss thinks this passage 
tells that ‘our cognitions of the starting points of practical reasoning [i.e. of good 
ends] are rational, exercises of intellect⎯but their content derives from character, i.e. 
from the generalised phantasia that is produced through habituation.’99 Once a 
person’s phantasia has perceived an action as pleasant, which, as Moss thinks, is to 
discern it as good, ‘intellect steps in’ as she puts it in her 2011 article, ‘assenting and 
thereby conceptualizing the appearance […]. Now [the person] not only experiences 
an appearance of virtuous activity as the good, but also believes that it is so’.100  
In the same article, Moss argues further that Aristotle’s claim regarding the 
necessity of acting with the involvement of right reason (orthos logos) for moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ibid. 
96 Moss 2012, pp. 223-4. 
97 Ibid., pp. 227-228, quoting Tuozzo 1994 on p. 227: “the good and the desire ‘differ only in their 
mode of cognition: the one [good] is conceptualized, and so involves thought, while the other [the 
pleasant] is unconceptualized and so involves perception (or phantasia aisthetike)….’” 
98 EN 7.8 1151a17-19, as quoted by Moss 2012 on p. 225.  
99 Moss 2012, p. 225. 
100 Moss 2011, p. 256. 
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virtue in EN 6.13 does not have to imply, in light of her interpretation, that a 
virtuous person can articulate the right reason for his acting⎯to act well, because 
such acting is good⎯which would require phronesis. Rather, the claim can imply, 
more modestly, that even if a person can have moral virtue as a result of non-rational 
habituation only⎯as the anti-rationalist interpretation reads EN 2.4 to say⎯it is not 
said to be proper virtue (kyria arête) unless he also consciously acts on the basis of 
the right reason. Moss explains her reading by means of the following analogue. 
Imagine two servants who act well. ‘The former acts on his own impulses; the latter 
takes the lead from his superior. And it would be reasonable enough, if somewhat 
odd to our ears, to say that only in the latter case is the servant truly (or strictly) an 
excellent one.’101 Proper (or strict) virtue might thus not be the same as moral virtue, 
as we have seen the rationalists read EN 6.13, but it could be moral virtue, for which 
the habituation of character and phantasma of good ends suffice, plus an ability to 
conceptualise the discernments of phantasia and articulate the right reason for action.  
 
1.3 A RATIONALIST REPLY TO THE CHALLENGE 
According to Moss’ anti-rationalist interpretation, the rational part of soul is not 
needed in discerning good ends: it is needed only for conceptualising them, 
deliberating about them, and articulating the reason for realising them. Once one has 
learned which actions are good, and has been habituated to enjoy acting well, one’s 
phantasia, which Moss interprets as an entirely non-rational faculty, suffices for 
discerning good ends. Rationalist interpreters have not, however, yet challenged her 
interpretation of phantasia, and her idea of applying this unorthodox interpretation to 
Aristotle’s theory of moral cognition. Let me attempt, however, to challenge it now. 
 I think that the most powerful argument against Moss interpretation would be that 
if it were endorsed, Aristotle would seem to be an incoherent thinker, unlike in the 
case of the rationalist interpretation. For Moss has not given us a compelling exegetic 
reason to think that the rationalist interpretation is incorrect. For example, the 
passage of DA 3.10⎯‘[m]any men follow their phantasia contrary to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid. pp. 212–213.  
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knowledge, and in all other animals there is no thinking or calculation but only 
phantasia’102⎯could also be read as only confirming that phantasia often leads 
people to moral weakness, instead of (implicitly) claiming that phantasia and reason 
are ‘mutually exclusive’, as we have seen Moss take it to claim. After all, as we have 
seen, Aristotle also makes a distinction between rational and perceptual phantasia in 
DA. Although Moss suggests that rational phantasia could be only a name for using 
perceptual phantasia in deliberation, which requires its perceptions to be 
conceptualised, this reading is no more textually justified than the mainstream 
reading that assumes them to be separate aspects of phantasia: one that cognises 
without concepts, another with concepts.  
 The other key passages outside EN that we have seen Moss to quote as supporting 
her interpretation, one in DA 3.3⎯’thinking and understanding seem to be just like 
having a perception of something, for in both cases the soul discerns (krinein)…’103 
and another in DMA, ‘both phantasia and perception (aesthesis) hold the same place 
[in moral discernment] as nous, for all are kritika’104 are far from explicit in allowing 
that we can discern good ends without involving the rational part of our souls.  The 
context of the former passage reveals that Aristotle might not even agree with the 
claim he presents in it: the passage is presented as endoxa, from which Aristotle 
starts his discussion of phantasia. Although the philosopher does not explicitly reject 
that phantasia could be kritikon in DA, he argues later in 3.3 that [phantasia] is not 
the same kind of thinking (noesis) as krisis […] for phantasia is up to us […] but in 
forming opinions we are not free, we cannot escape the alternative of falsehood or 
truth.’105 At face value, this argument seems to imply that phantasia does not 
discern, because discernments have truth-values, whereas phantasmata as such do 
not have to have.106 With regard to the passage of DMA, Aristotle’s purpose is not to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 DA 3.10 433a10-11. Quotations from DA and DMA are from Moss 2011 and 2012. 
103 DA 3.3 427a19–22. 
104 DMA 700b20-21. 
105 DA 3.3 427b16-21. 
106 My counterargument may not seem to be decisive, for Aristotle’s argument could also taken to 
imply that although phantasia can discern (e.g.) good ends, as endoxa suggests, it cannot discern 
whether these discernments are true or false, i.e. reflect the validity of its own discernments, which is 
the task of nous. However, I think this is unlikely, since Aristotle’s words state that phantasia is not a 
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show that our non-rational abilities could have the power of discernment, but 
classify all human motivations ‘either into thought (nous) or desire (orexis),’ as he 
announces right before the passage (in the line that Moss omits in her quotation). In 
the quoted passage, Aristotle only classifies phantasia and aesthesis among 
motivations that belong to the class of nous that is, are of the rational part of soul, on 
account of being discerning (kritika). In the end, the passage may thus even seem to 
support the rationalist interpretation: if phantasia and aesthesis are rational 
motivations, then, surely, discerning good ends with them involves the activity of the 
rational part.  
 In EN, we saw Moss to appeal to this passage of book 3, chapter 4: ‘a virtuous 
person discerns each thing [i.e. good end] rightly, and in each case the truth appears 
to (phainetai) him, for distinctive things [potential ends] are noble (kala) and 
pleasant according to (kata) each character.’107 This passage does not, however, have 
to establish that virtuous people discern good ends by imagining (phantazein) certain 
ends as pleasant, as Moss takes it to tell. Instead of establishing a causal connection 
from an end appearing as pleasant to a virtuous person to his discerning that end as 
good, Aristotle’s claim may only establish a correlation. He may mean that the better 
one’s character is, the more reliably one’s sensations indicate the goodness of a 
potential end, although only fully virtuous people discern good ends entirely rightly. 
 Let me now attempt to show why we should prefer these my alternative, 
rationalist readings to what Moss makes up from the above passages to back up her 
anti-rationalist interpretation. Aristotle’s motivation for dividing the soul into 
rational and non-rational aspects is the first reason. We have seen Moss argue that 
the division is not between our cognitive (discerning) and non-cognitive (passively 
perceiving) capacities, but only between conceptual and non-conceptual ones⎯non-
rational phantasia does not need to use concepts, but can nevertheless discern ends 
as good. In this case, the division would not be, however, relevant to the question of 
which abilities one should develop to discern good ends, but only to the question of 
whether this discernment involves concepts or not. In EN 2.2, Aristotle seems, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discernment (krisis), not that it is a discernment in a qualified sense. Therefore it is safer to assume that 
phantasia needs the aid of reason to result discernments, i.e. rational phantasia (see pp. 26-7 above).  
107 EN 3.4 1113a29–32. 
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however, to be more interested in the former kind of question: ‘we study ethics not 
so that we may know what virtue is, but so that we may become good’.108 In light of 
this practical aim, it seems more likely that he would differentiate the capacities of 
the soul on the basis of whether they can discern which ends are good, not only on 
whether they utilise concepts. For the answer to the former question would help a 
student of ethics in deciding whether to include some intellectual education to his 
moral training apart from the habituation of non-rational desires, but the answer to 
the latter question would not have such a practical purport. Since the rationalist 
interpretation assumes that the division of soul is based on the division of cognitive 
and non-cognitive capacities, we have an initial, albeit small, reason to prefer it to 
Moss’ interpretation.  
A more compelling reason to interpret Aristotle as a rationalist about the cognition 
of value, however, is that (at least) Moss’ reading of EN 6.13 is clearly less plausible 
than its rationalist alternative. Her analogy of two servants is not convincing. In fact, 
Aristotle seems to think its opposite by stating in the chapter ‘it is neither possible to 
be properly virtuous without phronesis, nor it is possible to have phronesis without 
virtue’.109 Instead of thinking that only a servant who acts well from obedience to the 
ends given by his master (who, in Moss analogy, stands for phronesis) would be 
truly excellent⎯implying that proper virtue is already developed virtue plus 
phronesis⎯it seems he would rather opt that only the servant, who acts well on the 
basis of his own reasoning is at all excellent⎯i.e., that any virtue presupposes 
phronesis, and is thus proper virtue. For example, in EN 1.4, Aristotle approvingly 
quotes Hesiod’s Works and Days: ‘the one is altogether best (ariston), who himself 
knows (noein) all things, but good in his turn too is he who obeys one who speaks 
well’.110 Moreover, in EN 6.13, right after the quoted passage, the philosopher seems 
to attempt to answer to a question that he presents in the beginning of EN 6.12: does 
it make any difference ‘whether [people] have phronesis themselves or (only) obey 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 EN 2.2 1103b27–8 (B&C).  
109 EN 6.13 1144b25–33. 
110 EN 1.4 1095b10–11, quoting Hesiod, Works and Days 293. 
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others who have it?’111 His explicit answer to this question (quoted on p. 6 above) 
is that only the people who have phronesis can act from the right reason (orthos 
logos), i.e., perform good actions for their own sakes, which is properly virtuous 
acting. Thus, it seems that according to Aristotle, if one acted well from taking the 
ends provided by her non-rational phantasia as given⎯assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that it can discern good ends⎯one would not yet be truly excellent, or, 
morally virtuous, which would require also phronesis. It is therefore (very) unlikely, 
pace Moss, that Aristotle would imply in EN 6.13 that one can be morally virtuous 
without yet having phronesis. 112 
The final and, I think, by far the most compelling reason, however, is that Moss’ 
anti-rationalist interpretation about Aristotle’s theory of value cognition seems to 
have a serious problem with his conception of moral responsibility. Moss does not, 
however, discuss this problem. Perhaps she tacitly assumes that since, according to 
Aristotle, an adult is responsible⎯subject to just praise or blame⎯for his actions if 
he performs them willingly (hekousion),113 and since the voluntariness of an action 
does not require it’s being (rationally) desired,114 one could be responsible for one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 EN 6.12 1143b30-32. 
112 Recently, also Moss seems to have noticed the weakness of her analogy. In Moss 2014a, she 
admits that a rationalist interpreter ‘has to hand a much more substantive explanation [than an anti-
rationalist] of phronesis’ difference to and superiority from cleverness [deinotes]: phronesis, she can 
say, is what gives one right end’ (Moss 2014a, p. 230, cf. fn. 45 above for Berti’s alternative 
interpretation). Thus, she now says that ‘it is reason’s,’ i.e. not only phantasia’s, ‘job to grasp what 
one’s character has fixed a goal and also recognise it as a goal.’ (p. 223) ‘This means,’ according to 
her, that desire obeys reason in the way that “someone obeys another when she says ‘I want F things, 
but I do not know what kinds of things are really F, and so I do not know if I want x, y or z, therefore I 
will defer to the counsel of my wise parent, friend or teacher.” (p. 239) These modifications prevent 
Aristotle’s division of soul in EN 1.13 or his insistence for the necessity of phronesis for virtue in EN 
6.13 from posing problems to Moss’ interpretation. Even her modified interpretation, according to 
which non-rational habituation determines whether one wants e.g. F things or something else (p. 233), 
is, however, vulnerable to the problem with moral responsibility that I shall introduce. 
113 Willingly performed, or, voluntary, actions are actions that elicit ‘praise or blame’, i.e., are subject 
to moral responsibility (EN 3.1 1109b34–5). In order to be voluntary, clarifies Aristotle, the action has 
be up to us (eph’ hemin) and not performed in ignorance (EE 2.9 1225b9). Some interpreters (e.g. 
Destre 2012) think that being up to us means that the agent should have had an opportunity to act 
otherwise; some others (e.g. Everson 1990) stress that for an action to be called the agent’s own, it is 
not necessary that she could have acted otherwise. However, whatever one thinks about the correct 
interpretation of eph’ hemin, and the applicability of ‘could have acted otherwise’ -condition to 
Aristotle, that does not affect my thesis of the necessity of prohairesis for moral responsibility.  
114 EE 2.7 1223b29–38: ‘we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire […] it remains then to 
consider whether acting from rational desire and voluntary acting are the same […] but no one 
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actions even if one chose them non-rationally, by imagining them as pleasant. Such 
an assumption would, however, be mistaken. For Aristotle evidently thinks that 
voluntariness does not make an action morally assessable.115 In EN, the philosopher 
also says that both small children and animals act voluntarily,116  but are not 
responsible for their actions, unlike adults.117 Hence humans must achieve something 
in their moral development that animals cannot achieve, which renders them 
responsible for their voluntary actions. The most obvious candidate for this 
achievement would be developing a capability to choose what to do, independently 
of one’s non-rational phantasia or any non-rational desires⎯this is, rational choice, 
or, prohairesis. Although Aristotle does not mention prohairesis while discussing 
just praise and blame in EN, he recognises that moral responsibility needs it in EE: 
 
Since virtue and vice and the acts that spring from them are respectively praised or blamed -for we do 
not give praise or blame for what is due to necessity or change or nature, but only for what we 
ourselves are causes of […] it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with matters where the man 
himself is the source and cause of his acts. We must then ascertain of what actions he is himself the 
source and cause. Now, we all admit that of acts that are voluntary and done from the choice 
[prohairesis] of each man he is the cause, but of involuntary acts he is not himself the cause; and all 
that he does from choice, he does voluntarily.118 
 
Above passage establishes that prohairesis allows us to regard a person as the cause 
of his actions, and thus responsible of them. According to Aristotle in EN 3.5, 
prohairesis is realised ‘when discerning (krinein) with deliberation, we choose 
according to our rational desire’.119 Thus, a choice of action made without antecedent 
deliberation, and the rational discernment of an end to be desired, could not be 
prohairesis. This being the case, it would be impossible for one to become 
responsible for his actions in the light of Moss’ anti-rationalist interpretation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rationally desires what he thinks bad, but acts so [voluntarily] in the state of akrasia […] it is therefore 
clear the voluntary then is not action from [even rational] desire […]. 
115 One might think that so-called mixed actions show this already: When a captain (EN 3.1 1110a8-
11) has to throw cargo away from his ship so as to save it from sinking, this does not justify blaming 
him of losing the cargo, despite he threw it away voluntarily, as he could have chosen not to throw it.  
116 EN 3.2 1111b8.  
117 Aristotle claims that a mark (semeion) of morally responsible agents is that their actions are subject 
to legal punishments (EN 3.1 1109b31-5), which is of course not the case with animals or children. 
118 EE 2.6 1223a9-19. Translated by Solomon (1995). ‘Excellence’ and ‘badness’ replaced with 
‘virtue’ and ‘vice.’ 
119 EN 3.3 1113a11–12. Few lines before this definition, in 3.3 1113a6, Aristotle says that prohairesis 
occurs ‘in the ruling part of soul’, i.e. in the rational part. I have indicated this in the square brackets.  
 41 
Assuming that habituation to virtue is a non-rational process and, moreover, that 
the discernment of ends is a form of non-rational cognition, phantasia, which 
operates by associating the sensations of pleasure and pain with concepts, and 
synthesising the mental pictures of the most desirable ends on the basis of these 
associations, we could not genuinely choose our ends, and actions. It would thus be 
unexplainable why we consider ourselves to be responsible for our actions, and 
justifiably so according to Aristotle. Since the rationalist interpretation gives us a 
way to credit the philosopher with a justification of our moral responsibility unlike 
Moss’ anti-rationalist interpretation, we have a presumptive reason for taking 
Aristotle to think that discerning good ends involves the activity of the rational part 
of soul. When we consider this conclusion together with our earlier considerations 
against Moss’ interpretation, we have, I think, a presumptive case for interpreting 
Aristotle as a rationalist, one who thinks that reason is needed in discerning what is 
good.  
 
1.4 THE RATIONAL DISCERNMENT OF GOOD ENDS 
We have concluded that discerning good ends calls for the activity of reason. As EN 
3.3 has taught us, the element of reason that Aristotle calls phronesis does not, 
however, discern good ends. For deliberation is the activity of phronesis and we do 
not deliberate about ends. It therefore falls to one’s non-deliberative thinking (nous) 
to cognise good ends. Although Aristotle never openly states that nous cognises good 
ends, we have seen (on p. 25) the philosopher indicate such cognition in EN 6.11, in 
which he attributes discerning the first principles (archai) of deliberation⎯that is, 
the ends we desire to realise⎯to nous. Rationalist interpreters disagree, however, 
how exactly nous grasps the ends of moral deliberation, that is, good actions: 
whether it shows a mental picture of ideal life, in which certain actions appear as 
good, or perhaps only recognises that a good action is a good end for moral 
deliberation, but lets our situational understanding to determine which action is good.  
 The so-called Grand End interpretation, which assumes that nous discerns an end 
as good by recognising it as making a certain contribution to our eudaimonia, has 
traditionally promoted the former answer. On this interpretations which principal 
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textual support we will review shortly below, nous intuitively grasps the ‘blueprint’ 
of eudaimonia, the picture of all individual good ends that make up the whole human 
good. E.g., ‘I need contemplation, healthy nutrition, and socialising etc. in order to 
realise eudaimonia’. Moral virtue is manifested in actions and in choices of action, 
and the above picture, the Grand End interpretation suggests, is always the starting 
point for the process of reaching and executing a good choice (prohairesthai), i.e., 
for moral deliberation.120 A virtuous person has the blueprint of good life entirely 
right, a non-virtuous person doesn’t. According to a more recent, particularist 
interpretation, 121  this model is, however, both unrealistic and never explicitly 
supported by Aristotle. It suggests that instead of the Grand End, one’s nous could 
grasp only a ‘formal’ conception of the end⎯that a good action is a good end⎯and 
then one has to figure out what particular action would be good in a particular 
situation with different intellectual abilities such as phronesis. The particularist 
interpretation thus proposes that a person does not have to have a comprehensive 
picture of the demands of eudaimonia in his mind before he can morally deliberate. 
Let us begin to assess the merits of these rival interpretations, starting with the 
Grand End interpretation. A representative version of it can be found in John 
Cooper’s work. According to him, the intuition of the demands of eudaimonia (to 
telos) presented by nous is the starting point of all successful moral deliberation. As 
Aristotle clearly states in EN 3.5 1114b15: ‘whatever [people] accomplish can be 
ascribed to (anapherontes) [their intuition of to telos].’ Moral deliberation, thinks 
Cooper, is about how to realise the components of this intuition, particular good 
ends, in a particular situation.122 He has argued so on the basis of An. Post. 2.19⎯at 
the end of which Aristotle concludes, ‘it is (non-deliberative) thinking (nous) that 
apprehends first principles (archai)’ 123⎯which Cooper reads in the light of 
Aristotle’s other contention, in EN 1.4, about the pursuit of eudaimonia being the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 EN 2.4 1106b36 makes the centrality of deliberation to moral virtue clear: in that passage, Aristotle 
calls moral virtue hexis prohairetike, ‘the state characterised by choosing well’. 
121  McDowell (1980 and 2007) and Broadie (1991) are classic examples of the particularist 
interpretation; Price (2011) is a more recent extensive particularist interpretation. 
122 Cooper (1974) presents a summary of his interpretation on pp. 85–6. 
123 An. Post. 2.19 100b12. Similar claims in 1.2 71b16–17 and 1.3 72b18–20. Cited in ibid. p. 65. 
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first principle of our acting.124 Similar argumentation is typical of all supporters of 
the Grand End interpretation, not only to Cooper. What makes Cooper’s version of 
the interpretation especially representative is, however, that it managed to avoid a 
certain problematic implication that marrs many earlier Grand End interpretations.  
The problem emerges once we notice that, since the blueprint of the demands of 
eudaimonia is always discerned by nous in advance of actual deliberation, it must 
show one all his good ends⎯for example, contemplation, health and socialising 
etc.⎯without offering him any possibility of deliberating about any of them. The 
problem with this view is that if the discernment of good ends is rational, but outside 
the scope of rational deliberation, it seems that a person could not rationally choose 
his ends. But, as we concluded in the previous section, Aristotle thinks he should 
choose them in order to be responsible for his actions.125 Remarkably, the problem 
seems very similar to the problem that I showed Moss’ anti-rationalist interpretation 
of moral cognition to have with Aristotle’s account of responsibility for actions.126 
 So as to avoid the problem, Cooper famously argued that Aristotle might not in 
fact think that we do not deliberate about our ends at all, but only that ‘we never 
deliberate about ends as such, but we may do so when considering them as available 
means to higher ends’.127 Consider the passage of EN 3.3 again: ‘[w]e deliberate not 
about ends but about the things towards ends. For a doctor does not deliberate 
whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman 
whether he shall produce law and order, nor does any one else deliberate about his 
end […]’. Aristotle here says that a doctor may not deliberate about whether the end 
of medicine is health, a statesman whether the end of statesmanship is justice etc., 
but this situation does not prevent them from deliberating what they should do in 
order to realise the correct conception of eudaimonia in their lives⎯which is a far 
higher end than health or justice, since it is the end of human life. Therefore it does 
not have to be the case that nous presents us every end that constitutes our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 EN 1.4 1095a15–20.  
125 See p 40 above 
126 See pp. 40-1 above. 
127 See Cooper 1975 p. 18; italics are Cooper’s own. Many later Grand End-interpreters (Kraut 1989, 
Irwin 1990 and 2007, Richardson-Lear 2004) have approved this argument. 
 44 
eudaimonia without us having the need to deliberate about what to consider good; 
nous can only enable us to see that eudaimonia consists in certain general ends, such 
as contemplation, health and socialising etc., but still leaves room for deliberating 
what particular actions we ought to consider as good to realise those general ends. 
Therefore we can choose our actions, but in order to be responsible for them, we 
would also need to be able to justify or revise our conception of eudaimonia as such; 
otherwise we could not be justifiably praised on account of our pursuing, e.g., 
contemplation as a part of that conception. However, Cooper has also argued that 
even if the blueprint of eudaimonia results from non-deliberative nous, this does not 
have mean that it cannot be justified or revised by deliberation. He writes: ‘Aristotle 
holds both that the [first] principles of sciences [one of which is ethics] are known 
intuitively, by nous, and they can be established by discursive dialectical 
argument’.128 This is possible because, as Cooper points out, dialectic is a different 
type of reasoning from deliberation. Dialectic aims at establishing some definition, 
e.g. that eudaimonia includes contemplation, by examining arguments for and 
against various alternative conceptions of eudaimonia, whereas deliberation aims at 
reaching a good choice of action on the basis of the blueprint of the demands of 
eudaimonia. When we deliberate about what to do here and now, we do not 
simultaneously deliberate about the contents of the blueprint, and when we use 
dialectic to define the components of good life, we do not deliberate about what to 
do, but study arguments. Therefore we would remain responsible for our actions 
even if we would take our ends as given by nous while deliberating about what to do. 
 Although Cooper’s version of the Grand End interpretation seems to be able to 
tackle the challenge posed by Aristotle’s views on moral responsibility, it might not, 
however, be compatible with what Aristotle says in EN 6.11 1143a35–b5. In that 
passage, quoted below, the philosopher differentiates nous in ethics (nous en tais 
praktikais) from the nous of A. Po. 2.19 that intuits the first principles, and which he 
now labels as nous kata tas apodexeis. For the former nous pertains to the last things 
(ta eschata) in deliberation, to actions, and its conception of first principles is not 
intuited, unlike that of the latter, but arises from the apprehension of particulars: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Cooper 1975, p. 67. 
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Thought (nous) is concerned with the last things in both directions, for [what grasps] both the first 
principles and the last things is thought not reason (logos). That is, on the one hand (men), the thought 
that pertains to demonstrations (kata tas apodexeis) concerns the unchanging first principles; on the 
other hand (de), thought in the matters of action (en tais praktikais) concerns also the last particular 
thing that admits of being otherwise, that is, the minor premise. For these last things are the principles 
or starting-points because of which one acts: the universals arise from particulars (ek ton kath’ hekasta 
gar ta katholou). Of these one must have perception (aisthesis), and this perception is thought.129 
 
Above passage seems to be incompatible with Cooper’s interpretation on account of 
implying that we construct our moral universals⎯one of which is our picture of 
eudaimonia⎯through deliberation, not by dialectical reasoning, as Cooper proposes. 
Cooper has, however, made an attempt to circumvent this threat. He thinks we can 
assume that nous about the matters of action (en tais praktikais, i.e. nous praktikos) 
is not a distinct aspect of nous in technical sense, but only a way of speaking about 
‘perceptual knowledge (i.e. true beliefs) of various types of things’⎯a competency 
to see, for example, that such and such food is healthy.130 For apart from its strict 
sense as the thinking that presents first principles, which Cooper thinks is the sense 
in which nous presents the blueprint of the demands of eudaimonia, the word nous 
also has a non-technical, colloquial sense as true believing in general. So Aristotle 
might not be talking here about two aspects of nous, but about a proper and a 
qualified sense of the concept. Aristotle’s sentence about universals arising from 
particulars may describe only how perception can generate universal beliefs⎯e.g. 
‘that serious philosophers tend to be old’⎯although nous proper could have no 
involvement with this process, because it is concerned only with the first principles, 
which cannot be generated by perception, but only defined through dialectic.131  
It seems, however, that the above reading treats Aristotle’s concepts selectively: it 
puts a great stress on the distinction between the nous in the proper sense and the 
supposedly colloquial notion of nous as true believing in general⎯which is not 
treated as an aspect of proper nous⎯while not registering that for Aristotle, 
‘universals,’ which ‘arise from particulars’ with which nous praktikos is concerned, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 EN 6.11 1143a35–b5. On the basis of (B&C). I have translated nous as thought instead of intellect 
and aesthesis as perception instead of discernment, which I take to be krisis.  
130 Cooper 1975 p. 38. 
131 Cooper 1975 p. 38–9. 
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may well include even first principles such as eudaimonia. Therefore the two 
concepts of nous do not have to refer to nous in the proper and colloquial senses, but 
to two aspects of one and the same nous. Even Aristotle’s phrase ‘on the one hand, 
nous (men) […] pertains to demonstrations (de) on the other hand, nous […] 
concerns the last particular gives us the impression that nous has two, equally 
‘proper’ aspects. Although proper nous grasps first principles, Aristotle never says 
that the same nous could not also grasp the last particulars⎯the Grand End 
interpretation only assumes so. That is, he may think that we could come to discern 
the first principles⎯e.g. what eudaimonia is⎯through perceiving particulars.132  
The passage in EN 6.11, 1143a35–b5, has now revealed a gap in the justifications 
of the Grand End interpretation, which, as we can see, cannot neatly accommodate 
the claims of the passage⎯even with Cooper’s improvements. Although Cooper is 
probably right with regard to the possibility of justifying the demands of eudaimonia 
by dialectic, it is, however, not evident that one has to always have the blueprint of 
eudaimonia available before deliberation. That is, it might not be, as Cooper argued, 
that always before a virtuous person begins moral deliberation, whatever the 
situation, his nous discerns that his end is eudaimonia, and that eudaimonia is, for 
example, a certain composite of ends such as contemplation, health, and socialising; 
then he deliberates so as to discern which actions would optimally contribute to the 
realisation of these ends in his situation. Provided that nous has two aspects, one that 
is about universals and another pertaining to particulars, it could be that the former 
aspect formally cognises that ‘a good action is a good end’, and the agent then has to 
figure out, with the latter aspect, what acting would be good in his circumstances. 
 Since, according to this particularist interpretation, a person does not choose his 
particular good ends on the basis of any blueprint of the demands of eudaimonia, but 
through perceiving the particular moral demands of his situation, that person might 
not need to appeal to a conception of eudaimonia before he has a need to justify his 
choice of action. And it might be that, only when he has to demonstrate why he acts 
as he acts, or, tell to a student of ethics why he should act in a certain way, needs he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Reeve (1992), p. 58, makes this suggestion. 
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articulate that he has been acting on the basis of the intuition (nous) that 
eudaimonia is the end of his acting⎯the intuition to which everything that he does 
can be ascribed, as we have seen EN 3.5 1114b15 (quoted on p. 42 above) to say. 
Insofar as ‘eudaimonia is acting well (eupraxia)’, as Aristotle states,133 it is realised 
once the moral demands of situations are met, regardless of whether one consciously 
attempts to realise it or not. This might be the inspiration for Aristotle’s statement in 
EN 2.4, which we have studied on p. 23 above, i.e. that although a virtuous person 
acts knowingly, acting knowingly is not important for the virtuousness of his acting.  
 Although it might not thus be necessary for even a virtuous person to consciously 
begin moral deliberation from a precise blueprint of the demands of eudaimonia, he 
is nevertheless able to appeal to eudaimonia whenever he needs to justify his actions, 
and could correctly identify what activity would be good in his situation. In order to 
actualise his capacity of deliberation, a virtuous person would only need to identify, 
however, which action counts as good in the situation at hand. Providing an agent 
with an idea of what action to perform in a particular situation, supplying him with a 
‘minor premise’, might also be the task of nous⎯besides giving us the intuition of 
eudaimonia as the end⎯the task that pertains to particulars according to EN 6.11 
1143a35–b5. Since the minor premise, remarks Aristotle, ‘admits being otherwise’, 
the action that nous identifies as worth performing in one particular situation may not 
be a good action in another. Admitting the particularity of good actions does not, 
however, preclude the philosopher from concluding that ‘universals arise’ from 
particular identifications. By this conclusion, we do not have to take him to only 
mean that the experience of identifying good actions can help us to construct rules of 
thumb⎯which are universals only in qualified sense, as being true for the most part 
and not universally⎯but also that a certain proper, unchangeable universal, i.e. the 
conception of eudaimonia can derive from it. Aristotle may think that only once a 
person has came to identify a good action in his particular situation can he come to 
understand what would realise eudaimonia in his situation: performing that action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 EN 1.4 1095a18–20 and 1.8 1098b20–22, in which Aristotle describes eudaimonia as eu zen, to live 
well, and as, eu prattein, to act well. Natali 2014 remarks on p. 188 that according to some modern 
interpreters these concepts are identical, but in fact eupraxia describes the content of a well-lived life. 
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 A recent proponent of the particularist interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
moral cognition, Anthony Price, describes Aristotelian moral deliberation as follows: 
 
The virtuous person finds some feature of the situation salient in seeing it as inviting or demanding 
some practical response (where “seeing” signifies not just discernment, but also noetic apprehension). 
This attraction is associated with his discrimination of some practical option as looking likely to 
achieve something worthwhile in the circumstances. The application of a concept is accompanied by 
the focusing of a [rational] desire. Once there is a question to be asked, “How am I to achieve such-
and-such an end?” deliberation can come into play […] noetic apprehension proposes a provisional 
end to be achieved in the context; deliberation, aided by further discernments and appreciations as 
appropriate, then explores whether it can be acceptably realized in the context; there finally emerges a 
judgement yielding a choice of doing this for the sake of that.134 
 
In this passage, Price discusses the operation of practical reason (phronesis), which 
Aristotle characterises as involving excellent deliberation (euboulia)⎯deliberation in 
which all premises and conclusions are true⎯as well as grasping ends correctly and 
commanding one to act well.135 If Price were right about what phronesis being 
excellence in moral deliberation implies, it should ‘discriminate’ which actions are 
required to realise eudaimonia in a particular situation. Price suggests that such 
discrimination is necessary for the initial ‘noetic apprehension’ of the minor premise, 
or good action, because sometimes the action that nous initially perceives as good 
might not be good in the end, although ‘the cases where, though wisely selected, it 
has ultimately to be discarded or amended must be the exception; in most cases, the 
right goal and the initial goal are identical.’136 Despite this, he does not give any 
concrete examples to support this conclusion. Presumably Price has in mind, e.g., a 
case in which one identifies with his nous that it would be good to give a present to 
someone, but then finds out, thanks to his phronesis, that he does not happen to have 
money for that present. The possibility of any subsequent need to amend the initial 
noetic apprehension of good action implies, concludes Price, that any such 
apprehension ‘must be adopted with a reservation’, that is, subject to deliberation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Price 2011, p. 226 
135Aristotle gives this characterization in EN 6.9 1142b30–3, just before the claim that phronesis is a 
correct conception of the end (for the interpretation of this claim, see fn. 45 on p. 22 above). For the 
claim about phronesis commanding us to act, see EN 6.10 1143a8–9, discussed in section 2.5 below.  
136 Ibid, p. 230 
 49 
‘upon how it can be realized in context’137⎯a task for which phronesis is needed. 
Although the particularist interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of moral deliberation 
may seem now more realistic than the Grand End interpretation, I think, however, 
that Price’s attempt to provide a particularist explanation for the role of nous and 
phronesis in deliberation needs some revision so as to be also faithful to the 
philosopher’s text. For in An. Post. 2.19 Aristotle states ‘nous is always right’.138 
Apart from showing the inadequacy of the standard translation of ‘thought’ (or 
‘intellect’ or ‘intuition’) for nous, the philosopher’s strict statement also makes clear 
that that noetic apprehension never needs further revision. One could of course think, 
with certain plausibility, that since Aristotle speaks of nous in many different senses, 
the statement of An. Post. 2.19 may not be at all applicable to the noetic 
apprehension of good actions. This assumption might follow from the view that the 
epistemology of An. Post. 2 is different from Aristotle’s moral epistemology in EN, 
which, however, as we will see in Chapter 3, does not seem to fit with what he says 
in that book.139 However, if we thought that the role of phronesis in deliberation is 
not to be a possible corrector of the identifications of good actions by nous, but to 
complement habituation in rendering agent motivated to perform them, we would not 
need to question infallibility of nous as stated in An. Post 2.19 in the context of EN. 
 We may thus think that every rational agent has enough nous to identify good 
actions⎯that is why they are responsible for their actions⎯but not every agent, for 
example vicious and akratic people, tends to perform those actions. The lack of 
sufficient moral motivation can derive from the deficient habituation of character and 
absence of phronesis. I attempt to show in the course of the next two chapters that 
Aristotle constructs this theory in EN. However, before we can engage in studying 
the contribution of the habituation of character and phronesis to moral motivation, 
we have to establish that people can rationally identify good actions before they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Ibid. 
138 An. Post. 2.19, 100b7. 
139  See e.g. Berti 2008b, p 48, for the view that the epistemologies of An. Post. and EN differ :‘le 
constant, comme nous le savons, forme aussi l'objet de la physique, sans l'empêcher d'être une 
véritable science, parce que la science, selon des les Seconds Analytiques, a pour objet aussi bien le 
nécessaire que le constant. [...] [Est] différente de la phronesis, qui est la vertu de la partie 
calculatrice.’ See p. 84 below, however, for the evidence that even if there were no ‘contstant’ 
universals in ethics, ethical and other knowledge could be obtained through a very similar method.  
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taught and habituated to performing them. I therefore argue in the next chapter that, 
according to Aristotle, they can, and that he even has a concept for the aspect of nous 
that identifies good actions independently of teaching and habituation: synesis. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
COMING TO ACT WELL 
If identifying good actions involves reason in Aristotle, as we have concluded above, 
then coming to desire to perform such actions when occasion presents itself cannot 
demand the habituation of non-rational part of soul only. It should also require 
cultivating reason, at least the ability to identify good actions, and probably also 
phronesis, the virtue of thought that consists in excellent deliberation and has 
cognitive access to the correct conception of good. In EN 2.1, Aristotle states, 
however, that moral virtues (ethikes arêtes) result from habituation, as opposed to the 
virtues of thought (dianoetikes aretês), such as phronesis that com from teaching: 
‘[b]oth the birth and increase of the virtue of thought results from teaching 
(didaskalia), hence it requires experience and time, whereas moral virtue is the result 
of habit (ethos)’.140 Aristotle seems to stress also the non-rationality of moral virtue: 
 
[B]y doing just things we become just, by doing temperate things, we become temperate; and by doing 
courageous things, courageous.141 […] By acting in dangerous situations and by becoming habituated 
to fearing or being brave, some become courageous and others cowardly–and it is the same for things 
concerning desires or anger […] In brief, the states (hexeis) come to be from like activities.142 
 
The above claims may seem to contradict my conclusion in Chapter 1 about the 
necessity of rational abilities to moral virtue. These anti-rationalist looking claims 
should, however, not be taken as a definitive summary of Aristotle’s theory of moral 
development, but its starting point, as he adds qualifications to these initial claims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 EN 2.1 1103a15–16 (B&C), ‘intellectual virtue’ replaced with ‘the virtue of thought’. 
141 Ibid. 1103a35–b1 (B&C), ‘moderate’ (sophrones) replaced with ‘temperate’. 
142 Ibid. 1103b21–22. See EN 2.5 for Aristotle’s identification of virtues with states (hexeis) 
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Having asserted that moral virtue comes from habitation in EN 2.1, the philosopher 
specifies that habituation is only the first stage of moral development: ‘moral virtues 
we come to have by first (proton) engaging in the like activities’.143 If habituation is 
first, then something must come after it. Thus, moral virtue cannot result exclusively 
from habituation. Aristotle also states that habituation needs a teacher 
(didaskalos). 144  This concept does not signify a person who only supervises 
habituation, but he is a teacher of intellectual disciplines, such as philosophy.145 
Therefore it seems that some teaching, although it is normally reserved for the 
virtues of thought, must also be needed for acquiring a finely-habituated character.   
 The question that arises now, however, is why Aristotle then seems to think that 
habituation and some teaching are both needed for developing fine habits⎯why he 
adds such a qualification to the dichotomy he presents in the quoted passage of EN 
2.1? Since moral virtue, to return once again to EN 6.13, comes only with acquiring 
phronesis, which complements the finely-habituated character, one needs teaching to 
develop it, insofar as phronesis is a virtue of though. A finely-habituated person 
(epieikes) does not, however, need to have virtues of thought, so, if teaching were 
needed only for developing phronesis and other virtues of thought, then it would not 
be needed for his habituation. If we must thus allow that teaching may not cultivate 
only the virtues of thought, but also character, there remains, I think, two following 
possibilities for the developmental role of teaching in the habituation of character. 
 First, Aristotle may consider that while habituation as such fosters the motivation 
to act well, a moral teacher is needed to teach an unhabituated child which actions to 
perform as good. On this model of moral development, teaching would be needed for 
developing the ability to identify good actions, which success in habituation 
presupposes, although not for moral habituation (performing good actions) as such. 
Second, alternatively, coming to be able to identify good actions may not require 
teaching about which actions are good: the child can acquire the ability to identify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Ibid. 1103a32. 
144 See EN 2.1 1103b13–17, quoted on p. 55 below. 
145 Liddell and Scott (1940) define didaskalos as ‘teacher’ or ‘master’ and (omitting Aristotle) note that 
Plato used it when speaking of (intellectual) schools in Alc. 1.109d, 110b, Gorg. 514c and Prot 326c. 
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good actions as a result of experiencing social life. According to this, alternative 
developmental model, teaching would contribute to ability to justify those actions.  
  Among interpreters, there has been more support for the former model, at least 
since Myles Burnyeat’s seminal 1980 paper Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in 
which Aristotle is presented as having a worked out theory of moral development for 
the first time in Anglophone scholarship.146 I want to argue, however, that the latter 
is nevertheless more likely to be Aristotle’s model: the ability to identify good 
actions is not a result of being taught them but comes through experience. 
Recognising this will enable us to see, I hope to show by the end of the chapter, that 
Aristotle’s synesis, the intellectual ability he describes in EN 6.10⎯a surprisingly 
little-studied chapter of EN⎯often translated as ‘comprehension’ or ‘understanding’ 
and considered but an aspect of phronesis, refers in fact to the experience-based 
apprehension of good actions. Maybe the EN 6.10 has received such scarce scholarly 
attention due to the fact that Burnyeat’s interpretation on the place of teaching and 
habituation in the development of fine habits may easily lead one to ignore synesis. 
According to Burnyeat’s interpretation, the textual basis of which I will review 
below, at the beginning of one’s (presumably a child) moral development, the 
teacher of EN 2.1 (presumably a parent) should teach him which actions are good. 
This enables the child to come to identify good actions, and to begin to learn through 
performing those actions that the goodness of an action makes it enjoyable, more 
enjoyable than any alternative action, such that the experience brings the child to be 
motivated to perform those actions. Although moral development is grounded on 
discerning which actions are good⎯the actions that are taught as good⎯a moral 
learner is motivated to perform the good actions only through coming to perceive 
that they are more pleasant than alternative actions. On this interpretation of 
Aristotle’s theory of moral development, the teaching that the philosopher speaks of 
in EN 1.4⎯the moral teaching that one can receive only once one has fine 
habits⎯should refer to attending lectures in philosophy, which, Burnyeat suggests, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Reeve (1992), pp. 51-4, Herman (1989), Whiting (2002), p. 173, Lorenz (2009), p. 190, and Moss 
(2012), pp.37–8, are almost uncritical towards Burnyeat; they all attempt to complement him rather 
than challenging him. As far as I know, only Curzer (2012) argues in favour the latter possibility.  
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are for phronesis. This would be quite different to the teaching mentioned at the 
beginning of EN 2.1, which only involves a parent telling his or her child which 
actions are good, and which, unlike the former, is needed for acquiring fine habits. 
I will argue in the course of this chapter that Burnyeat’s interpretation is, however, 
likely to be mistaken: first, because it⎯as Howard Curzer shows⎯does not fit with 
certain of Aristotle’s explicit view about the minimal cognitive requirements for 
receiving moral teaching, and the relation between pleasure and virtuous acting, and 
second, because, as I will show, neither can it accommodate Aristotle’s account of 
responsibility for character. I will therefore suggest that a parent’s main task in 
initiating a child’s moral development might not be to teach good actions to the 
child, but to punish him when he acts wrongly, and let the child learn to identify 
good actions on the basis of his own experience of social life. That is, instead of 
teaching, the ability to identify good actions may come primarily from social life. 
Hence also the main role of teaching in the development of fine habits might be to 
improve one’s motivation to act well. This task might not fall, pace Burnyeat, to 
habituation alone. Aristotle may consider, I show further, the experience of social life 
to be a sufficient basis for acquiring the ability to identify good actions, because he 
thinks that any child will come to face the moral opinions of other people, and find 
out what they think about certain actions, and the experience of facing such opinions 
will inevitably enable a child to identify good actions through reflecting upon other 
people’s opinions. In EN 6.10, which I study at the end of this chapter, Aristotle 
describes synesis as the capacity enabling us to identify good actions on this basis.   
I will thus conclude this chapter by suggesting that synesis, since it arises from the 
experience of social life, and does not presuppose that we are correctly taught which 
actions are good, can account for our responsibility for our actions. It would enable a 
young person to choose to be habituated into acting well or not⎯the choice that 
Burnyeat’s interpretation, which places the responsibility of identifying good actions 




2.1 ARISTOTLE ON HABITUATION AND TEACHING 
We can now study the principal textual basis for any interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory of moral development⎯that is, EN 2.1. In the beginning of that section, from 
which we have already seen a brief quotation on p. 50 above, Aristotle argues that 
the virtues of thought and moral virtues are developed in two apparently different 
ways. Let me now quote the section more extensively than on the previous occasion. 
 
Both the coming-into-being and increase of intellectual virtue results mostly from teaching 
(didaskalia)⎯hence it requires experience and time⎯whereas moral virtue is the result of habit 
(ethos), and so it is that moral virtue (ethika arête) got its name by slight alteration of the term habit. It 
is also clear, as a result, that none of the moral virtues are present in us by nature, since nothing that 
exists by nature is habituated to be other than it is. For example, a stone, because it goes downward by 
nature, could not be habituated to go upward, not even if one habituates it by throwing it ten thousand 
times. […] Neither by nature, therefore, nor contrary to nature, are the virtues present; they are instead 
present in us who are of nature to receive them, and are ready though habit.147 
 
The virtue of thought comes from teaching, but moral virtue comes from habituation. 
Since moral virtue comes from habituation (ethismos), it cannot be ‘present in us by 
nature’, because natural properties, as the above example about a stone shows, 
cannot be changed by habituation. However, since also sensual capacities such as 
hearing or seeing are present in us by nature, Aristotle separates moral virtue also 
from those capacities: ‘it is not a result of hearing or seeing many times that we come 
to have those sensual capacities […]. But virtues we come to have by engaging into 
activities first, as in the case of skills as well’.148 After having established that moral 
virtue is neither taught nor present in us by nature, and yet nor is it a sensual capacity 
but is acquired in the same way as skill, i.e. by habituation, Aristotle presents three 
analogues to support his conclusion: 
 
1. By building houses, people become house-builders, by playing the cithara, they become cithara-
players; so, too, then, by doing just things we become just, by doing temperate things, we become 
temperate; and by doing courageous things courageous.149 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 EN 2.1 1103a14–16 (B&C). 
148 EN 2.1 103a26-31. 
149 EN 2.1 1103a33–b2 (R). 
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2. Further, as a result and on the account of the same things, every virtue both comes into being and 
is destroyed, as it is similarly the case also with a skill. For it is a result of playing the cithara that both 
good and bad cithara-players arise, and analogously with house-builders and all the rest.150 
3. If this were not the case, there would be no need of a teacher, but everyone would come into being 
already good or bad. So too in the case of virtues: by doing things in our interactions with people, 
some of us become just, some unjust and by doing things in terrifying circumstances and by being 
habituated to feel fear or confidence, some of us become courageous, others cowards.151 
 
The first analogue states that becoming virtuous is like acquiring a skill. The second 
analogue adds to this that the process of acquiring a skill can also result in a deficient 
skill. Therefore the habituation of character⎯since it is analogous to acquiring a 
skill⎯makes people become either virtuous or vicious. By implying that non-
habituated people are neither virtuous nor vicious, and that both good and bad 
craftsmanship results from habituation, Aristotle may mean that if people have not 
chosen how to habituate their characters, they cannot be morally assessed. They are 
neither good nor bad⎯just as those who have never had an opportunity to choose to 
learn to play cithara or build houses are not responsible for their performance should 
they to play or build. For despite Aristotle does not mention the concept of choice 
(prohairesis) here, he regards it as the condition of moral responsibility in EN 3.5152 
The third analogue creates a possibility for interpreting Aristotle to think that, as 
does Burnyeat, that teaching enables a child to identify good actions, and habituation 
the motivation to act well. In that analogue, Aristotle states that, just as with any 
skill, ‘so too in the case of virtues’ there is a need for a teacher (didaskalos). But 
straight after that claim he repeats his earlier claim that we become virtuous by 
habituation. So, although we acquire moral virtue by habituation that is opposed to 
the teaching, which is reserved for the virtues of thought (according to the beginning 
of EN 2.1), habituation nevertheless involves a teacher. To avoid contradiction, 
Aristotle must therefore refer to two different kinds of teaching in EN 2.1 with the 
same concept: probably, teaching for the virtues of thought, such as phronesis, in the 
beginning of the chapter, and teaching a child good actions in the third analogue.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Ibid. 1103b7–11 (R). 
151 Ibid. 1 1103b13–17 (R). 
152 See pp. 39-41 above for more discussion and textual references. 
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2.2 BURNYEAT’S INTERPRETATION OF EARLY MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
Burnyeat begins his interpretation by stating, in line with the conclusions reached in 
the previous section, that, according to Aristotle, ‘you’, if you are a child about to 
begin developing your character, need ‘someone around to tell you what is good and 
just’.153 Burnyeat’s interpretation, that also the third analogue of EN 2.1 seems to 
support, assumes that Aristotle explains the task of the teacher in early moral 
development in the following passage of EN 1.4. Let us quote Burnyeat’s translation: 
 
For while one must begin from what is familiar, this may be taken in two ways: some things are 
familiar to us, others without qualification. Presumably, then, we should begin from things familiar to 
us. This is the reason why one should have been well brought up in good habits [ethe] if the one is 
going to listen adequately to lectures about things good and just, and in general about political (social) 
affairs. For the beginning (starting-point) [arche] is ‘the that’ [to hoti] and if this is sufficiently 
apparent to a man, he will not in addition have a need for ‘the because [to dioti].154  
 
This passage is the only place in EN in which Aristotle uses the terms to hoti and to 
dioti. These concepts, however, also feature for example in Met. and An. Post. 2.155 
Burnyeat does not, however, consider any possible connections between those 
works⎯which I will attempt to chart in Chapter 3⎯and the concepts that he 
translates (literally) as ‘the that’ and ‘the because’ in EN 1.4. Instead, Burnyeat relies 
on the ancient commentators, Aspasius, Eustratius and Heliodorus, and on the basis 
of their comments, he takes ‘the that’ and ‘the because’ to mean this in EN 1.4: 156 
 
What is “the that”? The ancient commentators agreed that Aristotle has in mind knowledge about 
actions in accordance with virtues; these actions are the things familiar to us from which we must start 
and what we know about them is that they are good and just. […] That being so, if the student is to 
have “the that” for which the doctrines of Aristotle’s lectures provide the explanatory “because” […] 
the emphasis had better be on his knowing of specific actions that they are good and just in specific 
circumstances […] moral advice will come to him in fairly general terms.157 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Burnyeat 1980 p. 74. 
154 EN 1.4 1095b4–8, quoted in Burnyeat 1980, p. 71. 
155 See Met 1.1 980b24–981b7 and An. Post. 2.13 97b15–20. 
156 ‘So Aspasius, Eustratius, Heliodorus ad loc.’ (Burnyeat 1980, p. 88 n. 3). However, in Ch. 3, I will 
question the assumption that the epistemological theories of Met. and An. Post. are not relevant to EN. 
157 Burnyeat 1980, pp. 71–72 (italics mine). 
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For Burnyeat, ‘the that’ is ability to identify good actions in specific situations⎯the 
things familiar to us (see italics on the passage of EN 1.4)⎯‘the because’ to explain 
why they are good.158 In the lines in italics in the above quotation, Burnyeat seems to 
assume, moreover, that the teacher that Aristotle thinks habituation to involve in the 
third analogue of EN 2.1 has the task of teaching a child that certain actions are good, 
or, providing him with the knowledge of ‘the that’. Although Burnyeat does not 
explain what this teaching pedagogically involves, it seems to require at least that the 
teacher should tell the child which actions are good in which contexts; since good 
actions are particular, he should presumably give the child rules of thumb instead of 
strict principles. Once the child knows the good actions ‘in fairly general terms’, 
presumably, can roughly discriminate between moral contexts (e.g. whether one is at 
family dinner, workplace or with friends etc.) and good acting in each general 
context, he has ‘the that’, and is generally able to identify what he should do in order 
to eventually become the finely-habituated person whom he wants to become.  
 Although acting well for the sake of pleasure is insufficient motivation for moral 
virtue, as we concluded in Chapter 1, the prospect of pleasure, Burnyeat assumes, is 
nevertheless what motivates a child to improve his character until he or she is finely 
habituated.159 Burnyeat thinks that Aristotle presents such a view in these passages: 
In EN 2.3, the philosopher states:  
We must take as a sign (semeion) of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the 
man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who 
is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against the things that are terrible and 
delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral 
virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, 
and on account of the pain that we abstain from good ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up 
in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as to both delight in and to be pained by the 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Thus Aristotle’s distinction between to hoti and to dioti seems to correspond to the distinction 
between true beliefs and knowledge (true beliefs plus explanations for their goodness) in Plato’s Meno. 
159 See Burnyeat 1980, p. 82. 
160 EN 2.3 1104b3–13 (R).  
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In EN 10.9: 
[T]he soul of the student (of ethics) must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy 
and noble hatred, like earth, which is to nourish the seed.161 
 
In the former passage, Aristotle says that it is ‘a sign’ (semeion) of a temperate man 
that he enjoys abstaining from sensual pleasures, since if a man did not enjoy his 
own temperance, he would be intemperate⎯just as it is a sign of a courageous man 
that he does not feel pain in the face of terrible things. That is, a morally virtuous 
person enjoys acting virtuously, and that is the ‘sign’ that marks him as morally 
virtuous. Aristotle seems to explain later in the passage that pleasure is the sign of 
virtue due to the fact that people who enjoy bad instead of good actions tend to also 
act badly. For this reason, habituation to getting pleasure from virtuous acting is 
crucial for becoming virtuous. Aristotle emphasises this conclusion in the latter 
passage, in which he also goes on to claim that habituation to proper pleasures and 
pains is a necessary precondition for the successful study of ethics (and hence, also 
for the acquisition of full moral virtue that requires attending lectures in ethics).  
 For Burnyeat, these passages reveal that ‘Aristotle holds that to learn to do what is 
virtuous, to make it a habit or second nature to one, is among other things to learn to 
enjoy doing it, to come to take pleasure⎯appropriate pleasure⎯in doing it’.162 
‘Appropriate pleasure’, for which a finely-habituated person acts, argues Burnyeat, is 
the intrinsic pleasure of acting well (thereby echoing the motivation of a virtuous 
person, who performs good actions because they are good in themselves), and is thus 
opposed to instrumental pleasures such as ‘enjoying philosophy for the sense of 
power it can give’.163 Aristotle’s justification for such a restricted conception of 
appropriate pleasure comes in EN 1.8, where he states that ‘the things pleasant to the 
many (hoi polloi) conflict with one another, because such things are not pleasant by 
nature’.164 In the light of Aristotle’s justification, enjoying philosophy for the sake of 
some further end, such as the sense of power, is not an appropriate way to enjoy it, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 EN 10.9 1179a26–31(R). 
162 Burnyeat 1980, p. 177. 
163 Burnyeat 1980, p. 76. 
164 EN 1.8 1099a11. 
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because even some bad actions, for example persecuting philosophers⎯i.e. that are 
not enjoyable by nature⎯might give a sense of power to the agent. Thus, in brief, 
any pleasures that can result from either good or bad actions are improper for 
Aristotle, while only those that can result only from good actions are appropriate. 
  According to Burnyeat, a child may learn to take appropriate pleasure in acting 
well through habituation only: ‘the capacity for ‘noble joy and hatred’ grows from 
habituation […] what you love in this sense is what you enjoy or take pleasure in’.165 
Although Burnyeat does not explain in his article why he thinks that, according to 
Aristotle, only habituation can develop a disposition to enjoy from acting well, and 
no teaching is needed for that, a justification for his view is not difficult to construe. 
Aristotle states in EN 6.13 that everyone has a capacity that he calls natural virtue: 
 
Each of the several virtues is in some way present by nature: we are just, inclined to be moderate, and 
are courageous and the rest, immediately from birth. […] In both children and animals, natural virtues 
are present but they are manifestly harmful in the absence of thought (nous). […] Just as a strong body 
without eyesight will end up stumbling with considerable force because it is without sight, so it is also 
in this case.166 
 
In above passage, natural virtue seems to refer the to potential for being virtuous 
possessed by everyone since birth, albeit not actualised, because not everyone 
develops their nous into moral understanding⎯perhaps not even into the competence 
to identify good actions.167 Since acting virtuously is to realise the human good, by 
actualising our natural virtue, in acting virtuously we also fulfil our natural desire for 
the good.168 Thus, since Aristotle also thinks, according to EN 7.12, that the principal 
source of pleasure is the satisfaction of desires, and remaining in the state in which 
they are satisfied, progressing towards moral virtue by acting well should inevitably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Burnyeat 1980, pp. 77–8. 
166 EN 6.13 1144b3–8 (B&C). I think ‘inclined’ is a possibly misleading translation for echomen, e.g. 
‘adapted’ would be more consistent, as in EN 3.5 1114a31-b16 Aristotle rejects that the way in which 
thing appear to us, whether they seem good or not, depends upon our natural inclinations. 
167 Cf. EN 2.1 1103a24-5 (R) ‘Neither by nature nor contrary to nature virtues arise in us; rather, we 
are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.’ The passage that I have 
rendered in italics probably refers to natural virtue as everyone’s innate potential to become virtuous.  
168 See e.g. EN 1.1 1094a1: ‘Every skill and science, and similarly, all actions and choices seem to aim 
at realizing something good’. In the course of EN 1.4, Aristotle adds that the good realisable by acting 
is acting well or eudaimonia (while conceding that many people do not understand this connection). 
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bring a child pleasure by satisfying his natural desire towards the good more and 
more fully.169 Because only acting well can fully satisfy this desire by realising the 
human good, Burnyeat would have here a straightforward justification for thinking 
that moral motivation increases only through habituation and not through teaching.  
 Although we could thus think that people may develop motivation to act well 
through habituation only, if they have already been taught to identify good actions 
that they can habituate themselves to enjoy, only these factors do not, however, 
suffice to account for the development of full moral virtue even according to 
Burnyeat. As Aristotle says in Pol. 3.4 ‘when we speak of a morally virtuous person, 
we mean that he has the perfect (teleia) virtue. Thus, it is clearly possible to be a 
good person without having the virtue that constitutes the virtuous person’.170 Taking 
the step from fine habits to moral virtue, ‘the final correcting and perfecting of the 
that’,171 in Burnyeat’s words, is developing the firm motivation to act well, because 
acting well is good, not only because it is pleasant. Commanding one to act from this 
right reason is the task of the virtue of thought⎯phronesis⎯as I argued on p. 21 
above. Therefore, perfecting the motivation to perform good actions also requires 
receiving teaching, from which the virtue of thought arises, according to EN 2.1.172 
 Since phronesis, according to Aristotle, is excellence in deliberation (euboulia), 
reaching good actions on the basis of correct particular and universal premises,173 it 
is not concerned ‘only with particulars’⎯i.e. with ‘the that’⎯but ‘also deals with 
universals’174⎯i.e. with ‘the because’. Therefore developing phronesis must involve 
acquiring ‘the because’ (to dioti)⎯the understanding of why good actions are 
good⎯to complement ‘the that’ and fine habits. Since the aim of moral development 
is not to merely become a good person, but to acquire perfect moral virtue, as Pol. 
3.4 tells us, Burnyeat sees a similar implication in Aristotle’s quotation of Hesiod at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Apart from EN 7.12, see also EN 10.9 1175a29ff. Sherman (1989) appeals to this passage (on pp. 
183–9) to argue that since pleasure comes from the actualisation of a natural capacity, such as a 
capacity to act well, the more one actualises one’s natural capabilities, the more pleasure one gets. 
170 Pol. 3.4 1276b35. 
171 Burnyeat 1980 p. 74. 
172 See EN 2.1 1103a14–16, quoted on p. 54 above. 
173 Aristotle discusses euboulia in EN 6.9 1142b17–33, and says that it is a sign of phronimos in 31–2. 
174 EN 6.8 1141b14–16. 
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the end of EN 1.4: ‘the best is who knows (noein) all things’⎯that is, who 
understands why good actions are good⎯‘but good in his turn is he too who obeys 
one who reasons well’⎯i.e. a merely finely-habituated person.175 After acquiring 
‘the because’, a ‘person’s conception of what is truly pleasant’, writes Burnyeat, is 
‘shaped by his independent, reasoned conception of what is good, just as it was 
earlier shaped by his father’s or teacher’s advice’.176 Once the person understands 
why good actions are good, he begins to perform them because they are intrinsically 
good, not only because performing them feels pleasant. This understanding of ‘the 
because’, that we have seen to be a component of phronesis, comes, thinks Burnyeat, 
from listening to ‘lectures about things noble and just’.177 Such a theoretical teaching 
must be different from the more basic moral teaching, which consists only in 
showing a student good actions, and is involved in earlier moral development. 
 According to Burnyeat’s interpretation, Aristotle’s claims in EN 2.1 thus yield the 
following general conclusions about our moral development: we become morally 
virtuous through habituation that involves a teacher, and we acquire the virtues of 
thought to complement habituated character by teaching. The teacher is essential for 
habituation, because a child needs to be told which actions are good so that he can be 
successfully habituated into acting well and to come to take intrinsic pleasure in 
performing good actions. Such pleasure comes naturally from repeated performance 
of good actions, because acting well, insofar as it is the human good, satisfies our 
natural desire for the human good, even if we would not know why. This is the first 
step of moral development. Once childhood habituation is complete, a young person 
can take the second step and attend theoretical lectures in ethics so as to learn why 
good actions are good. This level of teaching may lead to the development phronesis 
when the person becomes an adult, which enables him to act well because acting well 
is intrinsically good, not only because it is pleasant⎯and thus to have moral virtue. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Burnyeat 1980, p. 71. 
176 Ibid., p. 88.  
177 Ibid., p. 72. 
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2.3 PROBLEMS IN BURNYEAT AND CURZER’S SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
Burnyeat’s interpretation is not, however, entirely unproblematic. As I indicated at 
the beginning of this chapter, I think there are at least two major problems with it. 
The first is exegetical, while the second relates to Aristotle’s conception of moral 
responsibility. Let us study the exegetical problem now. Burnyeat interprets Aristotle 
as thinking that the habit of acting well⎯which a young person must have, according 
to EN 1.4, so as to listen to ‘the lectures about things noble and just’, and thus for the 
virtue of phronesis to develop⎯results from performing actions that the person has 
been told to perform whilst still a child. In Aristotle, one and the same concept of 
teaching (didaskalia) should thus refer to two entirely different types of teaching, 
telling good actions to a child and lecturing about ethics, depending upon the context.  
 Although we have studied why such an interpretation might seem attractive in 
section 2.2 above, we may nevertheless wonder what teaching good actions to a child 
actually is, if it is not letting his listen to ‘lectures on things noble and just’ of which 
he may profit after he has finished his habituation. Aristotle, after all, never talks 
about what this supposed early moral teaching should involve; saying only that 
habituation needs a teacher in EN 2.1. Burnyeat might reply to this concern by saying 
that, according to common sense, teaching children to recognise good actions must 
simply be different, and a far less theoretical form of teaching than the instruction 
provided in lectures on ethics. A small child cannot be expected to be capable of 
learning good actions by coming to understand why they are good. Though Aristotle 
might seem to be in a position agree⎯and I hope to demonstrate in Chapter 3 that he 
indeed thinks that only identifying good actions does not presuppose phronesis ⎯in 
EN 10.9 he clearly maintains, however, that ‘reason and teaching (didaskalia) does 
never prevail with all, but [in order for them to prevail] the soul of the listener must 
be already habituated’.178 Not only benefitting from advanced, theoretical teaching 
for phronesis, but from teaching in general⎯such as from being taught which actions 
are good⎯requires that a child is already well-habituated. Since only finely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 EN 10.9 1179a26–31. 
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habituated people can morally profit from listening to teaching, there could not thus 
be two levels of moral teaching, one for children and another for already finely-
habituated people. Instead, moral teaching should be reserved only for the latter. 
The above considerations have encouraged Howard Curzer to remark in a paper 
Aristotle’s Painful Path to Virtue that Burnyeat’s interpretation is ‘misleading’:179 
  
Of course, if there were no other way to guide learners [apart from teaching them good actions], then 
Burnyeat’s interpretation might be charitable despite Aristotle’s protestations that ethics teaching 
presupposes that the learner already knows the that. However, there are various ways to keep learners 
on track without either giving them the that (i.e., teaching learners “this is the right thing to do in this 
situation”) or reducing education to mere mindless repetition (e.g., making learners stand fast in battle 
again and again no matter what the risk and likelihood of success). For example, one might merely 
prevent the learners from acting wrongly, allowing them to discover the right acts for themselves.180 
 
According to Curzer’s suggestion, a teacher (didaskalos) in habituation, according to 
EN 2.1, might not need to provide a child with any explicit teaching (didaskalia) 
about good actions, but simply let him discern good actions and acquire the ability to 
identify them on his own. At this stage of moral development, the teacher’s role is 
not to instruct, but to supervise and react. As we will see later in this chapter, Curzer 
thinks that instead of teaching good actions to children, moral teachers should mostly 
reproach and punish children if they act badly. This (what we may call as) preventive 
habituation, Curzer argues, prevents children from performing bad actions through 
developing a sense of shame in them, in contrast to Burnyeat, according to whom 
they will be naturally motivated to avoid bad actions by coming to enjoy acting well.  
Curzer’s suggestion avoids Burnyeat’s problems with Aristotle’s text. However, I 
think that Curzer fails to sufficiently develop it. He does not study the positive side 
of his suggestion, namely how preventing children from acting badly by habituating 
them to be sensitive to shame may help them to learn to identify good actions. Curzer 
only claims that it should help; with a sense of shame, people ‘come to choose, not 
just the acts they think are virtuous, but the acts that really are virtuous’.181 
Unfortunately this is not exactly what Aristotle seems to think. While describing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Curzer 2012, p. 332. The paper was first published in 2002, and revised in Curzer 2012.  
180 Ibid. 
181 Curzer 2012, p. 339. He does not quote Aristotle’s text to support this claim. 
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conception of good actions as avoidance of excess and deficiency in EN 2.9, the 
famous doctrine of the mean, Aristotle remarks that it is one thing to learn not to act 
in a way that would make one subject to shame⎯‘to depart from the most contrary to 
the mean’⎯but quite another to discern the truly virtuous thing to do⎯to ‘to hit the 
mean’.182 The implications of Curzer’s inattention to Aristotle’s view, together with 
the second problem in Burnyeat, become clear when we study their interpretations in 
the light of Aristotle’s conception of moral responsibility. 
 As we registered in Chapter 1, Aristotle thinks that one is responsible for his 
actions provided that one was able to rationally choose whether or not to habituate 
himself into certain ways of acting.183 The philosopher elaborates his view in EN 3.5: 
 
Since the object of rational desire is the end [i.e. the human good], whereas the objects of 
deliberation and rational choice (prohairesis) are the means conducive to the end, actions 
belonging to these means would be based on rational choice and be voluntary. And the activities of 
the virtues belong to these means. Virtue too, then is up to us and similarly vice as well.184  
 
In light of above passage, and considering Aristotle’s conception of rational choice 
as a choice made independently of any non-rational desire⎯as I interpreted it on p. 
31 above⎯it seems mysterious how one could become responsible for one’s actions 
if our preferences for acting result from external stimuli: in the case of finely-
habituated people, either from learning to avoid being ashamed in other people’s 
eyes, as Curzer thinks, or from coming to enjoy performing the actions that they have 
been taught to consider as good, as Burnyeat maintains. If you are habituated to 
either abstain from or enjoy certain actions, and you therefore eventually become 
finely habituated, it may be asked at which point you were able to independently 
choose to acquire fine habits and thus became entitled to the appropriate praise.185 
Provided that you only abstain from choosing to act badly, this does not imply that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 EN 2.9 1109a30–b1.  
183 See pp. 39-41 above. 
184 EN 3.5 1113b2–5. 
185 This question is esp. hard to answer due to Aristotle’s famous view in EN 10.9 11804-5 that moral 
habituation is roughly analogous to obedience to law, which is externally imposed and to be obeyed by 
necessity, not by choice (of which, apart from Burnyeat 1980, neither Sherman 1989, who assumes 
Aristotle habituation to involves also self-directed intellectual development, seems take into account). 
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you have made the choice to become finely habituated. Should we thus think that, 
unless someone first tried the vicious life and then rejected it, then returning to the 
good path of moral development (or vice versa if he were to be a morally bad 
person), Aristotle would not regard that person as responsible for his actions?  
 Burnyeat does not present any measures for avoiding this uncharitable 
implication, and it seems that he could not, because by assuming that children need 
to be taught good actions, he also assumes that they do not have the ability to choose 
good actions in advance of receiving this teaching. Since Curzer does not attempt to 
study how a child comes to identify good actions, neither does he have a solution to 
this problem. However, unlike Burnyeat, Curzer’s interpretation has logical space for 
a solution: if the child comes to avoid bad actions as a result of developing a sense of 
shame, it still remains possible that he could become genuinely responsible for his 
character. It is only required that before his character is fully ingrained, he develops 
the rational⎯or, dianoetikon, as we established at the end of Chapter 1⎯ability to 
identify good actions independently of any moral teaching he has received, and also 
from his sense of shame and desire for pleasure. With such ability the young person 
could rationally choose whether to steer his development towards moral virtue or not. 
 
2.4 CURZER’S INTERPRETATION AND ARISTOTLE’S TEXT 
Since Curzer’s interpretative suggestion seems to provides us with an attractive 
possibility for carving a way out of Burnyeat’s inability to accommodate Aristotle’s 
account of moral responsibility, we should perhaps take it us our starting-point for 
interpreting Aristotle’s theory of moral development until the point of acquiring good 
habits. However, we now have to study whether it is correct or not, and look to what 
Aristotle actually says about how to develop a sense of shame, as well as the 
contribution of this sense to moral development. Curzer suggest that avoiding 
punishment and reproach initially motivates a child to abstain from acting badly, and 
eventually, after having been punished and reproached many times, he becomes 
better able to anticipate which acts would be despicable to other people, i.e. he 
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acquires a sense of shame.186 Thus the proposal, albeit plausible as an account of 
the development of the sense of shame, leaves open how the child comes to identify 
good actions or becomes motivated to perform them. Burnyeat is no doubt right 
about the important motivating role of the noble pleasure that the satisfaction of the 
natural desire of the human good brings to a person who acts well.187 However, if 
early moral development were more about acquiring the sense of shame, instead of, 
pace Burnyeat, being told which kind of actions are good, then a child would need to 
learn to identify good actions independently, allowing him to eventually rationally 
choose to perform them, and be thus to become responsible for his future acts. 
 The main textual support for Curzer’s interpretation comes from EN 10.9. In a 
passage that follows the statement about the inability of all but finely-habituated 
people to profit from moral teaching (quoted on p. 53 above), Aristotle elaborates: 
 
While speeches [logoi] seem to have the power to encourage and stimulate the free youth (eleutheroi), 
and to make a character, which is of good birth (eugenos), and a true lover of what is good, ready to 
be possessed by virtue, they are not able to stimulate and encourage the many (hoi polloi) to nobility 
and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of aidos (shame, guilt, remorse) but only fear, 
and do not abstain from bad acts because of their shamefulness, but through fear of punishment).188  
 
It is not immediately obvious how this passage supports Curzer’s interpretation. 
Coming to see this requires us to analyse the text from its very first lines, in which 
Aristotle states that ‘free youth’ (eleutheroi) are ‘the lovers of what is good’, 
presumable meaning that they enjoy acting well, and keep away from acting badly. 
Since free youth are, however, neither morally virtuous⎯they are only ‘ready to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See Curzer 2012, p. 338. 
187 Curzer (Ibid.) questions Burnyeat’s interpretation that receiving pleasure is the most important 
motivation for a moral learner to act well on the basis of Aristotle’s never explicitly claiming this (p. 
325). He proposes (by appealing to EN 10.9 1179b7–13 on p. 337) that shame could be a more 
important force in leading people to act well. However, since we have seen Aristotle say, in EN 2.9 
(see p. 49 above), that learning to avoid bad actions does not help for discerning good actions, Curzer’s 
claim is hardly plausible. The sense of shame can therefore only steer a person away from bad actions, 
and since virtuous actions yield pleasure insofar as performing them satisfies our natural desire for the 
human good (a point made on p. 46 above), the pleasure of acting well remains a more probable 
candidate for the primary motivation for a moral learner to perform good actions. 
188 EN 10.9 1179b7–13. In 1180a4 Aristotle repeats that ‘the many obey necessity rather than 
argument, and punishments rather than what is noble’. 
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possessed by virtue’ at some point in the future189⎯are yet even identifiable with 
finely-habituated people,190 and are no more than ‘of good birth’ (eugenes), Aristotle 
seems to imply that that the free youth somehow want to act well and hate acting 
badly even before they are habituated to acting well. Aristotle also says that despite 
their lack of experience, the free youth can nevertheless be stimulated and 
encouraged by moral speech, probably because they already love what is good.  
 This claim might easily seem to contradict the philosopher’s earlier claim. For we 
have seen that Aristotle says, in the immediately preceding lines, quoted on p. 62 
above, that only finely-habituated people can profitably listen to moral teaching⎯a 
statement reflecting his views introduced in EN 1.3 and 1.4, that in order ‘to listen 
adequately lectures about things good and just’, one has to have fine habits and 
experience in moral life.191 There is, however, a way for us to read these two 
successive claims about the proper audience for moral speech in EN 10.9 that avoids 
the contradiction. We can assume that in the former claim, Aristotle, by denying the 
capability of unhabituated people to benefit from moral teaching, may refer to the 
same moral teaching to which he refers in EN 1.4⎯that is, listening to lectures in 
ethics to learn phronesis. In the latter claim, the philosopher does not, however, even 
mention teaching (didaskalia), but only speech (logos), which he suggests can 
encourage and stimulate morally uneducated and unhabituated youth, provided that 
they only love what is good. Now, listening to moral speech is presumably less 
cognitively demanding than attending philosophical lectures on ethical matters. 
Although a person might be unable to adequately listen to such lectures without 
moral habituation and experience in life, he can, we may presume, nevertheless be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 This view may seem to depict Aristotle as an elitist who thinks that only the free youth, the 
offspring of people who had citizens right in Ancient Athens, are fit to become finely habituated, 
because they are of a better nature than the many. However, he could also be taken to think that the 
superior educability of the free youth derives only from the fact that they tend to live in an 
environment that prompts them to develop a strong sense of shame. If we adopt this more pragmatic 
view, then Aristotle could think anyone who lives in a proper environment could become like a free 
youth in this relevant respect and thus become finely habituated. Also Curzer adopts such a view. 
190 Aristotle denies in EN 1.3 1095a5–10 (B&C) that youth could be sufficiently experienced or 
habituated to attend ethical teaching: ‘hence of the political (ethical) art, a young person is not an 
appropriate student, for he is inexperienced in the actions pertaining to life […] further, because he is 
disposed to follow passions (i.e. does not have a finely-habituated character) he will listen pointlessly 
and unprofitably, since the end involved is not knowledge but action’. 
191 See previous footnote and EN 1.4 1095b4–8, quoted on p. 56 above. 
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stimulated and encouraged by moral speech if he only enjoys virtuous acting. 192  
If this conclusion, by which Aristotle could avoid contradicting himself in EN 
10.9, is correct, Burnyeat could not be right in claiming that we have to be taught 
good actions in order to ever come to enjoy performing them. Instead, Aristotle 
seems to think that we cannot listen to moral speech unless we already enjoy acting 
well and hate bad actions. This is what Curzer’s interpretation implies. According to 
Curzer, the sense of shame, which brings one to abhor bad acting, is not taught⎯just 
as the desire to act well, natural virtue, is in us by nature according to Aristotle.193  
At the end of the above passage, Aristotle ascertains that having a sense of shame 
is what differentiates the free youth, who are apt to become inspired by right moral 
speech and therefore to develop fine characters, from other people, or ‘the many’ 
(hoi polloi), who abstain from acting badly only because they are afraid of 
punishment, and who neither respond to right moral speech nor can expect to 
develop fine characters. Here is Curzer’s textual basis for claiming the importance of 
developing a sense of shame in early moral development. Since the many are not 
‘incurably bad’, according to Aristotle,194 something should presumably enable even 
them to develop a sense of shame. By now, it is clear that it would be quite useless to 
begin their moral habituation from teaching them which actions are good. Curzer 
thinks that Aristotle therefore considers the natural fear of punishment to be the 
catalyst of this process.195 We have seen that Curzer thinks that the principal role of a 
teacher in habituation is to prevent the child from acting wrongly by developing a 
sense of shame in him. Such a preventive habituation might (if we are charitable to 
Aristotle) eventually get even ‘the many’ to desire to act virtuously⎯i.e. to become 
like the free youth in this morally relevant respect, able to take the right moral speech 
to their hearts and focus on habituating their characters towards moral virtue.196  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Curzer 2012 notices this solution to Aristotle’s apparent contradiction on p. 334–5.  
193 See Curzer 2012, p. 332, quoted on p. 63 above. For natural virtue, see p. 59 above. 
194 In EN 10.9 1180a3–10 Aristotle says that the many who ‘disobey and are of inferior nature’ to 
virtuous people should be punished, as opposed to ‘incurably bad’ people, whom even punishment 
does not help, and who should thus be ‘completely expelled’ from the moral community. This remark 
implies that the many can develop at least a sense of shame through receiving punishment.  
195 Curzer p. 337.  
196 Cf. EN 10.9 1180a1-4, in which Aristotle states that laws can habituate people further. This may be 
taken to indicate that rights laws can improve ‘the many’ to desire to act well. 
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Curzer suggests that our natural fear of punishment could develop into a sense of 
shame through the cognitive process that he calls ‘internalizing punishments’.197 
Curzer describes this process as follows: ‘the many move from being punished for 
vicious acts to punishing themselves for vicious acts. After her parents have scolded 
and grounded Betty several times for getting drunk [for example], she almost hears 
their voices in her head when she wakes up with a hangover’.198  This psychological 
experience, according to Curzer, makes Betty desire to abstain from excessive 
drinking⎯not because she anticipates that her parents could actually punish her for 
her excessive drinking⎯she is aware that they might not even know that she has 
been drinking again⎯but because she recognises that excessive drinking is acting 
badly. Only acting well, consciously of the goodness of her actions, would therefore 
silence her internal voices. Did he cease drinking primarily in order to silence her 
internal voices? Or was it to avoid punishment? In that case, another voice might 
probably reproach her for not being honest or properly respectful to her parents, etc. 
In brief, she would not be able to prevent her action from having shameful aspects, of 
which she is now afraid was she not acting well because of the intrinsic value of 
acting well.199 As Aristotle writes in Rhet. 2.6: ‘shame is the impression of dishonour 
that makes us to avoid [dishonour] as such and not because of its consequences.’200 
When Betty has thus acquired a sense of shame, she has become aware of that acting 
well is valuable as such. I think that her awareness should bring her pleasure, for he 
now perceives that acting well for this right reason realises the human good and thus 
satisfies her natural desire for the good. Since we humans are motivated to learn what 
brings us pleasure, she is now ‘stimulated and encouraged’ by moral speech. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Perhaps EN 2.9 1190b1-7 could support Curzer’s claim. In that passage Aristotle compares 
habituation to straightening crooked wood. Cf. Prot. 325d in which Plato uses a similar metaphor to 
argue that moral habituation can be very painful, even violent process.  
198 Curzer 2012, p. 337. 
199 Inglis 2014, pp. 279-80 makes the same conclusion.  
200 Rhet 2.6 1384a22. Aristotle continues by stating that ‘people before whom we feel shame are those 
whose opinion matter to us.’ One may now think that the sense of shame thus presupposes that we can 
choose (prohairesthai) whose opinions to regard as important. But we have capacity for prohairesis 
only once we can rational discern good and bad actions, which, according to my interpretation, the 
sense of shame should precede. To counter this objection, I would point out that Aristotle does not 
think that children choose to respect e.g. their parents, but rather claims they respect them by having 
been ‘born of them’, because ‘they are the causes of their being and nourishment’ etc. (EN 8.12) 
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 Curzer’s interpretation enables us to read the passage of EN 1.4, the only place 
in EN in which Aristotle discusses the concepts to hoti and to dioti, slightly 
differently to the way in which Burnyeat reads it⎯as we have seen on p. 47 above. 
According also to Curzer, to hoti signifies the competence to identify good 
actions.201 But pace Burnyeat⎯we can conclude on the basis of Curzer’s arguments 
reviewed above⎯it is probably not acquired through obediently listening to moral 
teachers’ advice about which actions are good. Rather, anyone with a sense of shame 
can be motivated and can acquire to hoti, even without receiving explicit moral 
teaching. Curzer does not tell us, however, exactly how one may acquire it. Since 
Aristotle emphasised, however, in EN 10.9, that a sense of shame enables the free 
youth to be stimulated and encouraged by moral speech, we may assume that the 
people with a sense of shame could somehow develop the ability to identify good 
actions by listening to other people’s moral speech. Once the people with a sense of 
shame can identify good actions, they could choose to begin to habituate themselves 
to acting well, become eventually finely-habituated, and ready to cultivate phronesis. 
 
2.5 SYNESIS⎯THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY GOOD ACTIONS 
In this section, I attempt to show that synesis, ability that Aristotle introduces in EN 
6.10, is a dianoetikon ability with which people can discern good actions on the basis 
of listening other people’s opinions. I therefore argue that synesis has a wider area of 
operation, going beyond merely assessing the moral opinions of other people, than 
many previous interpreters have suggested. However, I reject that synesis must hence 
be a virtue of thought, because on my interpretation, it belongs to most people. 
 In the previous section, we have discovered that in order to be able to choose to 
act well, which is precondition for moral responsibility, one needs to have a rational 
ability to identify good actions, as only habituation cannot provide us independent 
choice. At most, as we have seen Curzer to convincingly argue, it can instil the sense 
of shame in us, which enables us to abstain from acting badly. As we have learned in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Ibid. pp. 321-2. 
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section 2.3 above, only abstaining from shameful actions is not, however, yet acting 
well, which, as Aristotle elaborates in EN 2.6, is acting ‘at the right times, with 
reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in 
the right way’.202 Neither can the ability to identify good actions be exhaustively 
taught to us, pace Burnyeat, by moral teachers, through telling which actions are 
good⎯because then it would not suffice to ground our moral responsibility, as we 
registered in section 2.3 above. In order to enable to a person choose his actions, and 
thus justify his moral responsibility, the person’s ability to identify good actions 
should be such that he can develop it independently of the (possibly mistaken) 
conceptions of good that people may try to teach to him. Only with this condition can 
that ability enable him to genuinely choose his actions. Therefore we should expect 
Aristotle to establish somewhere in EN that we have an ability to identify good 
actions, which is not taught, and which virtually all people with a sense of shame, 
who can discern bad actions⎯that is, most people⎯can acquire.203 This ability 
would presumably correspond with the aspect of nous that apprehends particular 
good actions without deducing them from universals as discussed on pp. 47-7 above.   
 In his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of moral development, Curzer does not, 
however⎯unfortunately⎯even raise the question of how we can come to identify 
good actions. He only successfully challenges Burnyeat’s interpretation that we learn 
to identify them by being told which actions are good⎯but does not present any 
alternative way of learning to identify them. But unlike Burnyeat’s interpretation, 
Curzer’s has a logical space for the ability to identify good actions, which operation 
not at all determined by how one has been habituated to act in his early moral 
environment, and what acting he might have been taught to regard as good earlier. 
Only such ability that can remain unaffected by non-rational desires⎯and which also 
therefore must belong to nous, to its aspect that pertains to particular actions⎯could 
ensure that a young person can choose to take the first step towards virtue, become a 
finely-habituated person, who may then attend lectures in ethics, which shall help 
him to acquire phronesis and become virtuous, or, refuse to take it, and become bad.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 EN 2.6 1106b20–23. 
203 See footnote 150 on p. 59 above for reference.  
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 In EN 6.10, which is one of the least studied sections of EN, Aristotle describes a 
rational ability, which he calls synesis (often translated, misleadingly, as we will see 
below, as ‘comprehension’204or ‘understanding’205). This ability, acquiring which 
should be in most people’s reach and which, thinks Aristotle, is acquired ‘by nature’ 
(physei)206 could allow us to identify good actions, and thus become responsible for 
our actions. Let me now quote entire EN 6.10 in five subsections: 
 
1. There is also synesis and good synesis, with reference to which we speak of those who use synesis 
or use synesis well. Synesis is in general neither the same things as proper knowledge (episteme), nor 
the same thing as opinion (doxa) (in which case everyone would have synesis) nor any one of the 
particular sciences (kata meros epistemoun)⎯for example, medicine, which is concerned with the 
matters of health, and geometry, with magnitudes. Synesis is concerned neither with beings that are 
eternal and unmoved nor with just any one or every one of the things that come into being, but rather 
with the things about which someone might be perplexed and deliberate. Hence it is concerned with 
the same things as moral understanding (phronesis). 
2. Synesis and moral understanding (phronesis) is not the same, however, for moral understanding is 
characterized by the giving of commands (epitaktikei estin): its  end is what one ought or ought not to 
do. But synesis is characterized by discernment (krisis) alone. For synesis and good synesis, as well as 
those who use synesis and those who do so well, is the same thing.  
3. And synesis is neither having moral understanding nor gaining it (oute to lambaneim phronesis).  
4. Rather, just as learning is said to be using synesis (synienai), whenever it makes use of proper 
knowledge, so synesis is said to consists of making use of opinion to render a discernment about what 
someone else says (allou legontos), regarding the matters moral understanding is concerned with–and 
rendering such a discernment nobly. For doing something well is the same as doing it nobly 
5. And from this [ability], the name ‘synesis’⎯in reference to which we speak of those who are of 
good synesis (eusynetoi)⎯has been derived, namely, from the synesis involved in learning 
(manthanein). For we often say learning when we mean using synesis. 
 
Some of the most recent commentators of EN, Broadie and Rowe, with Bartlett and 
Collins, seem to pass EN 6.10 without giving it much attention, assuming that synesis 
is exclusively a part of phronesis and therefore thinking that what Aristotle says here 
rephrases what he says earlier about phronesis, only with emphasis to its discerning 
instead of deliberative aspect.207 Perhaps the most attentive recent readings of the 
passage can be found in Norman Dahl’s book, Practical Reason, Aristotle and The 
Weakness of Will, in which Dahl dedicates a section to it, and in one Robert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 See e.g. Rowe and Broadie 2002, and (B&C) 2011 
205 See e.g. Ross 1995. 
206 EN 6.11 1143b7–9. See p. 110 below for more study on Aristotle’s expression ‘by nature’ in EN. 
207 E.g. Rowe and Broadie 2002, and (B&C) 2011 ad loc. However, of the earlier commentators, 
Gauthier and Jolif 1958 distinguish synesis from phronesis (see fn. 211 below).  
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Louden’s article. Both Dahl and Louden notice that synesis must differ from 
phronesis. Dahl writes, ‘[s]ynesis is like a purely intellectual or speculative grasp of 
moral ends, for it is primarily exercised when one passes judgment on the advice or 
moral pronouncements of someone else.’208 Louden would give a wider range of 
application for synesis as capacity to ‘issue a correct judgement of someone else’s 
choice or action’ apart from merely judging his moral pronouncements or advice.209 
 Dahl and Louden’s shared conclusion, that synesis is a speculative ability that is 
only concerned with judging other people’s moral positions, comes from two 
passages of EN 6.10. Aristotle remarks in passage 4 that synesis is said to be a 
correct opinion (doxa) about what someone else says about moral matters, and in 
passage 2, he distinguishes phronesis and synesis by stating that the synesis does not 
give commands, but only discerns. Dahl assumes, apparently following Gauthier and 
Jolif, that this distinction is between ‘[moral] knowledge that is motivationally 
grounded thus has an effect on what a person does and [moral] knowledge that may 
function only on a speculative level’.210 Louden adds, going more beyond Aristotle’s 
words, that a ‘synetos is in effect a very good listener and a perceptive critic.’211   
 The claim that synesis ‘may not’ be motivationally grounded seems plausible, as 
even an akratic has a correct moral judgement of other people’s moral opinions.  
Moreover, Aristotle’s statement in the passage 2, that only phronesis ‘epitaktikei 
estin,’212 while synesis is only ‘kritikon’, possibly comes from Plato’s Statesman, in 
which Socrates distinguishes the commanding (epitaktikon) activity of kings from 
the judgement (krisis) of judges. 213 Since Socrates employs this distinction to convey 
that only the epitaktikon activity leads to action⎯which is why it properly belongs to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Dahl 1984, p. 46. 
209 Louden 1997, p. 112. Italics removed. 
210 Dahl 1985, p. 46. Cf. Gauthier and Jolif (1950), p. 230, who comment the passage 2 as follows: ‘la 
sagesse [phronesis] requiert quelque chose de plus [to synesis]: il requiert l’intervention du désir 
rectifié par le vertus morales. For their extended commentary, see fn. 216 below.  
211 Louden 1997, p. 113, paraphrasing Stewart 1892 ad loc. 
212 Aristotle mentions that phronesis is epitaktike also in EN 6.13 1145a9.	  
213 See Plato, Stat. 260c. One might think that if Aristotle takes this analogue seriously, he would think 
that synesis should thus presuppose phronesis (like Aquinas according to Ojakangas 2013, see fn. 223 
below), because for Plato, good judges are phronimoi I think, however, that Aristotle would not have 
used Plato’s analogue to extract this specific conclusion, because, after all, also good kings are 
phronimoi for Plato – which would made the analogue useless in comparing synesis and phronesis.  
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kings⎯Aristotle wants to convey here that only phronesis entails that its possessor 
acts well.214 Gauthier and Jolif did not register that Aristotle might refer to this 
particular passage in Plato, but they mention (without referring to any specific 
passage in Plato) that Aristotle’s distinction is preceded by Plato’s very similar 
distinction,215 and noticed that the passage 1, in which Aristotle says that synesis ‘is 
concerned with the same things (peri ta auta) as phronesis’, may have a similar 
implication even on its own. If the judgements of synesis and phronesis concern the 
same things, then these judgements must have some difference in order to warrant 
the separation of these abilities; and this difference, they suggest, could be that the 
latter judgement also contains a motivating imperative to perform the good action.216  
 The ensuing conclusion that synesis does not have a power to command action 
does not need to mean, however, that synesis must operate without corresponding 
moral motivation. Since with non-phronimoi, the factor that determines whether a 
person will act in accordance with his moral discernments or not is whether his non-
rational desires have been properly habituated or not (as I shall show in Chapter 3 
below), also synesis could be ‘motivationally grounded’. Morally well-habituated 
people would presumably not very easily ignore the discernments of their synesis 
about other people’s moral views, but respect them in their pursuit of acting finely.  
 On the basis of this specification that also Dahl and Louden’s interpretation allow, 
I would like, however, to challenge their shared conclusion that synesis should judge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 If Aristotle had disagreed with Plato here, he would have presumably justified his disagreement as 
he does in the other places in which he disagrees with Plato (cf. EN 1.6). This time he employs, 
however, Plato’s distinction without even giving credit his predecessor, as if taking it as granted.   
215 Gauthier and Jolif (1958), p. 528: ‘Platon distingue expressément entre la connaissance judicative, 
kritike, et la connaissance impérative, epitaktike.’	  
216 Ibid. p. 531. Here Gauthier and Jolif use quite Kantian language, according to the scholarly fashion 
of the 1950s, but it does not obscure the point of their observation: ‘Ce qui distingue donne le 
jugement de la synesis, qui n'est qu'un jugement, du jugement impératif de la sagesse, ce n'est pas son 
contenu: Aristote y insiste fortement, c’es deux jugements ont même objet. […] Ils se prononcèrent 
l'un et autre sur l'action morale concrète, ils disent l'un et autre ce que je dois faire hic et nunc, le 
judgement de la synesis, parce qu'il s'exprime en termes de pure raison, met l'accent sur l'obligation 
rationnelle et énonce a l'indicatif: 'je dois, hic et nunc, faire cette action.'  […] ‘Au contraire, le 
jugement impératif de la sagesse [i.e. phronesis], parce qu'il à opéré sa jonction avec le désir rectifié 
par les vertus morales, va plus avant: il met l'accent, non plus sur l'obligation, c'est affaire entendue, 
mais sur l'action à poser effectivement, et il prononce plus  l'indicatif, mais à l'impératif, e il ne dit 
plus: 'je dois hic et nunc faire cette action-ci', mais bien: 'fais hic et nunc cette action que tu dois faire.'  
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exclusively other people’s moral views and actions.217 What could using synesis in 
a ‘motivationally grounded’ way mean if not using the discernments of synesis about 
other people’s moral views to evaluate one’s own acting in the light of those views, 
and to improve it? Moreover, even the morally unmotivated people, who fail to use 
their synesis to improve their own acting, should, l believe, be capable of using 
synesis to evaluate their own acting. To arrive at this conclusion, we should only 
consider Aristotle’s description about the epistemic nature of synesis in passage 1. 
 The philosopher begins passage 1 by eliminating the possibilities that synesis is 
science (episteme), opinion (doxa) or a particular science (kata meros episteme). For 
Aristotle, proper episteme is based on unchangeable universal principles,218 but he 
states synesis is not concerned with such principles (this shows that ‘comprehension’ 
or ‘understanding’ are bad translations, because one could be said to comprehend or 
understand, for example, mathematical axioms, which belong to episteme). Synesis is 
not an opinion, because opinions can be about impossible things, but synesis is a 
practical ability.219 Neither can synesis be a particular science, such as medicine or 
geometry. As Aristotle’s	  examples	  in	  passage	  1	  show, by this concept Aristotle refers 
to crafts based on applying more or less universal principles to particular cases, one 
of which synesis neither is. Geometry uses fully universal principles, while medicine 
applies generalisations, so synesis does not apparently use either, but pertains only to 
particulars. After attempting to establish with what synesis is not, Aristotle proceeds 
to conclude, as emphasised by Gauthier and Jolif, that synesis ‘is concerned with the 
same things as phronesis,’ i.e. with ‘human goods,’ and in particular, with actions.220  
 Good actions are not discoverable through the application of certain principles to 
particular cases, but require discerning the moral demands of circumstances as we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Dahl 1984, p. 46 and Louden 1997, p. 112.  
218 For Aristotle’s definition of episteme, see A. Post 1.33 88b30–7, Met .7.15 1040a1–2 and EN 6.3 
1139b19–24. Cf. Met. 6.2 1027a19-21, in which he thinks that (certain) sciences are, however, such in 
which truths hold only for the most part (just as in ethics). In DPA 639b21-640a8, he clarifies that 
physics and other natural sciences can be distinguished from theoretical sciences, such as astrology and 
theology. This distinction seems to point out that in natural sciences, just as in ethics, theories can be 
based on generalisations, but in unqualified (theoretical) sciences, always on unchangeable universals. 
219 Cf. EN 3.1 111b31, in which Aristotle states opinion can be about anything, even the impossible.   
220 See EN 6.5 1140b21 for the first quotation. Aristotle specifies that, in particular, phronesis deal 
with good actions in EN 6.7 1141b21 to differentiate it from sophia, which also is concerned with 
good, even the ‘best things in the world’ (1141a21), but not with actions. See Bataillard 1997 for more 
discussion about Aristotle’s possible reasons, including this, for differentiating phronesis from sophia. 
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concluded at the end of Chapter 1. Good actions are thus such as that in order to be 
good at all, they must be good for someone, at some specific time and place. Since an 
agent’s personal situation thus affects which acting would be good for him, a synetos, 
so as to be able to discern good actions, would not only need to discern the moral 
opinions of other people, but also be able to relate them to his personal circumstances 
and aims. On account of its reflective nature, Gauthier and Jolif thus even chose to 
translate synesis as ‘la conscience’.221 If synesis comes with acquiring the sense of 
shame, with the consciousness (‘la conscience’ in French) that certain actions are bad 
irrespective of whether punishments would ensue from them, but because other 
people would not approve them, as I suggested on pp. 68-9 above, a person with 
synesis could perhaps identify good actions with e.g. the aid of this reflection: ‘is 
doing this what other people would approve doing in my situation?’222  
 Let us now proceed to passage 2, in which Aristotle continues, as we have already 
registered, by stating that phronesis commands, while synesis only discern. Some 
interpreters have doubted whether synesis can discern good actions without the 
antecedent command of phronesis to seek such actions, but if it could discern them 
on the basis of the sense of shame only, this doubt would disappear.223 If only 
phronesis implies that its possessor also acts well⎯which was the point of Plato’s 
comparison between the ‘kings’ and ‘judges’⎯then even the person who has a finely 
habituated character, but not yet phronesis, might sometimes fail to act well. I study 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Gauther and Jolif (1958). Notice that French ‘la conscience’ is not synonymous to the English 
‘conscience’. The French term can mean also a person’s moral ‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness’, without 
implying⎯like the English concept of conscience⎯that ‘it is not the opinions of others, not even 
public norms, but his inner voice that has ultimate authority over him.’ (Ojakangas 2013, p. 3). 
222 In contemporary virtue ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse (2000) has proposed a quite similar model for 
identifying right actions: ‘An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a completely 
virtuous agent would characteristically A in C’ (p. 7). The only difference between her and Aristotle’s 
possible model is that the philosopher would replace the condition ‘a completely virtuous agent would 
characteristically A in C’ with ‘other people would approve A-ing in C’. Interestingly, this difference 
would make Aristotle immune to a certain objection to Hursthouse. Namely, Johnston (2003) has 
argued that it is not always either right or good to act as a virtuous person would act (pp. 816–20). For 
example: if someone, who is not able to stop drinking alcohol once he begins, wants to recover from 
her addiction, he should not attempt to drink moderately (as a virtuous person would), but stop 
drinking altogether. This is also the kind of acting that people around him would recommend to him.  
223	  E.g. Ojakangas 2013, p. 51. According to him, in ‘Nicomachean Ethics we find a notion that [as 
Aquinas comments it] perfectly fits with Aquinas’ definition of conscientia [in ST] This notion is 
synesis’, and in Aquinas, conscientia “makes judgement’ using the intellectual habit of phronesis.’	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how phronesis could improve even a finely-habituated person’s propensity to act 
well in Chapter 4, which would offer light also on Aristotle’s reasons for insisting in 
EN 6.13, quoted on p. 22 above, that one can be properly virtuous only once he has 
phronesis. Aristotle stresses, however, in passage 3, that synesis is not acquiring or 
having phronesis (oute to lambaneim phronesis). This claim can be taken in two 
ways: either confirming that synesis must be a part of phronesis, because it does not 
help in acquiring phronesis, or, alternatively, that only having synesis does not yet 
imply that its possessor will acquire phronesis. The former interpretation that assume 
that having discerning ability must entail having also the commanding capacity, 
would however, clash with Plato’s comparison⎯according to which there are people 
that can judge without commanding⎯which might well be a source for Aristotle’s 
account of the respective tasks of synesis and phronesis: judging and commanding. 
 Passage 2 also allows considering synesis as an ability that even not-yet-morally-
habituated people can have. Provided that having synesis does not imply acquiring 
phronesis, and since a person with a habit of acting well is in the process of acquiring 
phronesis, then synesis could also belong even to those who do not have developed a 
firm motivation to act well. This is how it could ground our responsibility for 
actions: with synesis, one could discern (krinein) good actions before being motived 
to perform them. We have noticed Aristotle to say in EN 3.5 (see pp. 40-1 above), 
that such discernment enables us to choose (prohairesthai) our actions on the basis of 
deliberation, which, in turn, accounts for our responsibility for the results of those 
choices. The discernment of good actions by synesis is therefore different from the 
intuition of the nature of eudaimonia by nous, to which all that we do can be ascribed 
according to EN 3.5 1114b15 (see p. 42 & 46-7 above). Performing the actions that 
we have chosen to perform with synesis shape this intuition either towards, or away 
from, the correct conception of eudaimonia, and teaching (see p. 113 below) could 
enable us to articulate it: say what we think realising eudaimonia requires from us. 
 Passage 4 seems to shed more light on the way in which synesis identifies good 
actions. The passage is, however, difficult to unpack. Aristotle seems to formulate it 
as an analogue between the way in which people speak of synesis, and his conception 
of the operation of synesis. Even the sentence with which the analogue begins seems, 
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however, incoherent. Aristotle writes ‘learning is said to be using synesis whenever 
it makes use of proper knowledge’, although he has just explicitly denied in passage 
1 that synesis is concerned with proper knowledge. In order to make sense of the 
sentences, we must thus assume that he, as the phrase ‘is said to be’ (legetai) 
indicates, is now exposing the opinion of some other people, with which he does not, 
however, agree. If this reading is right, then the diversity in people’s conceptions of 
what synesis is may explain why passage 1 is relatively lengthy compared to the rest 
of Aristotle’s arguments in EN 6.10: he had to make clear there that not all common 
conceptions of synesis refer to the conception of synesis that he has now in mind. 
 Back in passage 4, in the second sentence of the analogue, Aristotle defines 
synesis as an ability that uses the opinions of the others in order to discern which 
actions are good, that is, from someone else’s speech about the matters with which 
phronesis is concerned (that is, about how one ought to act), which also reaches the 
discernment well, or, nobly. This statement could follow from the first sentence only 
provided that the parallel Aristotle wants to draw between his and some other 
people’s conception of synesis is only the fact that both conceptions see the most 
important aspect of synesis to be making use of other people’s opinions. Despite their 
mutual differences, both mentioned conceptions of synesis share this view. For even 
the word synesis⎯in virtue of its beginning, syn-, which refers to doing something 
‘with other people’ in Greek⎯emphasises this.224 In this case, if Aristotle’s analogue 
were about the necessity of other people for the operation of synesis, this would lend 
support to my suggestion that synesis could operate as reflection on whether other 
people would approve of my performing certain action in my situation. 
 Since Aristotle emphasises that synesis and good synesis are the same in passage 
2, the last sentence of passage 4 should imply that a person does not have synesis at 
all provided that he does not discern good actions ‘nobly or well’, that is, that he 
does not reach a true identification of good action. Since only truly good actions are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Louden 1997 suggests (p. 113), without referring to any Aristotle’s text mentioning synesis, but to 
Pol. 3.2 1281b31, in which the philosopher claims that ‘multitude of people should share deliberation 
(boulesis) and judging (krinein)’ that synesis might be used in judging political matters together with 
other people. Also this interpretation would of course capture the ‘doing with other people’ implication 
of the prefix syn -, but it is speculative unlike my interpretation. For the history of concept of synesis 
(and a closely related concept of syneidesis) that notices its political connotations, see e.g. Seel 1953.  
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unqualifiedly good actions, synesis may enable a person not only to discern 
whether some action would be good from other people’s subjective viewpoints, but 
also to discern whether that action is also good without qualification, and thus truly 
good. However, provided that a person of synesis does not yet have phronesis, he 
does not know why those actions that he discerns to be truly good are good. One may 
now wonder, however, how one could possibly reliably identify an action as 
unqualifiedly good without knowing why it is good⎯could not other people’s 
opinion about the goodness of some actions quite often be biased according to their 
own interests, unintentionally misguided, or plain wrong? We will deal with this 
important and difficult question in Chapter 3, of which the entire last half is 
dedicated to the topic. At this time, I present another significant, though less 
complicated objection to my interpretation, which we can suitably address within the 
confines of this chapter.  
If my above interpretation of synesis were endorsed to complement Curzer⎯as 
showing how people with a sense of shame could recognise good actions and thus be 
justifiably responsible for their acting⎯then synesis might seem to be a virtue of 
thought. Since synesis identifies only those actions as good that are truly good, it 
clearly seems to consist in excellence in identifying good actions. As virtues of 
though aim at truth, as opposed to moral virtues that aim at realising the human good, 
and having synesis does not yet imply that one is motivated to perform the actions 
that one identifies as good, synesis seems to fill the criteria of being a virtue of 
thought. Louden thus thinks that synesis is a virtue of thought; and this might be why 
he labelled synetos as ‘a very good listener and a perceptive critic’, which we might 
expect from a person possessing the virtue of thought.225 If synesis were a virtue of 
thought, this would also conveniently explain why Aristotle remarks at the end of EN 
1.13⎯which is one of two places in EN apart from 6.13 in which the concept of 
synesis is mentioned⎯‘we speak (legomen) that some of the virtues [i.e. those that 
are not moral] are of thought […] wisdom (sophia), phronesis and synesis’226.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Louden 1997, p 112. 
226EN 1.13 1103a5. Another places in which Aristotle mentions synesis are EN 10.9 1180a17–19, in 
which he remarks that ‘those who have experience (empereia) discern each thing rightly, and they 
 80 
This attractive and apparently innocent conclusion, that synesis could be a 
virtue, would, however, put my interpretation under threat. It could be used to argue 
that Burnyeat’s interpretation of Aristotle's model of early moral development could 
be right. Although the philosopher thinks that developing fine habits does not 
presupposes teaching, acquiring them requires having synesis to identify good 
actions, and synesis, insofar it is a virtue of thought as Aristotle told in EN 1.13, has 
to be taught according to Aristotle's claim in EN 2.1, quoted on p. 50 above. Since 
Burnyeat suggests that teaching is the starting point of moral development, his 
interpretative tenet may now seem correct. People may learn synesis by being taught 
which actions are good, and acquiring it then enables them to perform them and 
eventually acquire finely-habituated characters. Thus Curzer and I may seem to be 
ultimately wrong in interpreting Aristotle as thinking that acquiring fine habits does 
not probably require a moral teacher to explicitly tell the good actions to a student.  
 I have, however, a reply to above objection. The last passage of EN 6.10⎯5 in my 
above numbering⎯which we have not yet taken into account, can be interpreted to 
imply that the synesis of EN 1.13⎯that which we call (legomen) as a virtue of 
thought⎯may not be the same as the synesis that comes to Aristotle’s attention in 
EN 6.10.  The philosopher, after all, frequently uses his concepts in many senses: e.g. 
logos means sometimes (what we may translate as) the faculty reason, other times 
only argument or speech. The following consideration shows, I believe, that the 
sense of synesis in EN 6.10 is quite different than in 1.13. In passage 5, Aristotle 
concludes that the notion of synesis ‘in reference to which we speak (legomen) of 
those who are of good synesis’ derives from ‘the synesis involved in learning.’ The 
first half of Aristotle’s statement seems to hark back to the notion of synesis of EN 
1.13, spoken of as a virtue of though, for presumably we call the same people as 
having good synesis (eusynetoi) whom we ascribe the virtue of synesis. Now, this 
elevated concept of (the) synesis (as virtue) of good learners derives, according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identify (syneseos) what actions are needed for reaching the end’ and in EN 10.9 1181a18, in which the 
philosopher claims that choosing nomoi well requires synesis. Often nomoi is translated as laws in this 
passage, thus making impression that synesis the ability specific to good lawgivers, i.e. to phronimoi. 
However, nomoi can also refer to customs, conventions, habits etc. in addition to laws, so Aristotle 
could additionally refer to choosing between habits, for which one does not need to be phronimos. 
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Aristotle, from the fact that learning involves synesis as the ability to discern other 
people’s opinions. The statement makes thus clear that there is a difference between 
the notion of synesis as a virtue of though in EN 1.13, a way of talking about synesis, 
and synesis as ability to identify good actions, from which the former conception 
derives. Due to this direction of derivation, it would not follow from Aristotle’s 
claims in EN 1.13 in any way that also the latter synesis must be a virtue of thought.  
  Since apart from the hypothetical objector, neither Louden does seem to notice 
that Aristotle’s synesis has (at least) two different senses, he ascribes the tasks to 
synesis of EN 6.10, such as very good listening skills and ability to perceptive 
criticism, which would presumably require virtues of thought. Therefore we should 
conclude that Dahl’s more austere interpretation of passage 2 is more plausible than 
Louden’s among the predecessors of my interpretation. As the synesis of EN 6.10 
does not therefore have to be a virtue of thought, pace Louden, it neither has to be 
taught, and the hypothetical objector’s argument for Burnyeat’s interpretation that 
claims that moral learning begins in being taught good actions is dispelled. The 
synesis as described EN 6.10 is the ability of moral discernment that can acquire 
through social interaction, and listening to people’s moral opinions. Specifying the 
acquisition of synesis remains to be discussed in Chapter 3, together with the already 
raised question of how identifying good actions can be reliable only on the basis of 
other people’s opinions, as it may seem that those opinions can often be mistaken. 
 
2.6 THE FIRST STEP: FINELY HABITUATED CHARACTER AND SYNESIS 
In the course of this and the preceding chapter, we have established that moral 
development presupposes acquiring first the sense of shame that keeps a child away 
from acting badly, and, later, a rational ability to identify good actions, synesis, 
which enables a young person to independently choose to act well. These capabilities 
that most people can develop without conscious choice allow one to take the first 
step to virtue: to become a finely-habituated, morally responsible person. We arrived 
at this conclusion by first making clear, in Chapter 1, that Aristotle, pace Moss, is a 
rationalist about cognising unqualifiedly good ends, or, actions, in the sense of 
thinking that identifying good actions is a task that requires rational capabilities. 
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After establishing the conclusion, I attempted to delimit my interpretation from 
alternative versions of the rationalist interpretation. For the rationalist interpretation 
can accommodate Aristotle’s famous statement in EN 3.5, that we do not deliberate 
about ends, in several ways. One version claims that our intuitive reason, nous 
presents us with the blueprint about ends that constitute the human good, or 
eudaimonia, and thus we need to only deliberate how to realise those ends. I argued, 
however that this ‘Grand End view’ is not likely Aristotle’s view. Instead, Aristotle 
thinks that different actions realise eudaimonia in different situations. Therefore we 
cannot have any intuitive blueprint of the specific contents of eudaimonia, but the 
philosopher must rather mean in EN 3.5 only that we do not deliberate whether good 
actions realise eudaimonia. The particular good actions one needs to identify with a 
different ability than intuitive nous. He may need a conception of eudaimonia only to 
understand, and explicate to other people, why a certain identified action is good.   
 In this Chapter, I attempted to show how Aristotle’s model of moral development 
might utilise the above theory. I began from EN 2.1, in which he says that we 
become morally virtuous by habituation instead of through teaching, but that this 
habituation requires a teacher. On Burnyeat’s interpretation, the task of a teacher is to 
teach a child which actions are good⎯to provide him with ‘to hoti’. I pointed out, 
however, that his interpretation does not fit what Aristotle says in EN 1.4 and 10.7, 
namely that one cannot attend to moral instruction unless he already has to hoti. 
Moreover, only listening to moral teaching and acting in accordance with it does not 
suffice to bring a child to become responsible for his actions; a choice (prohairesis) 
to act well (or not) is needed, too. Since Burnyeat’s interpretation, according to 
which the knowledge of good actions is given to us by teachers and we are motivated 
to act well only by experiencing that performing good actions brings pleasure, would 
not grant the possibility of one’s making such prohairesis, it cannot account for a 
person’s responsibility for his actions. I therefore argued that Curzer’s alternative 
interpretation is more plausible. It proposes that, instead of telling a child which 
actions are good, a moral teacher’s primary contribution to a child’s moral 
development might be to punish him for bad actions until he develops a sense of 
shame. In addition, the sense of shame could contribute to the child developing a 
 83 
motivation to become good, so that this motivation is not based only upon the 
prospect of pleasure. Curzer does not, however, explain how a child could come to 
know good actions if not by being told about them. For only abstaining from bad 
actions is not yet acting well.227 Therefore I complemented Curzer’s interpretation by 
arguing that Aristotle thinks that all people with the sense of shame have the ability 
of synesis, which the philosopher describes in EN 6.10. Aristotle, as several 
interpreters have noticed, seems to think that having synesis does not presuppose 
one’s being even a finely-habituated person. By studying EN 6.10 in a greater detail, 
I found that synesis could well be the ability that enables people to identify good 
actions before their character is fully ingrained. It thus justifies Aristotle’s regarding 
people as being responsible for their actions, on account of being able to identify 




DEVELOPING PHRONESIS  
 
In EN 1.4, in a passage quoted in Chapter 2, Aristotle claims that in order to begin to 
study ethics, one has to have ‘the that’ (to hoti), although not necessarily ‘the 
because’ (to dioti).228 As we learned in the course of that chapter, according to a 
number of ancient commentators, and to also Burnyeat and Curzer, having to hoti is 
being able to identify that an action is good.229 Correspondingly, acquiring to 
dioti⎯which these commentators interpret as referring to understanding why the 
identified action is good230⎯is an important reason for the people that already have 
to hoti to study more ethics: they read Aristotle as implying this by quoting Hesiod, 
‘the best is who knows (noein) all things’, at the end of 1.4.231 Moreover, acquiring 
to dioti seems to be also connected to developing the virtue of thought phronesis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227  We learned this from EN 2.9 1109a30–b1, discussed on p. 64 above. 
228 See EN 1.4 1095b4–8, quoted on p. 56 above. 
229 Burnyeat 1980, pp. 71–2, Curzer 2012, pp. 321–2, and Aspasius, Eustratius, and Heliodorus ad loc.  
230 Ibid. 
231 Burnyeat 1980, p. 71. 
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because, as Aristotle says in EN 6, phronesis does not only command us to perform 
certain actions as good, but does so on the basis of to the correct conception of the 
human good.232 Therefore, as also I concluded in Chapter 2, people must have to hoti 
and be able to identify good actions before they can begin to acquire phronesis. 
 Since both Burnyeat and Curzer endorse similar interpretations with regard to 
dioti and to hoti in EN 1.4, I used this conclusion in Chapter 2 as my point of 
departure for a critical assessment of their interstation of the first step of moral 
development in Aristotle, the step from childhood moral habituation (ethismos) to 
coming to possess to hoti and acting well. Now, I would like to proceed to expand, 
however, the above interpolations about the reference of to hoti and dioti in EN 1.4. 
For some reason, neither Burnyeat nor Curzer seem to attempt to draw connections 
between these concepts, and the same concepts in Aristotle’s scientific works. I 
would like to show, however, next that endorsing of Burnyeat and Curzer’s, and 
mine, conclusion about the necessity of to hoti for identifying good actions, and thus, 
for acquiring phronesis, would entail that Aristotle’s model of acquiring scientific 
knowledge in the beginning of An. Post. 2 should apply also to moral knowledge.  
 We come, says Aristotle, to have scientific knowledge about something by first 
observing ‘that a thing exists (ei esti), then figuring out what it is (ti esti), that it is an 
instance of a kind (to hoti), and [lastly, by asking] why it is the instance (to dioti) of 
the kind’. Aristotle seems to suggest that this model applies also to moral knowledge: 
 
If we [i.e. once we know that there is such a thing as pride, ei esti] were inquiring what is pride (ti 
esti), we should examine the instances of proud men [i.e. to hoti], we know of to see what, as such, 
they have in common; e.g. if Alcibiades was proud, or Achilles and Ajax were proud, we should find 
on inquiring what they all had in common, that it was intolerance of insult [i.e. to dioti] it was this 
which drove Alcibiades to war, Achilles wrath, and Ajax to suicide.233 
 
Though this passage in An. Post. 2.13 does not mention the concepts of to hoti, to 
dioti, or ei esti, in it Aristotle evidently makes use of his model of acquiring scientific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 For Aristotle’s view that phronesis is the virtue of thought enabling people to know why certain 
actions are good, see esp. EN 6.9 1142b25–36 (discussed on p. 128 below), which claims phronesis to 
be excellence in deliberation, ability to construct syllogisms of which universal and particular premises 
are correct. This entails that a phronimos has cognitive access to the correct conception of the good. 
233 An. Post 2.13 97b15–20. 
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knowledge. For example Kei Chiba has thus taken the passage to show that ‘these 
four items (to hoti, to dioti, ei esti, ti esti) are supposed to exhaust any instance of 
knowledge-seeking activity, whether [….] inquiry into nature or […] moral 
matters’.234 In spite directing us to think that having to hoti should thus come before 
to dioti and phronesis in moral development, just as it comes in acquiring scientific 
knowledge, this interpretation, and the interpretations of Aristotle’s similar remarks 
in EN 1.4 by ancient commentators, Burnyeat and Curzer, are not widely endorsed 
among the interpreters of Aristotle’s moral epistemology. Among them, Aristotle is 
often taken to think the opposite, that only phronesis can identify good actions.235 
 We should not assume⎯the interpreters such as John McDowell, Iakovos 
Vasiliou, and Thomas Angier seem to think⎯that Aristotle would agree with the 
model of An. Post. 2.13 in EN, because in this work, he stresses the particularity of 
moral knowledge as opposed to the universality of theoretical, such as astronomical 
or mathematical, knowledge. By emphasising in EN 1.3 that moral matters, unlike 
the matters that theoretical sciences investigate, ‘admit much variety and fluctuation’ 
and can be true ‘only for the most part’, the author of EN rejects, so they assume, 
that, e.g., proud people, just actions, or basically anything that is good, have any 
universal properties in common with everything else belonging to the kind ‘good’.236 
Hence there are no ‘instances of proud men’ in the way that there are instances of, 
e.g., eclipses or triangles, pace An. Post. 2.13, but only particular proud people, who 
show pride in their unique and particular ways. Therefore, since there is no way of 
knowing who is, e.g., proud or not prima facie⎯on the basis of observing universal 
properties analogous to the shadow of a celestial object passing the surface of 
another, or having three angles (i.e. to hoti)⎯one has to use one’s phronesis, his 
understanding of what would be proud behaviour for that particular person in those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Chiba 2012, p. 2. 
235 See e.g. Sherman 1989, Vasiliou 1996, McDowell 2006, and Angier nn 
236 Cf. Leszl 1990, who attempts to challenge this assumption, by pointing out even ethics can involve 
certain universal principles. E.g. in EE 2.11 1227b28-33 (Leszl quotes it in Italian on p. 73), Aristotle 
says that ‘as in the sciences the assumptions are first principles, so in the practical sciences the end is a 
starting-point and assumption: since it is required that so-and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be 
secured it is necessary for such-and-such a thing to be provided—just as in mathematics, if the angles 
of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, such and such a consequence necessarily follows.’ 
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particular circumstances (to dioti), to arrive at a true discernment of a good action.  
The prominence of this line of interpretation⎯regardless of its unflattering view 
of the coherence of Aristotle’s claims between An. Post 2.13 and EN 1.3⎯stems 
from the fact that it can offer, as I will explicate below, a psychologically rather 
attractive account of how one could identify good actions. However, McDowell, 
Vasiliou, and Angier’s interpretation is incompatible with the reading of EN 1.4 that 
the ancient commentators, Burnyeat, Curzer, and I support, because it must deny any 
firm link between having phronesis and to dioti, and claim that already having to 
hoti, ability to identify good actions, requires phronesis. Hence my challenge, so as 
to confirm the plausibility of my preferred interpretation of EN 1.4 and thus enable 
me to proceed to the second part of this Chapter, is to present at least equally 
psychologically attractive interpretation about identifying good actions. This 
interpretation will need to show how we might identify them without phronesis and 
to dioti⎯but only with synesis⎯in conformity with the model of An. Post. 2.13, 
while respecting Aristotle’s remarks about the particularity of good actions in EN.  
 
3.1 IS NOT PHRONESIS IS NECESSARY FOR  
IDENTIFYING GOOD ACTIONS? 
Although McDowell’s interpretation seems to disagree with Aristotle’s words in A 
Post. 2.13, he is confident that Aristotle nevertheless must think, at least in EN, that 
we can only get to know moral facts (to dioti) and be able to identify good actions 
once we have phronesis: that is, when we have an understanding of why they are 
good (to hoti). Apart from apparently respecting what Aristotle says in EN 1.3 about 
the difference between scientific and moral knowledge⎯in which, unlike in the 
former, one may suppose, there are no universals, and hence, no possibility for 
recognising good actions prima facie on the basis of universal properties⎯pace An. 
Post. 2.13, McDowell’s interpretation is also psychologically attractive. We do not 
characteristically identify good actions by attempting to spot some prima facie 
features that we know make them good regardless of situation⎯such as producing a 
sensation of pleasure or being in accordance with moral law. So as to identify an 
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action as good, we rather attempt to understand what situational features, which 
may sometimes involve pleasure, or being in accordance with moral law, but also 
many other, often unpredictable factors, make an action good in a certain 
situations.237 
 According to McDowell, Aristotle notices this ‘uncodifiability’ of moral decision-
making. What makes an action good, Aristotle thinks in EN 2.6, is its meeting the 
demands of our particular situation neither excessively nor defectively⎯hitting ‘the 
mean relative to us’.238 Since the mean is relative to us, it does not help us to identify 
good actions without the understanding of the particular demands of our current 
situation. ‘Phronesis is bound up with action’, concludes Aristotle in EN 6.7, ‘and as 
a result one ought to have knowledge of both [universals and particulars], but more 
so of the latter’.239 Because the goodness of an action thus depends upon the 
demands of a situation, and since everyone’s situation is particular, good actions 
differ across situations: as Aristotle puts it by means of a famous analogue between 
moral perception and dietetics in EN 2.6, what would be too little food for Milo the 
wrestler might be too much for a beginner in wrestling.240 McDowell proceeds thus 
to claim that one cannot identify a truly good course of action in a situation before 
being able to read the demands of the situation: e.g., if we extend Aristotle’s 
analogue, we must consider whether we are preparing a meal for a professional 
wrestler or for a beginner, and the dietary requirements of people at the various 
stages of wrestling training, etc. 241 That is, McDowell seems to assume that one has 
to first understand why certain action would hit the mean in a situation (i.e. have to 
dioti) so as to identify that action as good in that situation (i.e. have to hoti).  
 Even if we skip An. Post 2.13, McDowell’s interpretation may, however, now 
seem to also disagree the text of EN. Granted that identifying good actions is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 This view enjoys also wide support in contemporary moral philosophy. As far as I know, only W.D. 
Ross (e.g  2002, Ch. 2) has been a clear supporter of the alternative prima facie -view that I presented. 
238 See EN 1.3 1094b15, in which Aristotle says, ‘fine and just actions admit of much variety and 
fluctuation’ and EN 2.6 1106a25-35 for remark about good actions lying on ‘the mean relative to us’.  
239 EN 6.7 1140b20-2 (B&C). 
240 See EN 2.6 1106a36–b6. 
241 McDowell 2006, p. 66 cit. Wiggins 1987, p. 231, which presented a similar interpretation earlier. 
However, only McDowell takes this to be an interpretation of the distinctive function of phronesis, and 
applies it into interpreting Aristotle’s theory of moral development. 
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impossible prima facie, and requires phronesis, it would follow that acquiring 
phronesis should not be the epistemic end of moral development, but instead its 
precondition. For one cannot habituate oneself into acting well and be responsible of 
it unless one can identify which actions are good. Aristotle seems to think, however, 
that the epistemic goal of moral development is to acquire phronesis to complement 
already developed fine habits⎯he states in EN 6.13 that only phronesis can render a 
good character fully virtuous.242 McDowell suggests, however, that the ability to 
identify good actions may be only ‘a primitive form’ of phronesis.243 That is, there 
could be two levels of phronesis in Aristotle, an understanding of the moral demands 
of familiar situations, and a more refined and systematised level in which a person 
also has, for example, a capacity to articulate those demands, and apply his moral 
understanding to new and unfamiliar situations. All moral development thus 
presupposes the former phronesis, but virtue comes only upon developing the latter. 
 But unfortunately for McDowell’s interpretation, Aristotle never makes any a 
distinction between the supposed levels of phronesis. Since virtues are excellences, 
that is, perfections, he should rather think quite the opposite: that there are no 
degrees of virtue, that one is either virtuous or not⎯just as something is either 
perfect or not. Iakovos Vasiliou has attempted to present an alternative strategy for 
saving the McDowellian interpretation of identifying good actions. He has argued 
that most recent interpreters, McDowell included, could be mistaken about the 
argument at the end of EN 1.4, quoted on p. 47 above. Only this interpretative 
mistake⎯probably initially made by Burnyeat 1980⎯could have led McDowell to 
need to present ungrounded speculations about the existence of ‘primitive’ phronesis.  
 According to Vasiliou, in the passage of EN 1.4, Aristotle does not say that one 
who can identify good actions (who has to hoti) should also acquire understanding of 
why they are good (to dioti) to complete his moral development; he says only that 
‘beginning (arché) is to hoti and if this is sufficiently apparent to a man, he will not 
in addition have a need for to dioti’.244  We should not, argues Vasiliou pace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 See EN 6.13 1144b25–33, discussed on p. 21 above. 
243 McDowell 2006, p. 55. 
244 EN 1.4 1095b7–8. 
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Burnyeat, put too much weight on Aristotle’s ensuing quotation of Hesiod, that ‘the 
best is who knows all things’, i.e. also to dioti, but instead should focus only on 
Aristotle’s own words, which do not explicitly exhort anyone to acquire to dioti. 
Thus, instead of implicitly thinking that one should first develop ‘primitive’ 
phronesis in order to identify good actions, and later perfect this into ‘perfect’ 
phronesis, Aristotle might hold, Vasiliou argues, that once one can identify good 
actions, one does not need to study anything in order to gain superior phronesis, for: 
 
[…] precisely since one who possesses “the that” sufficiently can correctly identify particular actions 
as being just, courageous, etc. he must already have a grasp of “the because”.245 
 
Provided that a person able to identify good actions has no need to cognitively 
develop any further, as Vasiliou suggests, there is no need to speculate that he might 
only have the ‘primitive form’ of phronesis. The person can already have full 
phronesis and hence also moral virtue. Aristotle’s main reason for advocating 
listening to lectures on ethics would thus not be for the sake of moral improvement: 
maybe his famous statement at EN 2.2 ‘that we study ethics not so that we may know 
what virtue is, but so that we may become good’ refers not to the ideal listeners of 
ethics lectures, pace e.g. Burnyeat and Curzer, but only to those who want to become 
such listeners. The person who can identify good actions, and who thus also has 
virtue, might well have only epistemic reasons for listening to ethics lectures, such as 
developing his wisdom (sophia) and satisfying his natural desire of knowledge.246 
 Vasiliou’s above interpretation is McDowellian in claiming that even identifying 
good actions presupposes phronesis, but, as we can now see, it succeeds in avoiding 
disagreeing EN 6.13, without relying on McDowell’s implausible speculations about 
the existence of ‘primitive’ phronesis. Vasiliou can also treat An. Post. 2.13 as an 
account of acquiring the kind of moral knowledge that one learn in ethics lectures 
and that do not have implications to one’s moral character. However, although 
Vasiliou has thus shown a way for the McDowellian interpretation to avoid 
disagreeing with EN 6.13 or skipping An. Post 2.13, it seems that two passages in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Vasiliou 1996, p. 789. 
246  Aristotle famously announces this desire in Met. 1.1. 980a21: ‘All men by nature desire to know.’ 
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Met. 7.17 and An. Post. 2.19, in which Aristotle clarifies his model for acquiring to 
dioti, and which Vasiliou does not study, cast doubt also on his interpretation: 
 
Met. 7.17: To dioti is always sought in this form⎯“why does one thing belong to some other?” For to 
inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire⎯as we have said why the man is 
musical or something else. Now 'why to hoti is itself' is a meaningless inquiry, for to hoti or the 
existence of the thing must be evident⎯e.g. that the moon is eclipsed.247 
A. Post. 2.19: When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand, the 
earliest universal is present in the soul: for though the act of sense-discernment is of the particular, its 
content is universal: a man, for example, instead of only Callias. A fresh stand is made among these 
tentative universals, and the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts or the true universal 
are established: e.g. such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal, which by 
the same process is a step towards a further generalization.248 
Aristotle states in the passage of Met. 7.7 that before one can ask why e.g. a man is 
musical or the moon is eclipsed, the existence of a musical man or the fact that moon 
is eclipsed must be ‘evident’ to him. The identification that the moon is eclipsed, that 
a man is musical or someone is a man etc., is evident⎯Aristotle elucidates in An. 
Post. 2.19⎯through the sense-discernment of the particular.249 We can identify that 
someone is a man instead of only Callias merely by perception, that is, prima facie 
and without needing any antecedent knowledge of why he is a man, pace Vasiliou 
and McDowell.250 Although good actions may differ from many other facts on 
account of their lacking any fully universal properties on the basis of which they 
could be identified as good prima facie, also they contain at least a conceptual 
universal⎯the concept of ‘good.’ Such universals, says Aristotle in An. Post. 2.19, 
are already ‘contained’ in particular identifications. The ‘containment’ that Aristotle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Met. 7.17 1141a10–16.  
248 An. Post. 2.19 100a15–b3. Cf. similar views in 100b4, 100b5, 100a5-9 and 100a17. 
249 As e.g. Barnes 1975 notes on p. 255, Aristotle nowhere explains what the universal being evident in 
particular means, only that this is so. I think that the philosopher’s insistence might be connected to his 
possible solution of the problem of universals in Met Z: although forms are universals, particular 
substances could be also be forms (which they have to be in virtue of being non-material, as any matter 
is an attribute) if their essences were forms, i.e., were the universal forms in particular substances. 
250	  Cf.	  A. Post 2.19 100a5-9: Developing a skill starts ‘from the complete universal that has come to 
rest in soul.’ This seems to say that experience gives some universals in itself, such as man, chair, 
house, brick etc. from which we can start to develop our abilities to work with them. Met. 1.1 981a5-12 
adds that skill comes when one krisis about similar objects is formed: to have krisis that x helped to 
Callias’ disease is the task of experience, whereas to have krisis that x helps to all people having a 
certain kind of disease belongs to skill. Thus, to apply Aristotle’s previous claim, we first learn e.g. 
that this house that is made of bricks withstands weather, and once we know that it is on account of 
being made of bricks that any house withstands weather, we have (an element of) a builder’s skill. 
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has in mind seems to be a logical relation. Any term of kind, e.g. ‘man’ or ‘eclipse’, 
is universal insofar as it is a universal concept regardless of whether it refers only to 
a particular thing or also to a universal kind. Since ‘good’ is also a term of kind, what 
Aristotle says here should thus apply also to it as well, even though he does not 
explicitly claim so. Provided that the conceptual universal ‘good’ is analogous to the 
universal ‘man’ in this sense, we should be able to identify good actions in the same 
way as we as identify ‘men’⎯by perception that renders them immediately evident 
for us. This seems to imply that before one can ask why an action is good⎯inquire 
for to dioti⎯it has to be evident to him that the action is good⎯he must have to hoti.  
 Aristotle also indicates in the passage of An. Post 2.19 that the conceptual 
universal contained in any particular identification can become ‘true’ universal only 
once we discover under which universal kinds a particular perceived thing, e.g. man, 
eclipse, or good, belongs, and under which other universal kinds those kinds belong 
etc. Thus, by ‘true’ universals, Aristotle seems to mean ultimate universals, which 
can ground our identifications of things by giving the last reachable answer to all 
‘why’-questions that one may raise about them, e.g. why do you think that Callias is 
a man? Why do you think this is an eclipse? Why do you think this action is good?  
 
3.2 HOW COULD SYNESIS ALONE IDENTIFY GOOD ACTIONS? 
Met. 7.17 and An. Post. 2.19 have now given us some reasons for thinking that even 
if Aristotle were a moral particularist, he would not necessarily need to assume, pace 
McDowell and Vasiliou, that one needs to understand why certain actions are good 
in order to identify them as good. For the concept of good could be contained in a 
prima facie identification of a particular good action in the same way that the 
concept of man is contained in our prima facie perception of a particular man. Just as 
we do not need to understand what makes someone a man in order to perceive him as 
a man, perhaps we don’t need to understand why an action is good in order to 
identify it as good. In brief, we can use the terms of kind without knowing what 
features constitute the kind, namely the true universals. Thus we would not need to 
acquire understanding in virtue of which features a particular belongs to a certain 
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kind⎯to dioti⎯in order to only identify the particular⎯to hoti. In order to develop 
such understanding about, say, men, as in the example of An. Post 2.19, we would 
need to study some biology and metaphysics, so maybe also achieving moral 
understanding (phronesis) would require attending lectures in ethics, pace Vasiliou.  
 There may, however, be a disparity in above analogue between the visual 
perception of particulars without yet understanding their specific to dioti and 
identifying good actions without phronesis. Aristotle is clear in DA that visual 
perception is generally reliable, and thus it is reliable even without sufficient 
understanding of to dioti for defining the perceptions.251 What a person without 
sufficient knowledge of biology and metaphysics sees as a man is very likely to be a 
man. However, it is an open question if a person without moral understanding can 
reliably identify good actions. Although Curzer has given space for this possibility in 
his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of early moral development, and even though 
Aristotle’s text in EN 6.10⎯studied in section 2.5 above⎯Met. 7.17 and An. Post. 
2.19 shows that he admits this possibility, we would need also answer a question 
about reliability in order to establish that Aristotle’s synesis allows us to reliably 
identify good actions⎯not only to make more or less accurate guesses⎯without yet 
profoundly understanding why they are good. Only this conclusion would suffice to 
refute McDowellian interpretations about identifying good actions⎯apart from 
showing that synesis, as I argued in Chapter 2, can be a psychological basis for our 
moral responsibility, as it could enable us to choose which actions to consider good.  
 I think that we might find such a conclusion in Aristotle. In order to find out, we 
would need to ask how reliable synesis⎯the ability to identify good actions without 
knowledge of why they are good, just as we can visually discern that moon is 
eclipsed or that someone is a man etc. without having any justification for why we 
perceive them as we do⎯could be, in light of Aristotle’s text. In EN 6.10, in which 
he discusses synesis, quoted on pp. 62-3 above, the philosopher does not, however, 
venture to discuss the reliability of synesis, although he clearly assumes that it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See esp. DA 3. 3, 428a5ff: perception of proper sensibilia (such as colours in the case of sight) 
never errs. However, phantasia, of which one task is to synthesise perceptions of e.g. men from the 
proper perceptions of various senses can err, as we concluded in Chapter 1. 
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reliable⎯otherwise he presumably would not have remarked that ‘rendering 
[moral] discernment nobly’ is the characteristic function of synesis. If not explicit in 
his discussion of synesis, his views about learning crafts may, however, help us to 
understand why we should consider synesis reliable. For he considers the operation 
of synesis to be displayed in learning, and we have seen, on p. 45 above, that in EN 2 
he regards moral learning as analogous to craft learning.252 Therefore we should 
perhaps turn next to Met. 1.1, in which he suggests how craftsmen can perform their 
tasks reliably without understanding, however, why certain tasks are performed in 
certain instead of some other ways (i.e. to have to dioti) in their respective crafts: 
 
Besides, we think that the master workers in each craft are more honourable and know in a truer 
sense and are wiser than manual workers, because they know to dioti […]; thus we view them as 
being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory for themselves and knowing 
the causes. And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know, 
that the former can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; 
for master craftsmen can teach, and men of mere experience cannot.253  
 
Aristotle states here that a master craftsman (architechton) must understand the 
explanations for the things that are done (to dioti) in his craft (techne) in order to do 
his craft well and to pass it on to new generation of craftsmen. However, 
interestingly, in the passage Aristotle says also that the master might not perform 
craft tasks any better than an ordinary craftsman (technites) who only has experience 
(empereia). This may mean that mere experience in doing craft tasks, not only a 
master's understanding, can give one sufficient resources for succeeding in one’s 
craft⎯probably cognitively the most important of these is the ability to reliably 
identify actions that one should perform in order to complete the craft tasks (to hoti). 
In light of Aristotle’s analogy in EN 2 about the similarity of craft- and moral 
learning, this conclusion should also apply to his moral epistemology. Just as one can 
become a good craftsman by only acquiring experience in their crafts, people might 
come to be able to identify good actions also through only acquiring relevant 
experience. If a craftsman does not need the master's understanding of why certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 See EN 2.1 1103b7ff. 
253 Met 1.1 980b24–981a12. 
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tasks are done in a certain way in order to see how to do them successfully, why 
would a moral learner need to understand why good actions are good in order to 
identify them? Instead, he might need another cognitive achievement: experience. 
We should not, however, make too hasty conclusions. In a recent book, Tom 
Angier has signalled that the above rhetorical question might not yet persuade a 
supporter of the McDowellian interpretation. Angier claims that moral experience 
must differ significantly from craft experience, despite what Aristotle says about 
their similarity in EN 2. Developing the ability to identify good actions must, says 
Angier, be a very different process to craft learning. Only in the case of crafts the 
ability to identify proper actions can develop before the understanding of to dioti:  
 
It is not difficult to conceive many technai as incorporating a long initial period of more or less 
routine, largely imitative learning, in which apprentices are made to follow practical instructions 
without being apprised of the theoretical information that would hed light on their activity at a 
cognitively more sophisticated level.254 
 
But this experience vs. understanding dichotomy could not hold with moral learning: 
 
It is not easy to envisage such a separation applying in the case of moral learning. For in the latter 
context, there seems no possibility of an equivalent division between theory and practice, and 
hence no equivalent to the way in which craft-learners can adequately navigate the complexities of 
their respective technai, without having been exposed to their specific dioti.255 
 
The concept of experience cannot be analogous in the domains of moral- and craft 
learning, according to Angier. One can perhaps learn to perform certain simple craft 
tasks, such as making bricks, by repeating the same actions time after time⎯in this 
case, the experience does not involve understanding⎯but one cannot establish a 
repetitive routine in order to ensure that one acts well, because, as we learned from 
McDowell, every moral situation is entirely particular. Therefore a moral learner’s 
experience must involve an understanding of to dioti from early on. Hence Angier 
concludes: ‘whatever the merits of Aristotle’s understanding of the crafts and craft-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Angier 2010, pp. 124–5. 
255 Ibid., p. 125. 
 95 
models per se⎯it is in the application of these to the sphere of virtues that their 
cogency gives way’.256 If we thus abstain from putting weight to the analogue 
between learning crafts and virtue in EN 2, we could also reject the relevance of 
Aristotle’s views about the possibility of to hoti coming without dioti in Met 7.17 to 
his moral epistemology, and safely return to the McDowellian interpretation.  
Although this may seem an uncharitable conclusion, in any case we must concede 
to Angier that learning crafts might involve at least some mechanical repetition, 
where moral learning does not.257 So we cannot easily rule out the possibility that 
Angier is right in thinking that Aristotle’s associating moral learning with craft 
learning in EN 2 does not imply that he genuinely regards the experiences of moral 
and craft learning as similar.258 The philosopher might have simply chosen an 
inappropriate comparison. I think, however, that even if those experiences were not 
similar, this might not imply that identifying good actions requires understanding 
why certain actions are good (to dioti), that is⎯since such understanding belongs to 
phronesis⎯the virtue of phronesis. Aristotle would nevertheless have resources for 
explaining how people can identify good actions (to hoti). The attraction of this 
interpretation is that it would allow us to consider Aristotle’s theory of acquiring 
knowledge of to hoti without understanding to dioti in A. Post. 2.13 and Met 7.17 to 
be operative also in his moral epistemology. I would therefore like to begin to unveil 
a theoretical account that Aristotle could have given about the operation of synesis 
without making assumptions about similarities between the experiences of craft and 
moral learning. Moreover, I would also like to show that if we took this possible 
explanation to be correct, then we could see that his analogy between learning crafts 
and good actions in EN 2, with the complementing Met 7.17, should not be dismissed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Ibid. 
257 One may think that learning good manners, which Aristotle (although not many contemporary 
philosophers) would probably consider a variety of moral learning, is mechanical. However, as 
Herman 2005 has argued in studying the Stoics, learning good manners is not mechanical, since 
manners are ‘critical elements of doing what is appropriate’ (p. 286)⎯and one can come to recognize 
what is appropriate in a situation through experiencing situations, just as with good actions.  
258 Cf. Annas 2011, Ch. 3, who, in order to preserve the analogue, has introduced several qualifications 
for the crafts to which it is applied: a craft, in order to qualify for the analogy, has to be learned from 
experts, involve a need to understand why it is practiced, and aspiration towards acquiring expertise. 
Aristotle does not, however, anywhere introduce such qualifications, so I cannot user Annas’ strategy, 
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as irrelevant to his theory of moral development. Instead of pointing to a similarity 
between learning experiences, it may point out that both craft and moral learners, 
despite their possibly different experiences, need to attend to the opinions of experts. 
 
3.2.1 Identifying the Instances of Natural Kinds  
At least in contemporary epistemology, it is widely considered possible to reliably 
identify things as belonging to certain kinds without knowing why they belong to 
them. This development can be traced back to Hilary Putnam, who argued in the 
mid-1970s that people can reliably identify instances of natural kinds without 
knowing the definition of them, simply by perceiving them, and recognizing them as 
instances of some already-identified kind. For example, we can identify a certain 
liquid as water without knowing why it is water (i.e. because it is H2O), by 
perceiving its similarity with the liquid that people generally call water.259 This 
identification is reliable, so that what we identify as ‘water’ is water, because we 
know that instances of the liquid people call ‘water’ on the basis of their perception, 
just as all natural kinds, are definable as on the grounds of having certain fixed, 
scientifically discoverable features (such as being H2O), which we may not know.260  
Martha Nussbaum remarked in 1980s that Aristotle’s epistemology might work 
like Putnam’s theory, which he calls ‘internal realism’.261 However, apart from this 
brief comment, he does not pursue this interpretative thread any further. Linda 
Zagzebski, however, has recently attempted to apply Putnam’s internal realism to 
moral epistemology. She has suggested that apart from providing us with theory for 
identifying instances of natural kinds, it could also explain how we can identify good 
people. Although Zagzebski does not discuss Aristotle, we might examine whether 
Aristotle could have agreed with her conclusions, which I quote below: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 See Putnam 1975, esp. pp. 140–2. 
260 Charles (2002), p. 11, summarises Putnam’s view on our epistemic assumptions as follows: ‘(1) 
Water (or gold etc. natural kind) has an (as yet unknown) fundamental feature, of a type grasped by 
scientists, which determines its other features, (2) Water has one and the same feature in all possible 
worlds in which it exists which fixes the identity of the kind and. (3) The (as yet unknown) 
fundamental scientific feature (specified in (1)) is the feature (mentioned in (2)) which fixes the 
identity of water in all possible worlds in which it exists’. 
261 See Nussbaum, 1986, p. 312. 
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Good persons are persons like that, just as gold is stuff like that. […] In fact, it is not necessary that 
anybody know what makes a good person good (i.e. ‘the because’) in order to successfully refer to 
good persons any more than it was necessary that anybody knew what makes water to successfully 
refer to water before the advent of molecular theory. [...] As with natural kinds like gold or water, 
people can succeed in referring to the good person as long as they, or some people in their community 
can pick out exemplars.262 
 
Zagzebski suggests that we might identify good people without understanding why 
they are good, just as we can identify natural kinds such as water without knowing 
the scientific properties that determine that it is water. Good people, Zagzebski 
suggests, can be identified on the basis of ‘the emotion of admiration’, just as 
identifying a certain liquid as water can be made on the basis of sense perception, 
because we characteristically only admire people who are good, just as we 
characteristically call only liquid that has certain scientifically-discoverable features 
water.263 Zagzebski’s suggestion that the power of the emotion of admiration can 
help us to reliably identify good people seems to put her, however, at odds with 
Aristotle, who acknowledges that many people whom we consider good on the basis 
of our emotions are not really good. E.g. in EN 6.5 he says: ‘we suppose that Pericles 
and the people of that sort have phronesis’,264 although politicians in general, as he 
makes clear in Pol. (possibly echoing Plato’s criticism of Pericles in Gorgias) are far 
from being virtuous, but only excellent at manipulating other people’s emotions.265 
Thus Aristotle does not seem to be an internal realist about identifying virtuous 
people. But could he be an internal realist about identifying good actions? The 
answer also seems to be no. Provided that McDowell is right about what the 
particularity of good actions implies, that there are no certain universal properties 
that all good actions share, and so we cannot make similar epistemic assumptions 
about them as we can make with e.g. water: that they share a certain universal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Zagzebski 2012, p. 158. 
263 Zagzebski 2012, p. 159.  
264 EN 6.5 1140b8–9. Cf. Aubenque 1963, p. 46, and Berti 2008b, p. 16, who assume that Aristotle 
refers to himself with ‘we’, and considers Pericles a phronimos. Neither of them explains, however, 
why, then, he is so critical towards populist politicians like Pericles in Pol. 5.5 (see fn. 263 below).  
265 See Pol .5.5 in which Aristotle criticises democracy on the basis that it tend to leads to tyranny, 
because people tend to vote good and charismatic speakers, who conceal tyrannical intentions under 
great promises, to rule them, i.e. let them to manipulate their emotions. Cf. Gorgias 515e-16a. 
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property that makes them good. At most, we can metaphorically illustrate that good 
actions respond to the moral demands of situations, or, hit the mean relative to us. 
Hence there is no basis for us to assume that our identifications of virtuous actions 
are reliable, unless we already know why a certain action would be good. I think that 
this consideration, which seems to altogether prevent the attribution of Putnam-style 
‘internal realism’ to Aristotle, might have made recent scholars cautious of accepting 
Nussbaum’s remark, or even studying whether it may contain even a kernel of truth  
In his 2001 book, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence, David Charles has, however, 
proposed that Aristotle could be a different type of internal realist to Putnan, 
‘according to [whose] account, one can understand the term water as a natural‐kind 
term without having [pace Putnam] any views as to whether water possesses a 
fundamental scientific feature’ (i.e. a fixed universal property).266 If we regard this 
conclusion of Charles’ book-length interpretation of A. Post 2⎯which I do not have 
space to fully review here⎯as essentially correct, we could explain how people can 
identify particular good actions without reading the demands of situations first. 
Provided that people could identify instances of natural kinds, without knowing that 
natural kinds must have some fixed scientific features that define them, maybe they 
could also identify particular good actions that do not share any universal properties. 
Aristotle may think, suggests Charles, that we can consider the identifications of 
instances of natural kinds reliable if those identifications are supported by a master 
craftsman’s expertise. Recall the passage in Met 1.1, according to which one task of 
the master craftsman is to teach others, and compare it with a famous line from EN 
6.11: ‘the phronimoi […] have an eye of experience, they see correctly’.267 Charles 
attempts to establish an analogue between Met 1.1 and Aristotle’s ocular metaphor: 
 
First, without the master craftsman's understanding of kinds, we would be like those who are colour 
blind: unable to see what is there. As we need a properly functioning visual system to grasp colours, 
so we need the master craftsman's understanding to latch on to kinds. As the former does not 
undermine the realism of our colour judgements, so the latter need not undermine the status of our 
judgements about kinds.268  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 See Charles 2000, p. 15.  
267 EN 6.11 1143b13. 
268 Charles 2000, p. 360. 
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The very notion of a ‘kind’ may derive from the perceptions of a master craftsman, 
argues Charles, ‘for kinds, as we understand them, are ones of the type involved in 
our craft engagement with the world’.269 That is, we speak of gold as a natural kind, 
not because we assume that all instances of the material we call as gold share some 
scientifically-discoverable property, but because we see that a master goldsmith 
could perform his work successfully provided that he considers only a certain kind of 
material as gold.270 The master craftsman, Charles writes, ‘grasps what can and 
cannot be done with the objects he confronts, and aims to learn where limitations in 
what can be done stem from him and where from the nature of the kind itself, such 
that no extension of his skill could change it. The nature of the kind is that what 
makes some things possible and others impossible for him’.271 Should the master 
goldsmith consider, for example, not only that specific kind, but also something that 
is actually pyrite, as gold, he would fail at his work, which is not characteristic to 
some we consider a master, as this other material would melt at a different point and 
have a different malleability, etc. Thus, if we are uncertain about whether some 
material is gold, we can rely on a master goldsmith⎯whether he identifies that 
material as gold or not can be our epistemic basis for whether we regard it as gold.  
As we now see how one might identify instances of natural kinds without having 
knowledge of the scientific features that they must have, perhaps we can proceed to 
the issue of identifying good actions, as also Charles applies his interpretation to it: 
There are several heroes (and heroines) elsewhere in Aristotle's thought whose role corresponds to 
that of the master craftsman. The virtuous know how to act and can explain why they act in that way, 
but need not know the fundamental principles concerning human well‐being, which make their mode 
of action correct. Indeed, they may have no view as to whether there are any underlying principles of 
this type. 272 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Ibid. 
270 Here I replace ‘water’ with ‘gold’, which is Putnam’s another example (Putnam 1975, p. 155–6), 
because I consider it more illuminating in this context. For identifying gold reliably requires master 
craftsmanship, unlike identifying water, which even unskilled people can reliably identify. Hence it is 
not intuitive to call a person who can identify water across situations ‘a master craftsman’. Since 
identifying any natural kind, even water, requires, however, some experience, the difference in the 
degree of expertise does not affect Charles’ argument, which only assumes that mere experience, 
instead of any scientific knowledge, suffices for fixing the identities of instances of natural kinds.  
271 Charles 2000, p. 3. 
272 Charles 2000, p. 155. 
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I think this view is essentially correct⎯provided that we replace Charles’ virtuous 
people with the people of synesis (synetoi). Like Vasiliou, Charles seems to assume 
that phronesis, and hence the moral virtue that comes with it according to EN 6.13, is 
needed for identifying good actions. But since a phronimos evidently understands 
why good actions are good (to dioti)⎯even according to Vasiliou⎯Charles seems to 
be mistaken in thinking that the phronimos does not need such understanding. I 
would therefore associate people’s ability to identify good actions with synesis 
instead of phronesis. The latter might only be needed to justify those identifications. 
Now, in EN 6.10, we have seen Aristotle establish that synesis is the ability to 
reliably identify good actions on the basis of other people’s opinions. If people can 
confirm whether some material is, for example, gold or not by consulting master 
craftsmen, it might be that they could also reliably identify good actions by 
consulting other, possibly more experienced people’s opinions. In this case, we 
would not need to assume, without explicit support from Aristotle’s text, that 
identifying good actions involves phronesis. Thus we could show the McDowellian 
interpretation⎯which argues for the necessity of phronesis for identifying good 
actions⎯to be mistaken, without even appealing to the passage in EN 2.1, in which 
Aristotle argues that moral learning is similar to craft learning, which does not 
involve phronesis according to Met 1.1. Hence we could agree (or remain neutral) 
with Angier’s argument, presented in section 3.2 above, that Aristotle cannot mean 
that these two learning experiences are similar, because performing some craft tasks 
(such as making bricks) can be very routine, in a way that acting well never is. We 
could even expand Angier’s argument and suggest that, by the comparison, Aristotle 
may not be implying that learning to be good is a similar experience to learning to be 
a craftsman, which, as Angier’s argument shows, might be a problematic implication. 
He may only mean that that both moral and craft learners, whose learning 
experiences could differ considerably in their cognitive depth, acquire the ability to 
identify good actions by consulting other people’s moral opinions.273 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Cf. EN 2.1 1130a32, in which Aristotle says that the habituation is only the first stage of moral 
development: ‘virtues we come to have by engaging in the (like) activities first’. This implies that 
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3.2.2 Identifying Good Actions Reliably with Synesis 
This conclusion, inspired by the conclusions of Charles’ interpretation of A. Post., 
may, however, seem too straightforward. Unlike learning what gold is through 
consulting master goldsmiths, for example, or more cognitively modestly, what water 
is through consulting people who have had some experience with water etc., learning 
to identify good actions solely through consulting other people may seem to risk 
being unreliable. People who have a reputation for being masters in their crafts tend 
to be reliable guides, for if a goldsmith with the reputation of master only pretended 
to be able to tell gold from pyrite, he would fail in his craft. Likewise, with natural 
kinds, such as water, with which everyone deals on a daily basis, we can rely on 
almost anyone’s identifications about instances of them. However, if even many 
people whom we admire as virtuous might not be actually virtuous, but only good at 
manipulating other people’s emotions, as we have registered Aristotle acknowledge 
in Pol. (see p. 97 above) could anything then stop us from inadvertently appealing to 
unreliable moral opinions in identifying good actions? Although everyone has to deal 
with good and bad actions all the time, just as they deal with, for example, water all 
the time, Aristotle seems to think that there is no similar guarantee about people’s 
opinions on moral actions⎯not even publicly admired people’s opinions. Yet he 
seems to be convinced that although any particular person, or a group of people, can 
provide unreliable moral guidance, as a whole, people’s moral opinions are reliable. 
Unless Aristotle was confident in the overall reliability of synesis, he presumably 
would not have written, for example, the following about the people we admire: 
 
The good man judges each class of things rightly, and in each the truth appears (phainetai) to him. For 
each state of character have its own ideas of the noble (to kalon) and of the pleasant. And perhaps the 
good man differs from others mostly by about each of these things, beings as it were the norm (kanôn) 
and the measure (metron) of them.274 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
moral development involves at least one additional stage such as, perhaps, learning from more 
experienced people’s example and opinions. If learning crafts is analogous to moral learning, as 
Aristotle also claims in the same chapter, the same should hold true with regard to crafts as well.  
274 EN 3.4 1113a30–4 (R). 
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Since Aristotle assigns authority in matters of pleasure and nobility to good people 
while maintaining that many people we consider good are not actually so⎯for 
‘moral weakness distorts [us], and causes [us], to be deceived’275⎯he must think in 
this passage that non-virtuous people can trust in the people they consider good in 
general, although not necessarily exclusively in any particular person. Similarly, 
despite that any particular non-virtuous person is potentially deceivable, more 
vulnerable to bad pleasures and mistaken conceptions of noble ends than a virtuous 
person⎯since they do not understand why good actions are good⎯he thinks that, on 
the whole, they can reliably identify good actions. He implies in the beginning of EN 
7.7 that only vicious persons characteristically fail to identify good actions by stating 
that most people are somewhere in between the akratic and enkratic types of 
character, though more inclined towards the former, and that the the categorical 
difference between those types and vice is that only vicious people consciously 
choose pursuing sensual pleasures over everything else.276 The rest, most people, 
choose good actions correctly in their opinions, even if they do not always act well. 
Synesis could thus operate by presenting one with the people’s consensus about 
the goodness of available courses of⎯i.e. ‘is this what other people would approve 
of doing in my situation?’ Since being recommended by most other people does not, 
however, make any action good, one might thus identify good actions (to hoti) 
without having any understanding (to dioti) of why the action is ultimately good: 
because it realises eudaimonia. We have seen Aristotle note a similar possibility in A. 
Post 2.19 100a15–b3, quoted on p. 78 above, in which he remarked that an universal 
concept, e.g. man, can be contained in a particular identification, and we can thus 
perceive particulars as belonging to kinds. E.g., we can identify Callias as a man, 
prima facie, without understanding what features ultimately make Callias a man.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 EN 6.12 1144a33–5.  
276 Aristotle implies so in EN 7.7 1150a18-22 (R): ‘[T]he man who pursues the excesses of things 
pleasant, or pursues to excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake and not at 
all for the sake of any result distinct from them is self-indulgent [i.e. vicious]’. Right after this passage, 
he states that the vicious person’s corrupted choice makes him distinct from, and worse than akratic.  
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3.3 LATER MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
            THE ACQUISITION OF PHRONESIS 
We have now established how synesis might operate: by recognising good actions 
through appealing to the moral opinions of other people. Although Aristotle admits 
that many of their moral opinions are defective, nevertheless, on the whole, most 
people are right about which actions are good. But we have not yet studied how the 
epistemic step from having synesis to the virtue of phronesis can be realised. 
Phronesis is necessary for moral virtue, for moral virtue is not only performing the 
actions that synesis identifies as good for whatever reason⎯for avoiding shame or 
receiving pleasure or honour etc⎯but performing them because they are good in 
themselves.277 In order to be able to act from this right reason (meta tou orthou 
logou), one needs, we have registered Aristotle to remind us in EN 6, to develop 
phronesis, which is basically the ability to deliberate excellently what is good for 
human beings.278 We have come to know that acquiring phronesis thus involves 
learning a correct conception of the human good, coming to act from the right 
reason, and⎯since only phronimos consistently understand what is good for humans 
and why⎯coming to deliberate excellently about actions.279 But we have not studied 
how a person with synesis shall acquire phronesis. In order to be ready for that task, 
he needs, as EN 1.4 has made clear, to have a fine habits, to consistently perform the 
actions that his synesis has indicated as good. So far, we have seen Aristotle to only 
tell in that same chapter that listening lectures in ethics can perhaps contribute to 
developing understanding why certain actions are good in the finely habituated 
people,280 and that that phronimoi tend to be more experienced in than other people 
in matters of action. 281 Apart from these remarks, we do not know, however, what 
the developmental contribution of the teaching of ethics and the experience of life to 
reaching these cognitive achievements, and to the acquisition of phronesis, is. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 See footnote 44 on p. 22 above for references. 
278 See EN 6.4 1140a30. 
279 See p. 22 above for the first two conclusions, and fn. 135 on 48 above for the last one. 
280 See pp. 51-52 above. 
281 See e.g. EN 6.11 1143b6–14, quoted on p. 98 below. 
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 Since Aristotle only ever announces teaching and experience as the factors 
affecting in the development of phronesis for finely habituated people, we may think 
that phronesis results primarily either from listening teaching, or from experience in 
acting well. In the former case, (1) a synetos would learn to act from the right reason 
through listening to lectures in ethics; in the latter case, (2) attending Aristotle’s 
lectures would perhaps help to enable a person who has already learned to act from 
the right reason though experience to articulate his moral knowledge to others, to 
teach ethics. A third alternative would be that (3) phronesis comes equally from 
teaching and experience, that listening to ethics lectures would, for example, help 
one to learn the importance of acting from the right reason from his own moral 
experience, and that this informed experience would further reinforce the motivation 
to attend to those lectures, until one naturally acts from the right reason in any 
situation. So far, scholars who have studied this question seem have, however, 
favoured either of the first two alternatives.282 Let me try to show, however, through 
studying two first alternative lines of interpretation, that the third alternative 
interpretation turns out as the probably most plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s 
view on the contribution of teaching and experience to the development of phronesis. 
 Burnyeat can be taken as an example of the first interpretation. According to him, 
habituation, or doing as one is told to do, prepares a person to enter to lectures on 
ethics, attending which should teach him to understand why certain actions are good, 
to acquire phronesis. Moral habituation is important, because this cannot be taught to 
just anyone, ‘for some, perhaps most, people’s basic desires are already so corrupted 
that no amount of argument will bring them to see that virtue is desirable in and for 
itself’.283 Moral habituation gives one the proper frame of mind for listening to ethics 
teaching: when we, as habituated people, enter ethical lectures, Aristotle, Burnyeat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Most scholars of Aristotle’s ethics have not studied this question as I present it; of the scholars I 
have read, only Burnyeat (1981), Sherman (1989), Kristjansson (2007), Lawrence (20111) and Curzer 
(2012) have. Kristjansson, according to whom phronesis arises in habituated people ‘primarily through 
verbal instruction’ (p. 23, italics mine) and Curzer, who thinks one ‘acquires the knowledge of the 
happy life by teaching, after habituation has produced good dispositions of action and passion’ (p. 351, 
italics mine) side with Burnyeat (whose interpretation I study below) and the first answer presented 
above. Sherman, who says that ‘experience in […] choice‐making will develop phronesis’ (p. 175, 
italics mine), would agree with Lawrence (also whose interpretation I study) and the second answer. 
283 Burnyeat p. 81. 
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claims, ‘will encourage us to think about our life as whole, to arrive at reasoned 
view of the good for man’.284 In EN 2.3, Aristotle says that ‘there are three objects of 
pursuit: the pleasant, the useful and the noble (to kalon) (viz. good acting)’,285 of 
which only the first we naturally desire from birth. Habituation gets people to 
initially pursue virtue by gradually making acting well to feel pleasant to them. 
Teaching habituated people why what feels pleasant to them is also just and right will 
eventually lead them to develop phronesis, understand why certain acting is good. 286 
 In opposition to Burnyeat, Gavin Lawrence, who has recently introduced the 
second interpretation, has argued that not teaching, but the experience of performing 
good actions is the key to developing phronesis. Acting from the right reason does 
not presuppose any theoretical, articulated understanding why good actions are good, 
but only the experience of life.287 One can thus have phronesis without ever having 
learned why good actions are good. Lawrence suggests, however, that the phronesis 
that does not include any theoretical component is not yet full and ‘architectonic’ 
phronesis; it is not a true moral understanding of why good actions are good.288 
Lawrence sketches, moreover, how even an architectonic phronesis could develop 
through experience only. Once an already phronimos agent has enough experience: 
 
[O]n the basis of their many experiences, the agent induces from particular instances to universals—in 
such universal induction, they abstract out the supposed colloquial element to something of the form: 
Such and such benefits/is healthy for those in such and such condition.289  
 
Lawrence cites Met 1.1 and EN 10.9 1180b14–16 in favour of his claim that a person 
can be phronimos without having the above inductive ability, but only with this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Burnyeat, p. 82. 
285 EN 2.3 1104b30. For the equivocality of the noble and acting well, see footnote 44 on p. 22 above.  
286 See Burnyeat, p. 74 and 79.  
287 Lawrence 2011, p. 43. 
288 Ibid.  
289 Ibid., p 44. Aristotle describes this enthymematic method of induction in Rhet. 3.25 1402b16–18. 
He says in 1403a6–10 that its conclusions can be refuted either by showing that a different conclusion 
can be reached on the basis of some other particular cases or that the present case is dissimilar to the 
particular cases that prove the conclusion. Making abstractions from particulars, of which conclusions 
cannot be easily refuted with either method, requires enormous experience in particular cases, and 
hence Lawrence may be justified in thinking that only the wisest people can make them successfully.  
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ability is the person’s phronesis fully developed such that he can teach virtue to 
others. The former passage, quoted on p. 93 above, tells us, as we know, that a 
craftsman can perform his tasks well without having justification (to dioti) for them, 
but acquiring the justifications enables him to teach his craft to others. In the latter 
passage, Aristotle likewise writes that, ‘it does not belong to any chance person to 
inculcate a good disposition in whoever happens to be set before him, rather, if this 
belongs to anyone, it would be to a knower (of the universals), just as with 
medicine’. If we accept Lawrence’s interpretation about the degrees of phronesis 
(and ignore synesis, which Lawrence does not study) the former passage now may 
seem to support a view that a sufficient level of phronesis for being a good person, 
the degree that enables him to act well, is the ability to identify good actions, 
although the architectonic degree of phronesis, which would enable him to also teach 
others and acquire moral virtue, requires understanding why those actions are good. 
 Let us now attempt to establish whether Burnyeat or Lawrence’s interpretation is 
more plausible. According to Lawrence, we can acquire phronesis through only 
moral habituation, whereas Burnyeat proposes that finely habituated people can 
acquire phronesis only through attending lectures on ethics. The two interpreters 
have, however, different conceptions about at which stage of moral development one 
can acquire phronesis. Burnyeat thinks, as we have seen, that only what Lawrence 
would call architectonic phronesis is phronesis, whereas Lawrence would also allow 
a person with only a finely-habituated character to count as having phronesis, albeit 
imperfectly, because he still lacks an understanding of why good actions are good, 
which Burnyeat interprets as an essential feature of phronesis. Hence both Lawrence 
and Burnyeat eventually agree that we could learn to act well as a result of moral 
habituation. However, while the former thinks, in line with Curzer, that habituation 
does not presuppose anyone’s telling the student which actions to perform as good, 
the latter thinks that such basic teaching is required. We have, however, already 
concluded that Burnyeat’s view is implausible on pp. 64–5 above: this would imply 
that we have not rationally chosen which kind of characters to develop, and hence 
could not justifiably be regarded as responsible for our actions. So, with regard to 
this interpretative issue, we have a good reason to prefer Lawrence’ interpretation.  
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 Where developing the architectonic form of phronesis, or the one and only 
phronesis according to Burnyeat, is concerned, Lawrence maintains that only further 
experience in acting well (apart from earlier moral habituation) suffices to develop 
understanding of why certain actions are good. On the other hand, Burnyeat’s 
interpretation is that an already finely-habituated person needs to only attend lectures 
in ethics to develop it. As we saw in Chapter 2, developing moral understanding 
brings a profound transformation to the person’s moral: while the ability of synesis, 
that virtually everyone possesses, identifies good actions on the basis of other 
people’s opinions, phronesis identifies them on the basis of accurately perceiving the 
demands of particular situations. While a synetos has to ask questions such as ‘is phi-
ing what other people would approve of doing in my situation?’ in order to identify a 
good action, 290 a phronimos perceives whether phi-ing would hit the mean in his 
situation or not⎯which is what justifies why it would be good or not. Although this 
cognitive transformation is but one aspect of acquiring phronesis, ‘the eye of 
experience’, as Aristotle metaphorically describes it in a passage of EN 6.11 (that I 
will quote and study on pp. 109-10 below), it is crucial that we examine it in order to 
settle whether Burnyeat or Lawrence’s interpretation is more plausible. The 
transformation implies that the above cognitive development in the apprehension of 
good actions, which accompanies the development of phronesis, is not achievable 
only through listening to lectures on ethics, pace Burnyeat. Aristotle’s previous 
metaphor, and his statement in EN 1.3 that ‘each person judges noble the thinks he 
knows, and of these he is a good judge […] hence of the political art, a young person 
is not an appropriate student, for he is inexperienced in the actions pertaining to 
life’,291 signal that the cognitive development in moral discernment takes place 
through acquiring experience in acting well, which, according to Lawrence, is all that 
is needed for developing phronesis. Although Burnyeat might handle the EN 1.3 
passage by replying that the required experience is to be acquired before one can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 See section 2.5 above for my interpretation of synesis. 
291 EN 1.3 1095a3–6. Cf. EN 1.3 1095a5–10, quoted in footnote 146 on p. 58 above.  
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even begin to develop phronesis,292 such a reply would be incoherent, for it would 
imply that there would not be any cognitive development in a finely-habituated 
synetos’ apprehension of good actions during the time in which he is becoming 
phronimos, though we have seen in the above quotations that Aristotle thinks that 
there is such development. 
 On the whole, Lawrence’s interpretation about the contribution of teaching and 
experience to acquiring phronesis seems therefore more plausible than Burnyeat’s. 
Let us thus proceed to evaluate it further. The only immediately obvious problem in 
it is that there is no textual evidence for the conclusion that phronesis is only the 
ability to identify good actions, whereas there is, as I have argued in detail in section 
2.5 above, a plenty of such evidence in EN 6.10 for drawing the same conclusion 
about synesis. However, if we only replace Lawrence’s conclusion that phronesis is 
the ability to identify good actions with the more justifiable conclusion that synesis 
identifies good actions⎯and that the ‘full and architectonic’ phronesis is thus the 
one and only phronesis⎯his interpretation could survive this problem. After this 
conceptual modification, Lawrence’s interpretation would suggest that phronesis, the 
knowledge of why good actions are good, results from experience in using synesis. 
But Lawrence’s interpretation also suffers from a problem, which only conceptual 
modifications cannot remedy. If only a person who understands why good actions are 
good can teach ethics to other people, yet if one does not need to be taught ethics, but 
only have moral experience in order to acquire that understanding, we may wonder 
to whom he should teach ethics and why? Aristotle suggests in EN 1.4 that finely-
habituated people are the proper audience for his teaching, but provided that they can 
improve their character without attending to ethics lectures, they might have only 
epistemic reasons⎯to acquire moral knowledge for its own sake⎯to attend them. 
This is possible: on the first lines of Met 1.1, Aristotle states that we desire to know 
by nature, and a similar approach seems to characterise even the contemporary 
teaching of moral philosophy. However, this conclusion would hardly fit with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 See Burnyeat 1980, p. 81–82 for this reading of the passage, according to which teaching phronesis 
will only be effective with a student who is already morally experienced, as only ‘he is ready to form 
his desires in the light of reasoning.’ (p. 82) 
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status of ethics as a practical science, or Aristotle’s claim in EN 2.2 that we study 
ethics to become good, not to know what is good.293 Therefore it would be desirable 
in an interpretation of his views on the contribution of experience and teaching to the 
development of phronesis to allow ethics teaching to have moral benefits as well. 
I would thus like to propose an alternative interpretation, which assumes that 
teaching and experience are equally necessary for developing phronesis. According 
to this suggestion, one becomes phronimos not by deducing why certain actions are 
good on one’s own, on the basis of one’s experiences, pace Lawrence. Rather, one 
could let teaching help one ‘to pick out’ reasons for the goodness of certain actions 
from experience, which, in turn, would help him to see that understanding those 
reasons also improves his acting (in Chapter 4 we will see how acquiring phronesis 
could improve even a finely habituated synetos’ acting), motivating him to seek more 
teaching to grasp those right reasons for action even better. At the end of this 
development, one instinctively acts from the right reason, and hence, has phronesis.  
 
3.3.1 The Roles of Teaching and Experience 
My proposal above may seem, however, to be in need of more specification. If 
Aristotle thought that a finely habituated synetos takes the step to phronesis through 
teaching and experience, it would be disappointing if he nowhere said what makes 
each aspect developmentally distinct: what is the difference between teaching, or 
listening to lectures in ethics, and experience in acting well? The two might seem to 
often overlap, at least conceptually. For example, is not receiving ethics teaching 
describable also as an experience, or is acquiring experience in listening lectures 
quite the same as being taught ethics, etc.? Therefore it would be important for 
Aristotle to delineate this difference if he thought that developing phronesis from 
synesis and fine habits was neither primarily reducible to an outcome of teaching⎯as 
Burnyeat has suggested⎯or to the many years of acting well⎯as Lawrence thinks.  
 I think, however, that Aristotle has materials for constructing an account of the 
developmental role of teaching and experience in the last step of moral development 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 EN 2.2 1103b28–9. Quoted on p. 6 above.	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from synesis and fine habits to phronesis. Although Aristotle never tells us what 
attending to lectures in ethics can teach a finely-habituated person in distinction from 
what he can learn from his own experience of acting well, it suffices for us to study 
what Aristotle says about the distinct role of experience in developing phronesis to 
get to also know the role of teaching⎯for since Aristotle ever mentions only these 
two sources and catalysts for this development, any element of phronesis that could 
not come from experience, must hence come from teaching. In EN 6.11, he writes:  
 
(A) Though no one is held to be wise (sophos) by nature, a person is held to have discernment, 
(krisis), synesis, and thought (nous) by nature. A sign of this is that we suppose these accompany the 
times of life, and a given time of life is possessed by thinking and discernment, for nature is the cause 
of them. (B) Hence thinking is both beginning (arche) and end (telos), for demonstrations (apodexeis) 
arise from these [i.e. krisis, synesis, nous] and concern them. (C) As a result (hoste), one ought to pay 
attention to undemonstrated assertions and opinions of the experienced and older people, or of the 
phronimoi, no less than to demonstrations, for they have an eye of experience, they see correctly.294 
 
In section A, Aristotle says that although wisdom (sophia) does not come by nature 
(physein), discernment (krisis), synesis, and thinking (nous) are capabilities that 
come with age. He seems thus to contrast chosen and necessary moral development, 
the latter of which a normal human being develops at certain age even without taking 
the conscious effort to develop them.295 Section (B) is very terse and thus, it is also 
controversial for interpreters. The kind of interpretation that an interpreter is inclined 
to adopt seems to depend, however, on whether or not he or he favours the Grand 
End interpretation discussed in Chapter 1.296 For a supporter of that interpretation, 
thinking (nous) being the ‘beginning’ (arche) of moral demonstrations would mean 
that it intuitively presents an agent a blueprint picture of eudaimonia, the truthfulness 
of which the agent tries to show dialectically through demonstration, which thus 
renders nous also the ‘end’ (telos) of the demonstration. However, the Grand End 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 EN 6.11 1143b6–14. 
295 Aristotle contrasts moral habituation that does not take place inevitably, but which has to be chosen 
(according to EN 3.5) and events that take place ‘by nature’, that is, take place inevitably under certain 
conditions (e.g. a stone falls by nature if dropped), in EN 2.1 1103a14–16, quoted on p. 54 above.  Cf. 
Kraut 2007, p. 204, fn. 4: 'according to Aristotle, a tendency can be properly called natural […] if it is 
not a product of reasoning or any other conscious effort to summon it into existence.’ 
296 See section 1.4 above. 
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interpretation has already shown to be not the most plausible overall interpretation 
of Aristotle’s theory of moral cognition: for example it cannot plausibly 
accommodate the philosopher’s statement in an immediately preceding passage, 
quoted on pp. 35-6 above⎯that ‘universals arise from particulars.’ Hence we might 
seek some other reading. Perhaps Aristotle wants to remind that thinking is the 
‘beginning’ of moral demonstrations, because synesis, our discerning ability to 
identify good actions, is an intellectual (dianoetikon) ability, and their ‘end’, because 
phronesis, understanding why they are good, is a virtue of thought. At least in this 
sense, moral demonstrations could be correctly said to both start and conclude with 
the involvement of thought.  
We may take Aristotle to indicate in section C that the experience of thinking, 
using discernment (krisis), and synesis, the abilities mentioned in section A, in both 
acting well and moral demonstrations, contributes to the development of phronesis. 
For it is hard to see what else apart from the previous discussion could be the 
reference of his phrase ‘as a result... (hoste).’ One may now wonder why Aristotle 
separates, in section (A), discernment from synesis, which, as we have learned, 
means moral discernment, the ability to identify good actions. However, the reason 
for this is likely that one needs also epistemic discernment, of truth, valid arguments, 
etc. to successfully learn phronesis, because learning it involves not only acting well 
many times, but also listening the lectures in ethics.297 As section (A) lets us know, 
no one becomes wise (sophos) by nature, without chosen effort: that is, only using 
one’s natural cognitive abilities for the sake of becoming wise for many years can 
make one phronimos.298 According to section (C), we can therefore rely on the moral 
opinions of older and more experienced people than us, even without asking for 
demonstrations, ‘for they have an eye of experience, they see correctly’.  
It would be a sign of interpretative confusion to think that this statement of 
Aristotle’s could imply that a fully morally virtuous person does not need to even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 This small consideration, although speculative, could further undermine already undermined 
Lawrence’s (2011) interpretation, according to which only experience of good actions suffices to 
develop phronesis. For in that case, Aristotle would not have had to distinguish synesis from krisis 
among the factors that contribute to the development of phronesis. 
298 In the context of the passage, sophia presumably refers to practical rather than theoretical wisdom. 
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have any capability to construct moral demonstrations, because they have an 
ability to intuitively ‘see’ good actions thanks to their experience. Although virtuous 
people may of course not need competence for scientific demonstrations aiming at 
proving universal truths⎯as a species of which the Grant End interpretation regards 
also moral demonstrations, demonstrations aimed at proving that eudaimonia can be 
captured into certain universal blueprint⎯they need, however, to be able to make 
moral demonstrations, which are about particulars: to identify good actions and 
understand why they are good⎯that is, have synesis and phronesis. We established 
this conclusion already in Chapter 2. Provided that synesis, which belongs to most 
people, can already ‘see’ good actions with the help of people’s opinions, seeing the 
good actions is, as a matter of fact, not even specific to ‘the older and experienced.’ 
Aristotle’s metaphor about the eye of experience could be more coherently 
interpreted to mean that apart from correctly discerning which actions are good, the 
experienced people can also correctly ‘see’ the demands of situations, which can then 
be used in demonstrating why just those actions are good in each situation. This 
understanding is specific only to the experienced phronimoi. Understanding why an 
action identified as good by synesis is good⎯not only insofar as it is good according 
to other people’s opinions, but also because it meets the demands of a situation⎯can 
only come from many years of experience of acting across different situations. 
Aristotle might have chosen to use the metaphor of the eye of experience because the 
phronimos’ experience-based understanding why good actions are good evades any 
satisfactory conceptual description. If situations are made of space, time, sounds, 
feelings, and many other things that cannot be translated into the propositional form 
required by a conceptual description, how could their demands be translated as such? 
Moreover, even if we could somehow conceive of the demands of situations 
through propositional structures⎯as McDowell has argued299⎯an explanation of 
why it is good to perform a certain action could hardly be entirely propositional. For 
the knowledge of the relations between moral propositions is not knowledge of a 
proposition⎯otherwise our moral explanations would constitute either an infinite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 McDowell 1994 is the most famous contemporary version of this ‘conceptualist’ thesis. 
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regress or web, neither of which Aristotle’s moral epistemology permits. 
According to him, phronesis is ‘a correct conception (hypolepsis) of the end (to 
telos)’,300 which is the lastanswer to the question why good actions are good: because 
meeting the demands of situations (eupraxia) is equivocal to eudaimonia. 301 It is the 
end of all our desires, of whose content we neither know by nature nor, as we have 
seen, can satisfactorily describe in language.302 The content of eudaimonia has to be 
learnt by experiencing the demands of situations. Therefore presumably the method 
of articulating this knowledge in language must be taught: although no one could 
learn to discern the moral demands of situations without extensive moral experience, 
even morally inexperienced or badly-habituated people could characterise some of 
those demands. As Aristotle states in EN 7.3, they could register, e.g., that eating 
sweets is bad for them in this situation, or that light meats are healthy for people in 
their condition, etc. However, without ‘the eye of experience’, they could not 
understand that acting well realises eudaiomonia, and apply this knowledge to their 
actions: Aristotle admits that people can recite correct moral demonstrations without 
having confidence in them.303 I hope to show in Chapter 4 that it is perhaps a lack of 
confidence deriving from a lack of experience that produces akrasia. This might be 
why he emphasises that only finely-habituated people can profit from his lectures.304 
Although Aristotle does not say much explicitly about the didactic content of his 
lectures,305 his separating the developmental contribution of experience and teaching 
substantiates his view that a finely-habituated person needs both experience and 
teaching to develop phronesis. Experience provides one with understanding of the 
moral demands of situations; the ability to see that doing as synesis advises is 
eudaimonia independently of anyone’s opinion. Teaching enables one, however, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 EN 6.9 1142b33–6, 
301 Aristotle equates eudaimonia with acting well (eupraxia) and living well (eu’ zen) in EN 1.4 
1095a19–20 and in MM 1.4 1184a26. 
302 The aim (telos) of every action is eudaimonia (EN 1.1 1094a1), but people disagree about what 
eudaimonia is (EN 1.4 1095a20–30). 
303 EN 7.3 1147a19–23. 
304 EN 1.4 1095b4–7. 
305 Cf. Kristjansson (2007), p. 42: ‘perhaps Aristotle did not consider himself such an expert on moral 
didactic to write a manual on it’, or that, since a ‘large portion of Aristotle’s writings on education 
have undoubtedly been lost’, maybe his writings on delineating the difference also.  	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conceive those demands as justifications for the identifications of synesis⎯that is, 
to articulate them in language⎯i.e., that this action is good, because of x and y, etc. 
For a synetos, who has neither extensive moral experience nor education, and who 
hence identifies good actions mostly on the basis of other people’s opinions, coming 
to conceive that the actions that other people’s opinions support are good, because 
they also realise eudaimonia, no doubt strengthens his motivation to act well. The 
more moral teaching a person receives, the better he conceives this connection, and 
the more experience he has, the better he understands why good actions are good.  
Aristotle's account of taking the developmental step from fine habits to moral 
understanding can therefore be as thorough, though less explicit, as his description of 
the steps from our natural state to acquiring fine habits⎯i.e. developing a desire to 
act virtuously, synesis, and the habit of not desiring bad pleasures. However, a 
question remains about how the virtue of thought phronesis can make a finely-
habituated person morally virtuous. We know only that Aristotle is convinced that 
this is the case. We have studied how phronesis can be developed, and we know that 
a phronimos understands why good actions are good, is likely to have a strong 
motivation to act well, and can teach virtue to others. We have not yet studied, 
however, what moral, or action-related benefits Aristotle thinks developing phronesis 
should bring that mere habituation cannot, and how phronesis might help in making 










CHAPTER 4  
AVOIDING AKRATIC ACTING 
 
Phronimos is a person who has the virtue of phronesis, who understands that acting 
well is eudaimonia.306 Although Aristotle’s theory of moral development does not 
explicitly feature a further type of imperfect, non-phronimoi character apart from the 
vicious, akratic, and enkratic⎯who all fall short of being finely habituated⎯it does 
have space for a finely-habituated person who is not phronimos. For example, he 
says in EN 1.4 that in order to listen to lectures on ethics, which should help them to 
acquire phronesis, people must already be finely habituated.307 Likewise, he claims 
in Pol. 3.4 that a good citizen is not synonymous with a virtuous person: although 
both have fine habits, only the latter has phronesis.308 Since phronesis is a virtue of 
thought, a finely-habituated person has at least an epistemic reason, a reason related 
to increasing his knowledge, to acquire it: to come to understand that acting well is 
eudaimonia. Let me show now that Aristotle also thinks that such a person also has a 
reason related to improving his own acting⎯a moral reason⎯to become phronimos. 
 As we learned from EN 6.13, Aristotle’s concept of ‘proper virtue’ signifies moral 
virtue that involves phronesis, and in EE 8.1 he states in the same vein that ‘it is clear 
that [when] people become phronimoi, the states of [their] non-rational aspect 
become simultaneously good’.309 In Chapter 1 of my thesis, we discovered that these 
claims derive from his conviction that only acting well with phronesis is meta tou 
orthou logou⎯acting well, because acting well is eudaimonia.310 Aristotle regards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Aristotle equates eudaimonia with acting well (eupraxia) in EN 1.4 1095a19–20. The aim (telos) of 
every action is eudaimonia (EN 1.1 1094a1) but in order to realise eudaimonia, one has to understand 
that eupraxia is eudaimonia. Aristotle indicates in EN 6.9 1142b33–6 that phronesis is this 
understanding. 
307 EN 1.4 1095b4–7. See EN 2.1 1103a14–16, quoted on p. 54 above, for Aristotle’s claim that 
developing a virtue of thought (such as phronesis) requires attending to teaching. 
308 Pol. 3.4 1277b25–30. 
309 EE 8.11246b32–6. 
310 See p. 22 above and EN 6.5 1140b5–6: ‘Phronesis is a capacity to act with the right reason (alethei 
meta logou) with regard to things that are good or bad for a man. For while making has an end other 
than itself, acting well (eupraxia) cannot, for it is the end (telos) (i.e. because eupraxia = 
eudaimonia)’. Elsewhere (e.g. EN 6.13 1144b27–8) he uses synonymous term orthos logos while 
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especially this mode of acting as noble (kalon).311 Anyone who does not have 
phronesis, who does not understand this, orthos logos in his present situation, can 
only act in accordance with (kata) it, which, though a recommendable mode of acting 
on its own, is not yet noble. Moreover, a phronimos never acts out of his character, 
but all other people, even the finely habitude people who do not yet have phronesis, 
can act badly on occasion.312 Hence there must be a moral reason for a finely 
habituated person to acquire phronesis: becoming able to act meta tou orthou logou.  
 We have not studied what moral implications taking this developmental step has 
for a finely-habituated person according to Aristotle. In this chapter, I attempt to find 
out the most important of those implications. I assume that the philosopher considers 
acting meta tou orthou logou especially noble, because anyone who does not 
understand that acting well is eudaimonia⎯the only moral motivation that can 
possibly preclude any competing motivations, for the natural aim of our every action 
is to realise eudaimonia313⎯may act from bad motivation. This assumption, that a 
cognitive defect allows bad motivation to cause akratic acting, is the guiding 
hypothesis of my interpretation of Aristotle’s account of akrasia in EN 7.3, which I 
attempt to establish in part 1 of this chapter. Any person who can identify a good 
action with synesis, but who does not have phronesis such that understanding that 
performing that action would be eudaimonia, I argue, is vulnerable to acting 
akratically. For the most past, the risk of him acting akratically is relative to his 
moral habituation: a finely-habituated person is less vulnerable to acting akratically 
than an enkratic, who, in turn, is far less vulnerable than an akratic. My conclusion, 
however, will be that only a properly virtuous person is invulnerable to akratic 
acting, because only he has phronesis in addition to a finely-habituated character. 
 This conclusion, according to which the moral reason for finely-habituated people 
to acquire phronesis is to eliminate their vulnerability to akratic acting, may seem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
describing acting in accordance with this right reason, that good actions are performed because 
performing them is acting well (= eudaimonia). 
311 See footnote 44 on p. 22 above for references. 
312	  In	   EN 9.4 1166a26-29, Aristotle claims that phronimos never has to regret anything, for his 
inclinations are so harmonious that the same things are always bad or pleasant to him, which implies 
he never does anything bad. However, in Pol. 7.13 1332b6-7, Aristotle states that ‘people’ – thus 
referring to all the people who are not phronimoi – ‘do many things contrary their habit or nature.’ 
313 See footnote 44 on p. 22 above for references. 
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implausible. It goes against the scholarly consensus view that already enkratic 
people never act akratically, which is the psychological feature that differentiates 
them from the akratic, and, moreover, this also seems to remove also any non-
arbitrary difference between enkratic and finely-habituated people, thus contradicting 
itself. For have I not just claimed that akratic, enkratic, and finely-habituated people 
can all have bad motivations and are all vulnerable to akratic acting, thus making 
these types arbitrarily separated degrees of one type of character, not different types? 
 In order to counter this negative impression, I argue that the non-arbitrary 
difference between the akratic and enkratic character-type in Aristotle could lie in the 
fact that an akratic person’s bad desires are characteristically stronger than his good 
desires, whereas for an enkratic, good desires prevail. Appealing to the psychological 
features that one’s behaviour displays most of the time could be a non-arbitrary basis 
upon which Aristotle could classify an akratic as a bad type of character and an 
enkratic a good type.314 I attempt to show further, in the last half of this chapter, that 
the difference between an enkratic and a finely-habituated person might be that the 
latter, since his moral habituation is completed, does not even desire inappropriate 
pleasures, unlike the former⎯whose moral habituation is still in progress.  
 A desire for pleasure is not, however, the only motivation that can motivate one to 
akratic actions: in EN 7.6, Aristotle points out that at least anger (thumos) can also 
lead people to act akratically. Since anger has no connection with pleasure, the 
habituation of character required to resist inappropriate pleasure might not help to 
control it. I will therefore argue⎯on the basis of studying EN 7.6⎯that even finely-
habituated people are vulnerable to acting akratically (excessively violently) while 
being angry, and this is what differentiates them from the virtuous people. I will 
suggest that only developing phronesis⎯which implies excellence in deliberation 
and motivation to act well on account of understanding that acting well is 
eudaimonia⎯might prevent akratic acting from anger. Becoming able to rein in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Aristotle makes this classification first time in EN 7.1 1145a15–17, and calls enkrates frequently as 
good (spoudaios) and akratic as bad (phaulos) elsewhere. In Pol. 7.13 1332b6-7, he says, moreover, 
that most people do many things contrary to their habits and nature, which implies that akratic and 
enkratic could people also act in a way that is not typical to their character at times.  
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one’s anger in any situation, I will conclude, would be an excellent moral reason 
for finely-habituated people to take the step to phronesis and full moral virtue.  
 
 
4.1 THE COGNITIVE DEFECT IN AKRASIA ACCORDING TO BROADIE 
The interpretation that I have delineated above begins from the hypothesis that an 
akratically-acting person suffers from a cognitive defect⎯presumably from a lack of 
phronesis315⎯that enables a bad non-rational motivation to take him over. This is 
what Aristotle explicitly argues in the beginning of EN 7.2. Since Aristotle’s latter 
arguments, however, are less explicit, there is a room for disagreement about what 
motivational safeguards the akratically acting agent lacks by not having phronesis. 
According to my interpretation, he may only lack understanding that performing a 
good action is eudaimonia. Since everyone desires eudaimonia more than any other 
end of rational or non-rational desires (people only ever disagree about what 
eudaimonia is), no one could voluntarily act in a way that he understands to prevent 
eudaimonia⎯i.e. act badly⎯provided that he understands what eudaimonia is. 
However, according Sarah Broadie, whose influential book Ethics with Aristotle 
contains probably the most comprehensive particularist interpretation of Aristotle’s 
account of akrasia so far⎯an interpretation that departs from the assumption studied 
in the end of chapter 1, that the process of moral deliberation involves universals 
such as the conception of eudaimonia⎯an akratically-acting person’s lack of 
phronesis implies that, under strong non-rational desire, he momentarily ignores his 
knowledge of what would be a good action, and as a result performs bad action.  
 I have already concluded, in Chapter 3, that it is plausible to think that the rational 
ability of synesis identifies good actions, and to consider phronesis the virtue of 
thought that safeguards one’s motivation to act well: the understanding that acting 
well realises eudaimonia. Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in EN 7.3 is the final test 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Aristotle claims that an akratic does not have phronesis in EN 7.2 1146a7–9 and 7.10 1152a6–8 and 
in EN 6.12 1144b2, that the akratic can have cleverness (deinotes). Since deinotes is incompatible with 
phronesis, also this Aristotle’s view implies that the akratic does not have phronesis. 
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for my interpretation. Should it lend more support to the conclusion that an akratic 
agent might not be ignorant of the good action while acting badly, but only fail to 
understand that performing it realises eudaimonia, apart from having had insufficient 
moral habituation, then we have a reason to prefer my interpretation to Broadie’s. 
 Let me therefore begin to specify Aristotle’s views on akrasia. The starting point 
that all interpreters, including Broadie, endorse is that Aristotle’s theory of desire has 
no problem accommodating the possibility of akratic acting: his conception that the 
desire for pleasure is entirely non-rational enables him to argue that it can drive one 
to act against one’s rational decision to perform a good action (provided that one 
does not understand that performing it would be eudaimonia). Thus we may expect 
Aristotle not to attempt to explain in EN 7.3 how akratic acting is possible. However, 
that akratic acting is possible according to Aristotle’s theory of desire is precisely 
what poses him a philosophical challenge. He is after all committed to preserve the 
views of his authoritative predecessors (endoxa) as far as possible,316 and probably 
his most authoritative predecessor, Socrates, thought that there is no such thing as 
akratic acting, since all bad actions result from ignorance.317 Therefore, Aristotle, so 
as to save the basic thesis of Socrates’ view while not abandoning his own theory of 
desire, needs to show there is some cognitive mistake, describable as ignorance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 See EN 7.1 1145b2-7 (R): ‘We must […] set the phenomena (phainomena) before us and, after first 
discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truthfulness of all the authoritative opinions 
(endoxa) about these, or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative of them; for if 
we both refute the objections and leave the opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case 
sufficiently.’ There has been scholarly disagreement about the relation between appearances and 
endoxa in Aristotle’s passage. According to Nussbaum (1986), both appearances and endoxa are 
opinions, because she thinks that both involve judgements, whereas according to G. E. L. Owen (1986) 
and Jonathan Barnes (1980), appearances are ‘bare’ observations and endoxa authoritative people’s 
(such as Socrates’) opinions about them. These both views seem to be, however, too extreme. For 
some appearances are no doubt opinions and involve judgements - such as the appearance that there 
are akratic actions. This does, however, not have to mean that all appearances are judgements, because, 
as we concluded in Ch. 1, Aristotle does not think that one needs to make any judgements in order to 
perceive something as e.g. pleasant (or of certain colour etc.). For an interpretation of this kind, see 
e.g. McLeod 1995 (that criticises Nussbaum, Owen and Barnes), pp. 4-6, or Berti 2008a, pp. 26-7. 
317 Prot. 358C: ‘No one who either knows or believes that something else, which is in his power to do, 
is better than what he is doing, subsequently does the other, when he can do what is better’ and D 
‘Now, no one goes voluntarily toward the bad or what he believes to be the bad’ See also Clit. 407D, 
in which Socrates is reported as saying, ‘injustice is involuntary’. 
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involved in every bad action, but that this mistake does not prevent some of those 
actions from being genuinely akratic: ‘against what [the agent] discerns the best’.318 
 Aristotle makes this challenge explicit in EN 7.2:  
 
Now we may ask how a man who discerns (kritein) correctly (orthon) can behave akratically. That he 
should behave so when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange⎯so 
Socrates thought⎯if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about 
like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such 
thing as akrasia; no one, he argued, when he discerns acts against what he discerns the best⎯people 
act so only from ignorance. Now this view plainly contradicts the appearances, and we must inquire 
about what happens to such a man: provided that his acting involves ignorance, what is the manner 
(propós) of his ignorance? 319 
 
Aristotle’s answer to the question with which he ends this passage is, however, far 
from explicit. One task that he poses himself in the following chapter, EN 7.3, is to 
answer it and thereby show the compatibility of his theory of desire with Socrates’ 
thought⎯to set the boundary between ‘mere ignorance’ and akrasia. I attempt to 
show next that in EN 7.2 and 3 Aristotle aims to explain how the akratically-acting 
person’s lack of phronesis does not count as mere ignorance. He is not ignorant 
insofar as he can identify the good action and find reasons for performing it; he is 
ignorant only insofar as he does not understand that acting well is eudaimonia. 
Broadie, however, has quite the opposite interpretation: since, according to her, 
phronesis ‘is to do with particulars’, the understanding that acting well is eudaimonia 
is exclusively theoretical knowledge on his view.320 Hence she thinks that whether 
one understands that acting well is eudaimonia or not does not affect one’s moral 
motivation, and the akratically-acting person’s lack of phronesis is therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318	  Cf.	  Bostock 2000 ad loc: ‘One might remark here that both in these initial skirmishes, and in his 
subsequent treatment of the issue, Aristotle is accepting that 'ignorance' is somehow involved; he does 
not seem to contemplate the possibility that Socrates has got it entirely wrong. And this despite the fact 
that he has not actually given us any argument at all in favor of Socrates' position.’ This is also what 
both Broadie and Charles assume. I think, however, that Aristotle does not consider an akratic ignorant 
only out of respect to Socrates, but also his own view that phronimos never acts badly (see EN 9.4 
1166a10-29) precludes him from attributing the moral understanding of a phronimos to the akratic.  
319 EN 7.2. 1145b21–31. 
320 See Broadie 1991, p. 242. Broadie appeals to EN 6.11 1143a28–b5, in which Aristotle says ‘with 
regard to action, [nous⎯Aristotle does not explicitly refer to phronesis] is concerned with last and 
possibly changing things’, to justify this point (cf. pp. 35-6 above, in which I interpret this passage 
somewhat differently). She does not, however, explain how her interpretation relates to EN 6.8 
1142a14–15, in which Aristotle states that phronesis is ‘concerned not only with universals’. 
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displayed only in him ignoring the moral demands of his situation⎯that he is not 
‘merely ignorant’, but ignorant of the moral demands of his present situation in 
particular.321 Akrasia is thus not ‘mere ignorance,’ but a certain variety of ignorance. 
 Let us begin to assess the principal merits of my and Broadie’s interpretations. 
Perhaps the most obvious consideration for accepting my interpretation of Aristotle’s 
reply to his own challenge is that if the akratically acting person were in any sense 
ignorant of what his situation required him to do, then it can be doubted if he even 
acts akratically. Provided that Aristotle accepts Socrates’ definition of akratic acting 
as one’s acting knowingly ‘that something else, which is in his power to do, is better 
than what he is doing’,322 then Broadie’s ‘akratically acting person’ might not be a 
specifically akratic for Aristotle, but only a type of ignorant person. However, if the 
akratically-acting person identifies the good action, is aware of it while acting, but 
nevertheless fails to perform it, as I suggest, then he would clearly act akratically.  
 Broadie has contested this consideration, however. According to her, Aristotle, 
unlike Socrates, does not even clearly differentiate akrasia from ignorance, but 
draws their mutual boundary only by considering akrasia a certain variety of 
ignorance. Since, claims Broadie, ‘Aristotle equates the activity of using knowledge 
with knowledge in the strict and primary sense of the term’,323 just as Socrates before 
him, he could not admit that one can fail to use moral knowledge without ignoring 
it.324 Since this conception of akrasia would count as ignorance on Socrates’ view, 
ignorance as a failure to use moral knowledge, Aristotle can consider akratic acting 
possible while accepting the impossibility of akrasia without any ignorance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Broadie 1991, p. 292. 
322 See  the entire quotation of Prot. 358C in footnote 317 above. 
323 Broadie 199, p. 291: ‘Since knowledge possessed is essentially knowledge‐for‐use […], a proper 
account of what it is to have knowledge makes reference to something beyond, which is the use. Since 
the use is also the final actuality of what is possessed, it is virtually inevitable, for reasons of logic and 
metaphysics, that Aristotle will equate the activity of using knowledge with knowledge in the strict and 
primary sense of the term’. 
324 See Broadie 1991 p. 280: ‘The modern problematic of incontinence starts from the assumption that 
the incontinent agent is subject to conflicting desires […] The problem which Aristotle mainly 
addresses is quite different: it is that describing someone as incontinent seems to entail contradictory 
ascriptions of knowledge and ignorance’. Therefore, (p. 288–9): ‘for [Aristotle], it is wholly natural to 
speak and think of incontinent behaviour as ignorance. This would be why Aristotle never questions 
Socrates' claim that the incontinent acts in ignorance (Socrates claims in Prot. 358C, see footnote 249 
above, that akrasia is impossible) but seeks only to rebut the Socratic implication ion that knowledge is 
wholly lacking’. 
 122 
 Indeed, in the beginning of EN 7.3, quoted below, Aristotle seems to describe 
an akratic as a person who fails to know what he should know in order to act well: 
 
Since there are two kinds of premises, nothing prevents someone who holds both from acting contrary 
to his knowledge, because he makes only use of the universal premise, but not the particular one, the 
matters of action being of course particulars. There is also a relevant difference pertaining to the 
universal premise relating to the person himself and to the matter of concern at hand. For example, 
that dry foods are advantageous to every man and that he himself is a man, or, that this kind of a thing 
here is dry. As to whether some particular thing (e.g. food) here is of particular character (e.g. dry), 
however, the akratic person either does not have or ignores it. And so, given two different ways of 
knowing, a great difference will arise, such as that for an akratic to know in the one way (i.e. to know 
the universal, but either not to have or ignore the particular), seems nothing strange, but in the other 
way (i.e. to know the universal and particular) it would indeed be strange (thaumastós).325 
 
In this passage, Aristotle assumes that the pieces of our moral knowledge can be 
conceived in terms of universal and particular premises (protaseis).326 As we saw in 
Chapter 3, the former kinds of premises are about the good in general (‘dry foods are 
advantageous to every man’), whereas the latter are about good actions (‘this food is 
advantageous’) that a particular situation demands. Since Aristotle’s syllogistic 
division is not between theoretical and particular knowledge⎯because even 
‘universal premises’ are not necessarily true in any situation like theoretical 
knowledge (e.g. if one suffers from dehydration, dry food would probably not be 
advantageous for him), and thus count as particular knowledge⎯this may seem to 
lend support to Broadie, for whom all moral knowledge is particular.327 Moreover, 
Aristotle seems to be concluding here that akratic acting has to involve certain 
ignorance of the particular premises⎯because the akratically-acting person does not 
have the phronesis that would make his sensitive to them, Broadie might add. The 
possibility that Aristotle raises, that sometimes the akratically-acting person may not 
even have attentively learned what a good action is, seems to also strongly assimilate 
that person’s epistemic condition with certain ignorance of the demands of his 
situation. To think otherwise, says Aristotle, would ‘indeed be strange’ (thaumastós), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 EN 7.3 1147a1–9. 
326 Perhaps in the same sense as he divides the soul in EN 1.13. 
327 See Broadie 1991, p. 242, and footnote 320 on p. 120 above.  
 123 
a phrase which must thus mean that it would be impossible.328 Aristotle’s text may 
therefore seem to provide evidence for Broadie’s interpretation, according to which 
the akratically-acting person’s lack of phronesis, makes his prone to ignoring the 
particular moral demands of a situation when under the influence of bad desire. 
 
4.2 CHARLES’ ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
 If we continue reading, however, beyond the beginning of EN 7.3, this impression 
about the correctness of Broadie’s interpretation may begin to change. Even if 
Aristotle states that acting akratically while not ignoring the demands of the situation 
in any sense would be ‘strange’, his statement, as for example Filip Grgic has 
remarked, ‘does not have to mean impossible, but signals the need for 
explanation’.329 Therefore, Aristotle does not have to be read as confirming, pace 
Broadie, that the relationship between akratic acting and acting from ignorance is 
that the former is only a variety of the latter: the ignorance of particulars. Anthony 
Kenny has even once suggested that acting from such ignorance, as described in the 
passage, might be not be genuine akrasia; perhaps Aristotle is simply explaining 
‘one sense, in which people are said to act akratically’ without acting akratically in 
the proper sense, that is, performing a bad action while knowing the moral demands 
of his situation.330 Apart from Kenny, also David Charles has claimed that in the first 
passage of EN 7.3 Aristotle does not describe akratic acting in a proper sense, but 
only varieties of ignorance that are colloquially called akratic. For Charles, only the 
‘strange’ akratic acting⎯which Broadie's interpretation regards as impossible for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 See Broadie 1991, p. 281: ‘[…] to Aristotle it seems impossible (italics mine) that a person should 
voluntarily do what conflicts with an earlier resolve while remaining aware of that resolve’. Cf. 
McDowell 2007, p. 61: ‘[Aristotle] does not acknowledge cases where thinking is in a good order, but 
there is a failure in executive excellence between the thinking and the action that it endorses’. Cf. p. 
73, on which McDowell concludes, on the grounds of his interpretation of practical wisdom as an 
ability to identify good actions (see section 3.1 above for this) that ‘incontinence is possible only 
(italics mine) on the basis of the flawed approximation of the view of a situation that practical wisdom 
would achieve’⎯i.e. on the basis of ignorance of, or inattention to, the moral demands of the situation. 
329 Grgic 2002, p. 343. 
330 See Kenny 1966, p. 173.  
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Aristotle to accept⎯sets the defining boundary between akrasia and ignorance by 
differentiating it from both the ignorance of particulars and of universals.331 
I think that we have reason to favour this interpretation, because, as I attempt to 
show, from the passage quoted below onwards, Aristotle seems to focus on ‘strange’ 
akratic acting, and the rest of his discussion in EN 7.3 is dedicated to this: 
 
Further, another way of having knowledge, different from those just mentioned, is available to men. 
For in the case of having, but not using knowledge, we see that having is different, such as that person 
both has it in a way and does not have it ⎯for example, someone who is asleep mad or drunk. But 
surely those in the grip of passion are disposed in this way; for the outbursts of anger, sexual desires, 
and certain other such things clearly bring about a change in body too, and in some people they even 
cause madness. It is clear, then, that akratic must be said to be in a state similar to those people.332 
 
While discussing above passage, Broadie seems to implicitly excise the sentence in 
italics, for he assumes that the passage continues to describe akrasia as a type of 
ignorance⎯or, ‘having (learned) but not using knowledge (of a particular good 
action)’, as Aristotle puts it⎯instead of ‘strange’ akratic acting, that is, acting badly 
while not ignoring the knowledge of the good action.333 Broadie needs to take this 
manoeuvre because Aristotle’s sentence tells us that the akratic acting he will now 
discuss is ‘different’ from that previously mentioned, i.e. different from merely 
ignoring the moral demands of a situation, or, syllogistically speaking, particular 
premises. But Broadie thinks, as we have seen, that Aristotle equates such ignorance 
with a failure to use the particular premises, and thus, the possibility of akratic acting 
without ignoring the particular premises is impossible for the philosopher to 
acknowledge. However, by now clearly differentiating an akratic that only fails to 
use the particular premises from the one who is ignorant, Aristotle suggests that there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 Charles 2009, p. 49. 
332 EN 7.3 1147a10-24 (B&C).  
333 I write, ‘implicitly excise’, since Broadie 1991 does not mention the sentence. In a footnote (no. 29, 
p. 296), Broadie even states: ’Cf. Charles (1984) 117–32, for the view that NE VII.3 recognises two 
types of incontinent, one who is, and one who is not, clear about what he should do. But it must be 
admitted that the chapter offers no definite evidence for this. […] [Hence] the comparison at 1147 a 
13–14 with drunks, sleepers and madmen must be meant to apply to all cases of incontinent behavior 
(cf. b 6–8) and attention is being called to two similarities: the incontinent condition is one in which 
the agent fails to respond appropriately even when the occasion offers; and however it comes about, its 
existence has a physical basis and it does not disappear without changes in the body.’ (italics mine) 
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are akratics who are not in epistemic state equivocal to ignorance while acting 
badly. 
After this sentence, Aristotle, however, nevertheless describes this differently-
akratic agent to have knowledge in some way, but still not to have it in a certain 
sense, similar to ‘the sense in which people who are asleep, mad or drunk possess 
[moral[ knowledge.’ Charles has called this state ‘weak akrasia’⎯weak, because it 
may seem that in it, the agent's desire for inappropriate pleasure, which the lack of 
phronesis permits to arise, is not strong enough to cause him to ignore the particular 
premises.334 It can be, however, admitted for Broadie’s defence, that Aristotle’s 
description is rather unclear, for it does not show how weak akrasia differs from 
mere ignorance of the particular premises⎯which could also be attributed to the 
sleeping, the drunk, and especially to the mad⎯or even that it must. Therefore we 
might be tempted to excise the line in which Aristotle says that the akratic acting he 
attempts to explain from now on differs from the ignorance of particular premises. 
 However, I don’t think we should take this option, because Aristotle continues his 
description, and shows, by also using metaphors of a student of philosophy and an 
actor⎯who cannot certainly said to be in any sense ignorant of the particular words 
that they recite, while nevertheless not acting in accordance with them335⎯that he is 
now talking about weak akrasia instead of the ignorance of the particular premises: 
 
But stating the arguments that proceed from knowledge is not a sign of anything, for even people in 
the grip of these passions recite demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who are first in 
learning will put together arguments, but do not yet obey them. For one must grown naturally into 
knowledge, and that requires time. As a result, it must be supposed that the akratic speak as actors 
do.336 
 
According to Charles, this passage implies that the akratic agent, just as an actor or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Charles 1984, pp. 118–132. 
335 Cf. Charles 2009: ‘the young students constitute an interesting case: they can put together 
arguments, make long speeches, and may well be convinced (e.g. on the basis of authority what they 
have been told. They can understand and present the relevant propositions clearly and lucidly. […] 
When they repeat the words of their teachers, they are like those [actors] who have learned a script 
without properly assessing its truth’ and Charles 2007, p. 206: ‘like the young students, the akrates has 
failed to make the arguments or good conclusion “part of herself” [as Aristotle says in 1147a22]’. 
336 EN 7.3 1147a18–24 (R).  
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student, ‘can go through the entire argument against (e.g.) eating this sweet, arrive 
and be aware of the good conclusion’. Charles suggests, however, that the akratic 
might fail to obey the good conclusion ‘because he or he lacks appropriately based 
confidence’ in it.337 The basis for confidence is, of course, ‘attraction to doing what 
he concludes should be done’.338 Without strong attraction to acting well, even a 
person who identifies the moral demands of his situation can fail to respond to them 
well, because inappropriate pleasures might attract him more than acting well. 
 Charles’ interpretation offers a plausible explanation for the difference between a 
merely ignorant and ‘weak akratic’⎯a difference that Broadie does not recognise. 
Since, on Charles’ view, the akratic does not ignore any piece of moral knowledge 
that he needs to know in order to have the correct conclusion, the interpretation 
preserves the difference that Aristotle acknowledged between an akratic and an 
ignorant person in EN 7.3 ⎯unlike Broadie’s, which considers akrasia a variety of 
ignorance.339 In the light of Charles’ interpretation, the ignorance from which the 
akratically-acting person has to suffer, so that Aristotle’s account of akrasia would 
remain true to Socrates’ view, would be different from an ignorant person’s 
ignorance, from the lack of knowledge. The akratic’s ignorance would be displayed 
in his lack of confidence in following his rational desire to act well⎯which would fit 
with Aristotle’s equating using moral knowledge with having it, as Broadie also 
argued. For an unconfident akratic does not certainly use his moral knowledge.340 
This way of ignoring moral knowledge would not need to entail the ignorance of 
situation-specific moral demands, of which the akratic suffers according to Broadie.  
 Charles does not venture to explain how akratic acting displays a lack of 
phronesis. His interpretation may not, however, even seem to call for such an 
explanation, because one would probably not need phronesis to avoid weak akrasia. 
A person’s vulnerability to weak akrasia can be entirely conditioned by his moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Charles 2009, p. 51. 
338 Charles 2007, p. 206. 
339 According to Broadie (1991, pp. 288–9) akratic acting is a variety of ignorance, in which one 
‘“knows” in the sense of having knowledge’, but does not ‘”know” in the sense of using it’.  
340 Charles 2007, p. 208: ‘If practical knowledge of the good conclusion involves not merely arriving at 
the good conclusion but also being drawn to act on it (cf. Broadie’s similar claim in previous footnote) 
it can be undermined by factors which do not make the weak akrates doubt its truth (pace Broadie).’ 
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habituation: the more finely-habituated one is, the less prone one is to desiring 
pleasure to such an extent that it could defeat one’s noetic discernment of what is 
truly good. Apart from weak akrasia (and varieties of ignorance that are colloquially 
called akrasia), there is, however, another form of akrasia, studying which seems to 
show that so as to avoid any variety of akrasia, not only weak akrasia, phronesis is 
required besides a finely-habituated character. I argue in part 2 of this chapter that 
although a finely-habituated person might perhaps never fall into weak akrasia, his 
habituation is not yet a safeguard against all akratic acting, because he may 
nevertheless act akratically from anger (thumos)⎯which is a cognitive failure that 
only phronesis, whose function (ergon) is excellence in deliberation, can prevent. 
  
4.3 ARISTOTLE’S ‘PHYSICAL’ DESCRIPTION OF AKRATIC ACTING 
Before continuing to study finely-habituated people’s possible vulnerability to act 
akratically from anger, let me attempt to demonstrate that the last chapters of EN 7.3 
also lend support to the view that one cannot act akratically if and only if one has 
phronesis even if habituation could make him invulnerable to weak akrasia. 
     Right after the last quoted passage (EN 7.3 1147a18–24, on p. 113 above), 
Aristotle gives another, even more complicated, description of akrasia, this time in 
‘physical manner’ (kai hode physikos) in EN 7.3 1147a24–b2⎯i.e. by considering 
by which mechanism the akratic agent’s thought and desire actually move him to act. 
 
(A) Further, someone may also look at the cause of akrasia in the physical manner (kai hode physikos) 
as follows: for the universal (premise) (tou katholou) is an opinion (dóxa), the other (premise) (hetera) 
concerns particulars, over which discernment (aisthesis) is authoritative from the start. (B) And when 
one conclusion (sumpehranthen) arises from the universal, the soul must necessarily assert it, but in 
the case of doing things, the soul at once acts. (C) For example, if one is compelled to taste all that is 
sweet and this thing here is sweet (it being a particular), someone who is able and not prevented must 
at the same time necessarily also act. (D) When, then, there is the universal present in us, forbidding 
us to taste, and there is also the opinion that ‘everything sweet is pleasant', and that 'this is sweet' (and 
this opinion is active), and when desire (epithumia) is present in us, the one opinion bids us to avoid 
the object, but desire leads us towards it; for it can move each of the parts. So it turns out that akratic 
action results somehow from reason and belief.341 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 EN 7.3 1147a24–b1 (R). 
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Aristotle states first, in section (A), repeating his conception stated in EN 7.3 
1147a1–9,342 that akratic deliberation, just as any moral deliberation, consists of a 
universal premise, which is about what is good in general, and the other premise that 
is about what particular action would be good. Aristotle adds here, however, that an 
akratically-acting person’s ‘universal premise’ that forbids him to taste the sweet is 
(only) an ‘opinion’ (dóxa). I have not seen interpreters paying special attention to 
this addition, but I believe it might turn out to be very important. For according to a 
passage in EN 3.2, opinion does not have to motivate acting, and usually it does not.  
 In that passage, Aristotle writes: 
 
‘[W]e choose (prohairometha) to avoid [good or bad] things, but we opine about what [something] is, 
or to whom or in what manner is it advantageous, and we really do not opinion about pursuing or 
avoiding them. [...] and we choose what we know most of all be good, whereas we opine about what 
we do not know [...] the same people do not seem to both choose and opine what is best, rather some 
opine what is better, yet, on account of their corruption (kakia), they choose what they ought not.’343 
 
 
On the basis of the above quotation, we should think that a weak akratic’s universal 
premise is quite unlike the universal premise of a morally virtuous person with 
regard to its power to move one to act. Although it might have an identical logical 
form, the weak akratic’s person’s universal premise could not be an implication of 
rational understanding why certain actions are good⎯a cognitive achievement that is 
constitutive and intrinsic to the virtue of thought phronesis.344 For in this case, the 
universal premise would not be a mere ‘opinion’ any more, but proper knowledge, 
and move us to confidently choose a good action instead of only consider certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Quoted on p. 121 above. 
343 EN 3.2 1112b3-11 (B&C). They translate kakia as ‘vice’ in this context. I have opted for 
‘corruption’ to avoid confusing akratic with a vicious person, who does not even have good opinions. 
344	  For justifying this claim, esp. EN 6.9 1142b25–36, which equates phronesis with excellence in 
deliberation, the ability to construct moral syllogisms of which all premises are true, and having the 
correct conception of the end of action. In EN 6.12 1141b21-8, Aristotle adds that phronesis is also 
orthos logos, i.e. performing good actions on account of their goodness (cf. EN 6.5 1140b5–6: 
‘Phronesis is a capacity to act with the right reason with regard to things that are good or bad for a 
man. For while making has an end other than itself, acting well cannot, for it is the end.’	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actions more advantageous than others, as Aristotle says in the above passage.345  
 After subtly clarifying that the weak akratic’s universal premise is a mere opinion, 
i.e. that it does not have power to actually move the akratic to act (unlike it moves a 
virtuous person for whom it is knowledge), in section (A), the philosopher proceeds 
to make a related contrast between the kind of moral deliberation that only results an 
assertion, and deliberation “in the case of doing things” in section (B). Since the 
latter kind of moral deliberation necessarily causes one to act once concluded,346 and 
since I have concluded in 4.2 above that Aristotle thinks that the weak akratic does 
not need to act even according to what he recognises as the conclusion of his moral 
deliberation⎯for otherwise Aristotle would not have a need to differentiate him from 
the akratic agent that is ignorant of the conclusion⎯it follows that the weak akratic’s 
moral deliberation must be of the former type. That is, his moral deliberation must be 
only assertive, begin from moral opinions and end up asserting their advantages or 
disadvantages in comparison with other opinions, without, however, ever resulting in 
a conclusion that necessarily moves him to act according to a certain opinion. Thus it 
seems not true to say, pace Broadie, that Aristotle equates ‘having’ and ‘using’ 
knowledge, or, as we can see now, having and using true opinion: we can now see 
that he distinguishes the two ways of possessing those opinions, only asserting, or 
having, and also using them.347 This picture would also fit with Aristotle’s earlier 
metaphors about the weak akratic being like an actor on the stage, or, as we will read 
soon below, a drunkard reciting philosophical teachings⎯for all those people only 
assert certain conclusions without inclination to act in accordance with them.  
 I believe that these conclusions about Aristotle’s conception of the physical aspect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 If having rational understanding why certain actions are good did not affect our actions - Aristotle 
would not have needed to emphasise either in EN 6.13 or EE 8.1 that one can only become a morally 
virtuous person in the strict sense (kyrios agathos) upon acquiring phronesis. 
346 Aristotle famously describes such a deliberation in DMA 701a13-14: ‘[In practical deliberation] the 
two premises result in a conclusion which is an action — for example, one conceives that every man 
ought to walk, one is a man oneself: straightway one walks...’ This Aristotle’s example seems to 
conclude that once one has the premises necessary for identifying how he should act, ‘he acts […] 
provided that there is nothing in the case to compel (him to act otherwise).’ Aristotle makes the same 
point also by using building a house and making a coat as examples (DMA 7 701a15-16). Since the 
akratic agent’s deliberation does not conclude in an action, it would therefore be a mistake to think that 
the account of DMA would apply also to his deliberation, although interpreters often claim so.  
347 See p. 109 and 113 above for Broadie’s conception of akratic person’s ignorance. 
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of moral deliberation, i.e. about the force of weak akratic’s premises to cause 
acting, in sections (A) and (B), enable us to see that a certain line of interpreting 
Aristotle’s conception supported by contemporary commentators, might be mistaken. 
348 Were the akratic deliberation only assertive, the example of practical deliberation 
that Aristotle gives in section (C) above could not describe an akratically acting 
person’s deliberation. Let me quote the example again: ‘if one is compelled to taste 
all that is sweet and this thing here is sweet (it being a particular), someone who is 
able and not prevented must at the same time necessarily also act.’ If this example 
were about an akratically-acting person’s deliberation, as the supporters of that line 
of interpretation assume, then his akratic acting, as we will see, should be a result of 
two competing chains of moral deliberation clashing in his mind, and the bad chain 
winning his mind over in the end. Therefore the agent would neither be weak in 
Charles’ sense, aware of what he should do but unable to execute the action due to a 
non-rational urge to act otherwise, nor ignorant of the good action as a result of a bad 
desire, as Broadie argued⎯but perform a bad action due to an intellectual confusion.  
 According to the considered line of interpretation, while the beginning of section 
(D) describes the good chain of deliberation, this example in section (C) describes 
the bad chain, according to which conclusion the akratic person ends up in acting. 
Provided that the akratically-acting person’s moral deliberation is only assertive in 
the state of akrasia, this ‘competing syllogisms’ scenario cannot, however, be the 
case. Regardless of whether it is good or bad, a purely assertive moral deliberation 
could not move him to act. Thus, even if the person had a bad chain of moral 
deliberation in his mind apart from the good one, this chain, if only assertive, could 
not move him to act akratically. The example in section (C) may thus not describe 
akratic deliberation, but illustrate the akratically-acting person’s non-rational, non-
deliberated desire, which motivationally overrides his correct, and his only, chain of 
moral deliberation⎯what is expectable since this deliberation is only assertive. 
Besides this consideration, also Aristotle’s language in section (C) points to the 
correctness of my interpretation instead of the alternative ‘competing syllogisms’ 
interpretation. For no one, not even the most hardened akratic, could seriously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 For recent versions of this interpretation, see Zingano 2007 and Lorenz 2009, pp.190-1. 
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contemplate such an implausible universal premise as ‘I ought to taste everything 
pleasant’ as the ground of his acting. Moreover, Aristotle says that the akratic agent 
would follow that premise provided that he is ‘able and not prevented.’ It is, 
however, hard to see why anyone would be ‘compelled’ to follow this sort of premise 
upon only contemplating it. Aristotle’s description about the compulsion to eat 
sweets is thus more probably a conceptual description of the akratically acting 
person's non-rational desire (which is neither chosen nor up to deliberation) than any 
universal premise that he formulates in his mind. Assuming that this is the case, we 
could take Aristotle's passage to show that the weak akratic acts against his rational 
choice driven solely by a non-rational desire, not by any competing syllogism. Since 
his rational choice not to eat sweets cannot move him away from eating the sweets, 
he simply cannot help but eating the sweets if he desires to eat them. This is how his 
non-rational desire could be said to compel him to eat them. 
Section (D) may seem to pose, however, a potential threat to my interpretation. 
Aristotle may seem to state in it that the source of the weak akratic person's desire to 
act badly, to eat a piece of sweet food, is in his opinion that ‘everything sweet is 
pleasant,’ which he connects with his other premise that ‘I ought to taste everything 
pleasant.’ Although this latter premise, as we have concluded above, might seem too 
odd for any rational person to actually contemplate as the basis of his acting, it 
simply must be in the akratic agent’s mind, an objector may say, so that his other 
premise that ‘everything sweet is pleasant,’ a belief that we might assume an akratic 
to have, would cause him to act badly, as it does, according to Aristotle. The 
philosopher even concludes that the akratic act thus ‘results somehow from reason 
and belief.’ Hence the ‘competing syllogisms’ interpretation, although it uncharitably 
entails that the akratic would contemplate implausible universal premises (i.e. apart 
from having bad desire to eat sweets and contemplating the correct syllogism 
forbidding him to taste the desired sweets), may nevertheless seem to be right. 
However, as Pierre Destreé has recently remarked, even section (D) does not 
entail that the akratically acting person would need to have a bad chain of reasoning 
to override the correct one in his mind so as to act according to his bad desire. The 
person can desire pleasure non-rationally, without contemplating an extravagant 
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universal premise such as that ‘I ought to taste everything pleasant’. However, so 
as to generate a desire directed towards some particular piece of sweet food out of his 
general non-rational urge to receive pleasure, he has to have formed a belief such as 
‘everything sweet is pleasant.’ This is how akratic acting can result ‘somehow from 
reason and belief:’ both are involved instrumentally in satisfying the bad desire.349 
 We can now see that Aristotle’s account of akrasia in ‘physical manner’ does not 
invite us to question the conclusion that we reached on the basis of his earlier 
description, that an akratic person does not have to be ignorant of the good action. 
The physical account neatly accommodates the phenomenon of weak akrasia: if the 
akratic agent’s universal premise is only an opinion, not knowledge that is present in 
phronesis, the deliberation that can be based on it must be only assertive, as it is the 
case with a weak akratic, not a deliberation that concludes with a decisive choice to 
perform a particular action, as with a person of phronesis. Since, according to my 
interpretation, the akratic person that Aristotle describes lacks an understanding of 
why certain actions are good, as such Aristotle’s account supports it, as opposed to 
Broadie’s interpretation. For according to him, as we have seen above, understanding 
why certain actions are good should not matter at all for one’s motivation to act.  
 After having subtly clarified that the akratically-acting person cannot be aware of 
the universal premise in the same way as the morally virtuous person, as for him it is 
a mere true opinion, whereas for the virtuous person who also understands why it is 
true, the premise is knowledge that causes him to choose a certain action⎯Aristotle 
concludes his description of akratic acting in a physical manner with the this passage:  
 
 ‘Now, the last premise (teleutaia prótasis) both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and 
being what determines our actions this man either has not when he is in the state of passion, or has it 
in the sense in which having knowledge did not mean knowing but only talking, as a drunken man 
may utter the verses of Empedocles.350 
 
The interpreters of EN 7.3 have traditionally had difficulties with this passage. It may 
seem that also my interpretation will have, for if the non-rational desire of the weak 
akratic undermines his confidence in performing the action that he has correctly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Destreé 2007, p. 152. 
350 EN 7.3 1147b8-19. 
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identified as good (i.e. the particular premise), as also Charles proposed, why 
would Aristotle seem to conclude here that all the cases of akrasia involve the lack 
of knowledge about the last, that is, particular premise? However, the term teleutaia 
prótasis is ambiguous, for prótasis is a Greek term not only for a premise but also for 
a proposition. It could also refer to the akratic’s last proposition, the conclusion of 
his moral deliberation, that is, to his discernment that a particular action is good.351  
 The another option, that teleutaia prótasis, which an akratic fails to know, is the 
last premise, e.g. ‘this food in front of me is sweet’⎯and thus, the akratic must be 
ignorant moral demands specific to his situation, as Broadie suggested⎯seems to 
have, however, a wider support than the just presented option. This support is not due 
because adopting that option would result a more coherent overall interpretation of 
EN 7.3 as a whole⎯for it does not: as we have seen in section 4.1, a corresponding 
overall interpretation, e.g. Broadie’s interpretation, cannot accommodate EN 7.3 
1147a10-24, in which Aristotle implies akrasia as having but not using knowledge to 
differ from ignorance of the situation-specific moral demands. Rather, its support 
seems to derive entirely from certain textual considerations that I address below. 
 Of the most recent interpreters, also Destrée, for example, supports the option that 
teleutaia prótasis is the last, or particular, premise. The akratic must know what is 
good in general⎯the universal premise⎯for acting well, as well as the particular 
premise, involving the identification of a particular good action. According to 
Destrée, the cause of (what Charles calls ‘weak’) akratic acting is this: the bad non-
rational desire clouds the identification of the good action in the akratic’s moral 
deliberation and therefore, since there is no contradicting premise in his mind any 
more, the pleasant, but bad action ‘never gets presented as being a non-good’ to the 
akratic, but as an ‘only’ pleasant action. Due to this momentarily ignorance, the 
akratic performs the bad instead of the good action.352 We can see this interpretation 
is quite a different from the interpretation offered by Charles, whom we have seen, in 
section 4.2 above, to propose that the weak akratic lacks ‘confidence’ exclusively in 
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  In the weak akratic’s deliberation, as for a virtuous person, the conclusion of practical deliberation 
is action, as we concluded Aristotle to think in EN 7.3 on p. 128 above.	  
352 Destreé 2007, p. 181. 
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the conclusion of his moral deliberation, in his discernment of the goodness of a 
certain course of action, while under the strong influence of bad non-rational desire. 
Probably the principal textual consideration that has made most interpreters, 
Broadie and Destreé hesitant to endorse Charles’ interpretation, despite its apparent 
philosophical plausibility, is this: Many interpreters of Aristotle, among whom we 
find Destreé and also, for example, David Bostock, have remarked, that although it is 
of course grammatically possible that prótasis could refer to proposition instead of 
premise in EN 7.3 1147b8-19, it is nevertheless exegetically rather unjustifiable to 
assume that teleutaia prótasis could possibly refer to the last proposition, that is, to 
the conclusion of the akratic person’s deliberation, in that context. For only few lines 
before the passage, in section (B), Aristotle uses the term sumpehranthen to refer to 
the conclusion of the akratic’s deliberation, and it is unexplainable why he, if the 
reference remains the same, would suddenly replace the term with another one.353  
Charles has, however, attempted to evade this consideration by proposing that the 
reference of teleutaia prótasis and sumpehranthen might nevertheless not be the 
same: the latter may “refer not to the final proposition (i.e. teleutaia prótasis), which 
emerges from the premisses, but to the action done.” 354 Although Charles does not 
elaborate about Aristotle’s possible reasons for making such a distinction, I could 
argue that if the akratic person’s deliberation were only assertive, as I have 
concluded above, then its conclusion would not yet be identical with an action, 
unlike in the case of a virtuous person’s moral deliberation. Here the philosopher 
would have had a good reason for making the distinction that Charles suggested.  
Even if we, however, would accept this point, it might still seem far-fetched to 
think that Aristotle actually employs such a distinction in EN 7.3 1147b8-19, 
because, as we have seen, even before introducing the concept of teleutaia prótasis 
in that passage, he has already specified that sumpehranthen is realized in an action 
only provided that the agent is ‘able and not prevented’ in EN 7.3 1147a24–b2, 
section (C). Once this qualification is introduced, he could as well have used the term 
sumpehranthen also in EN 7.3 1147b8-19, without the risk of his audience getting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Ibid. p. 146  and Bostock 2000, p. 132. 
354 Charles 2007, p. 71. 
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confused about whether it refers to an actual action, or to a propositional 
conclusion of deliberation that can still be prevented from being realised as an 
action.355 
Due to the ambiguity of the reference of teleutaia prótasis, it has now turned out 
that it is difficult to say which of the two interpretations of the place of akratic’s 
failure in the physical process leading to his bad action we should prefer. From the 
viewpoint of philosophical charity, we should probably prefer Charles’, for it allows 
us to acknowledge that Aristotle, realistically, allows the existence of a weak akratic, 
who does not make any mistake in his deliberation, but lacks nevertheless confidence 
in performing a good action. However, the price of the charity would be that Charles’ 
interpretation would require us to adopt the above unconventional, and perhaps also 
insufficiently textually justified, reading of the reference of teleutaia prótasis. 
This interpretational impasse permits me to suspect that neither interpretation 
about the meaning of teleutaia prótasis satisfactorily captures Aristotle’s point in 
using such an ambiguous concept in the conclusions of his account of akrasia in a 
physical manner. I would like to suggest that Aristotle might have chosen an 
ambiguous term, because he wanted to leave it open whether the akratic has the 
conclusion, that a certain action is good, in his mind or not, when succumbing to his 
bad non-rational desire. For if either Broadie, Destreé and others’, or Charles’ line of 
interpretation were entirely correct, presumably Aristotle would have chosen a more 
explicit term⎯such as en merei prótasis, ‘the particular premise’, or sumpehranthen, 
‘conclusion’⎯to denote the step of deliberation after the reaching of which the 
akratic submits to his bad desire. As far as I know, no interpreter has asked why 
Aristotle might have intentionally left the question about the exact place of the 
akratic’s submission to a bad desire in his order of deliberation so completely open. 
Let me attempt, however, to address this issue. Perhaps the philosopher does not 
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  Lorenz 2014, p.257, has suggested yet another consideration for taking teleutaia protasis to refer to 
the conclusion. He remarks that Aristotle says teleutaia protasis ‘determines our actions’ in EN 7.3 
1147b9. According to him, it is hard to see how minor premise could determine our actions unless it 
necessarily implies conclusion, which it cannot do at the cost of preventing us from considering 
alternatives, and therefore the protasis must be conclusion. I am yet to see a counterargument to this. 
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even consider important to answer the question that has occupied interpreters for 
long without producing much clarity to the reference of teleutaia prótasis, because 
he, I believe, can conclude his account on the physical process behind akratic acting 
without even telling the exact reference of teleutaia prótasis. Provided that the 
akratic deliberation is only assertive, there is no wonder that the akratically-acting 
person does not obey his deliberation, regardless of at what point it involves 
ignorance. Unlike interpreters such as Charles and Destreé assume, as I attempt to 
show next, Aristotle reveals that akrasia is not in the strict sense a failure to have 
(confidence in) a certain proposition⎯the elusive teleutaia prótasis⎯due to bad 
moral habituation, although such a phenomenon is involved in all cases of akrasia, 
but derives from the lack of phronesis. This might be the only ignorance that akrasia 
has to involve, and thus, Socrates remains right, for he considered only the moral 
knowledge that is in phronesis to be any moral knowledge. That is, although the 
habituation of desires could probably prevent most cases of akrasia⎯probably even 
all cases of weak and ignorant akrasia by making people to stick more firmly to their 
premises and conclusions⎯the philosopher’s view, as I will argue below, is that only 
the possession of phronesis, not just being finely habituated⎯although phronesis 
presupposes such habituation⎯makes one invulnerable to all varieties of akrasia.  
 After giving his physical description of akrasia, Aristotle concludes in EN 7.3: 
 
The position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result; for it is not in the presence of 
what is thought to be knowledge proper (kyria episteme) that akratic acting arises (nor is it this that is 
“dragged about” as a result of the state of passion), but in that of perceptual (aisthetike) knowledge. 
This must suffice as our answer to the question of action with and without knowledge, and how it is 
possible to act akratically with knowledge.356 
 
Aristotle seems to conclude that Socrates’ conception of akrasia could be right 
insofar as akratic acting is impossible in the presence of proper knowledge (kyria 
episteme). However, akratic acting remains possible if the person has only perceptual 
knowledge (aisthetike episteme). Since understanding of why certain actions are 
good, namely, on account of their realising eudaimonia, is probably the only piece of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 EN 7.3 1147b14–19 (R). 
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moral knowledge that may qualify as episteme in the proper sense⎯in virtue of 
the universality and unchangeability357⎯let me suggest that Aristotle might conclude 
here that people who do not have this understanding, who do not have phronesis, 
could be vulnerable to acting akratically. So far, many interpreters have, however, 
suggested a different interpretation. They have not considered that Aristotle could 
describe the knowledge that akratic does not have here. Instead, they have claimed 
that instead of the knowledge that he lacks, kyria episteme refers to the akratic’s 
grasp of universal premises, and aisthetike episteme to his discernment of their 
relevance to his situation; and that the akratic agent’s bad desire prevents him from 
making use of those discernments, or, having confidence in them, as Charles put it.358   
 I think, however, that this standard reading derives not so much from Aristotle’s 
text⎯because, as concluded above, an akratic agent’s universal premises, e.g. that 
‘one should not eat sweets’ or that ‘dry foods are healthy’ are not true in any 
situation unlike kyria episteme should be⎯but from the interpreters not being 
interested in asking why Aristotle labels the weak akratic’s universal premise as dóxa 
in EN 7.3 1147a24–5, quoted on p. 127 above. If Aristotle used the word dóxa in 
technical sense⎯as denoting a proposition of which truth value can change from one 
situation to another, that is, an opinion⎯he could not, pace the standard reading, call 
later the same premise as kyria episteme that is distinct from contingent dóxa.  
 A supporter of the standard reading may now think, however, that the distinction 
between episteme and dóxa could not be technical in end of EN 7.3, for earlier in the 
same chapter, in 1146b24-31, Aristotle seems to underplay the significance of the 
distinction for the question ‘whether or not akratics act knowingly (eidotes)’ (46b6): 
 
As for the suggestion that it is true opinion (alethes dóxa) and not knowledge (episteme) against which 
we act incontinently, that makes no difference to the issue (logos), for some people when in a state of 
opinion do not hesitate, but think they know exactly. If, then, the notion is that owing to their weak 
conviction (pistis) those who have opinion are more likely to act against their judgement than those 
who know, we answer that there need be no difference between knowledge and opinion in this respect; 
for some men are no less convinced of what they think than others of what they know.’359 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 See EN 6.3 1139b19–30, in which Aristotle gives this definition about episteme. 
358 See p. 125 above. 
359 EN 7.3. 1146b24-31 (R). Ross’ translation for logos, ‘argument’ replaced with ‘issue’.	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Aristotle says above that the distinction whether we act against knowledge or 
opinion is not important for the question, because an akratic can have as great 
confidence to opinion as he has to episteme. If one can act even against his 
confidently held true opinion, then he could also act against his episteme. Hence the 
distinction between opinion and episteme seems to provide no ingredients for 
answering to the question.   
This conclusion is, however, in line with my interpretation. For Aristotle’s passage, 
as the philosopher made clear on a line preceding it (EN 7.3 1146b19), concerns only 
the unqualified (haplos) akrasia that is caused by the desire of improper pleasures. 
My interpretation suggests, however, that acquiring episteme could only help already 
finely habituated people, who have already learnt to desire proper pleasures and are 
thus invulnerable to this type of akrasia. It would enable them to take the step to 
phronesis, and become also invulnerable to other possible types of akrasia. Thus, 
although the lack of moral habituation suffices to account for one’s vulnerability to 
unqualified, or, pleasure-related akrasia, the distinction between acting on the basis 
of opinion and episteme can still explain the difference between the people who can 
overcome only this akrasia, and those that are invulnerable to all types of akrasia. 
This conclusion would not require us to assume that kyria episteme refers to an 
akratic’s true universal opinions, which would be a very unusual way for Aristotle to 
use the concept, but to understanding why good actions are good, which cannot 
improve a person’s motivation to act well unless he is already finely habituated. 
  If this is what kyria episteme would signify in the conclusion of EN 7.3, then 
aisthetike episteme might refer to other moral propositions that a person cognises⎯to 
his situation-specific premises pertaining to universals, such as ‘do not taste sweets’, 
pace the received interpretation, apart from only the premises that refer directly to 
particulars such as ‘this is sweet’. Since ‘perceptual knowledge’ is thus analogous to 
a true opinion, just as Aristotle’s labelling the akratic’s universal premise as dóxa 
signalled, it is episteme only in a qualified sense. Elsewhere in EN, Aristotle calls 
true opinions that pertain to acting as ‘practical knowledge’ (episteme praktike).360 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 See EN 6.8 1141b3042–a11. Aristotle says there that phronesis is identified especially with 
practical knowledge. This should not, however, be taken to mean (pace Broadie and McDowell) that 
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 Assuming that an akratically-acting person does not understand that acting well 
is eudaimonia, and as such does not have phronesis, he acts without kyria episteme, 
and can thus be said to be ignorant (agnoios)⎯as he must be if Aristotle is to save 
Socrates’ thesis that all bad acting results from ignorance⎯although he may act 
badly knowingly of both universal and particular premises. However, as both kinds 
of premises (even thought the former do not directly refer to particulars), are only 
opinions, and hence contingent, his knowledge is only of particulars, or, ‘practical 
knowledge.’ Since identifying a good action does not presuppose knowledge of the 
nature of eudaimonia, but only synesis, which is the practical knowledge of the 
actions that most people would approve in an agent’s situation, such knowledge 
should enable him to identify a good action and choose to perform it as good. It is 
only that his unhabituated non-rational desire may lead him to temporarily ignore his 
particular premises, or lack confidence in the conclusion of his moral deliberation.  
 Since the text of EN 7.3 thus supports my assumption that weak akratic acting is 
possible whenever one does not have the understanding of why good actions are 
good (kyria episteme), we may proceed to showing which kind of akrasia, then, 
cannot be cured by moral habituation only. Before this, however, I attempt to show 
the compatibility of my interpretation with Aristotle's views on enkrateia⎯that, 
despite implying that both akratic and enkratic people are vulnerable to weak 
akrasia, it can nevertheless acknowledge that those character states do not only differ 
in the degree of their vulnerability to surrendering to bad desires, but also in kind. 
The finely-habituated people are not enkratic, because they are insusceptible to weak 
akrasia, but they must nevertheless be prone to some type of akrasia on account of 
lacking kyria episteme. At least the type cannot be ignorant akrasia discussed 
because those people have all the premises that they need for identifying good 
actions. But there is yet another type of akrasia, impetuous akrasia, or, acting against 
one’s moral knowledge from anger (thumos), which, I argue, is a motivation different 
from non-rational desire. I attempt to show that the philosopher’s discussion of anger 
in EN 7.6 (and elsewhere) allows that even a person, who has completed his moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
phronesis is all about practical knowledge, since in EN 6.7 Aristotle has just said that it is also 
concerned with universals, i.e., the objects of proper knowledge.  
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habituation but lacks kyria episteme can fall to acting akratically while angry. This 
vulnerability could, I argue, make the moral difference between him and the virtuous 
person, who has phronesis, and thus also kyria episteme, and establish that avoiding 
excessive anger is a moral reason for a finely-habituated person to acquire phronesis. 
 
4.4 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AKRASIA AND ENKRATEIA 
If understanding why certain actions are good, on account of realising eudaimonia, 
⎯which is constitutive to phronesis ⎯differentiates fully virtuous people from those 
who are vulnerable to akratic acting in certain extent, as I have argued, then even 
enkratic and finely-habituated people must be vulnerable to akratic acting. Therefore, 
I face a challenge in explaining now, what⎯if not invulnerability to akratic acting, as 
is often claimed⎯is the difference that warrants considering the enkratic a different 
type of character from the akratic. Only once this difference is clarified can I proceed 
to explain how even finely-habituated people could be vulnerable to akratic acting.  
 According to the received interpretation, an enkratic person never acts akratically, 
which defines his character as enkratic.361 Nevertheless, I assume that he may still act 
akratically, but this is far less likely than in the case of an akratic. Although 
interpreters do not usually even consider the alternative that I present⎯thus making 
the received interpretation seem uncontroversial⎯Aristotle’s famous definition of 
enkrateia in EN 7.9 permits it. His words⎯‘the enkratic abides by his choice more 
and the akratic man less than the most men’⎯do not amount to denying that the 
enkratic could act akratically. The philosopher’s words in EN 7.7, that an enkratic ‘is 
victorious (to nikan) over’362 his bad desires rather suggests that he does not always 
overcome them, for no one is always victorious, but victory in a contest (nike) is 
achievement that one can hardly repeat without sometimes losing. Therefore, instead 
of a question about the possibility of acting akratically, perhaps, for example, the fact 
that only an akratic person acts akratically characteristically could amount to the 
difference between the two types of character. For since the enkratic has a good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 See e.g. Irwin 2007, p. 154, for the traditional division between enkrateia, akrasia, and virtue.  
362	  EN 7.7 1150a35.	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(spoudaios) character, we may think that he characteristically acts well and only 
exceptionally akratically, and vice versa for the akratic. Asking what mode of acting 
is characteristic to a person, we may assume, would probably be a more natural way 
of defining his character than asking what mode is ever possible to him. Aristotle 
seems to hold this view, for he acknowledges that ‘most people are in between 
[akratic and enkratic]’,363 which he could not have said if he thought that only a 
person who never acts akratically can be enkratic, as the received interpretation 
implies. For in that case, a person who has periods of akrasia and enkrateia, like 
most of us, would not be in between these two types of character, but only akratic.  
 Amelié Rorty has arrived at a rather similar conclusion as a result of studying the 
moral differences between an enkratic and a morally virtuous person. She points out 
that as far as a virtuous person’s non-rational desire is habituated to pursuing 
virtuous ends, he must be ‘more motivationally secure’ than an enkratic person, 
whose desires run against one another.364 On my interpretation, this is not, however, 
the only difference between them, because apart from the superior moral habituation 
that a finely-habituated person has undergone, the properly virtuous person also has 
phronesis. If we acknowledge this, then my interpretation, which allows even 
enkrates to occasionally act akratically, is more compatible with the conclusion of 
EN 7.3 than the received interpretation of enkrateia. While concluding EN 7.3, 
Aristotle says, as we have seen, that akrasia does ‘not occur in the presence of proper 
knowledge’, which, we have learned, is the understanding that acting well is 
eudaimonia. As only phronesis enables such understanding, Aristotle’s conclusion 
would imply that all other people, such as the enkratic or even the finely-habituated, 
are vulnerable to akratic acting (in the extend determined by their moral habituation). 
My interpretation might, however, be criticised on the basis of Aristotle’s 
statement in EN 7.9: ‘bodily pleasures do not make [an enkratic person] act against 
reason’.365 If the enkratic people were vulnerable to akratic acting, then Aristotle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 EN 7.7 1150a15: Aristotle continues by admitting that most people ‘incline more toward the worse 
disposition’, i.e., are closer to the akratic than the enkratic. 
364 See Rorty 1984, p. 274. Since her interpretation, also e.g. Broadie 1991, p.308 fn. 11, p.152, 
Drefcinski 2000, pp.115-116 and Lorenz 2009, p. 188, have reached similar conclusions. 
365 EN 7.9. 1 151b34–52al.  
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should have admitted that an enkratic person occasionally acts akratically, unlike 
the virtuous person, but here he seems to state the contrary: that the enkratic abstains 
from performing bad actions entirely, just as a virtuous person.366 I think, however, 
that such criticism would be misguided. For even if enkratic people could act 
akratically, this would not yet imply that an enkratic person would ever act 
akratically. An enkratic may manage to always resist his bad, non-rational desire for 
pleasure, but his resistance would be accidental. Maybe the enkratic is simply not 
prone, on account of his decent upbringing, to experience very intense temptations. It 
could be, however, that if he ever experienced such a temptation, he could act 
akratically.367 This conclusion would be consistent with what Aristotle ever says 
about enkrateia, and he never says that it is ‘firm and unchangeable’, like virtue.368 
 
4.5 ONLY PHRONESIS CAN PREVENT IMPETUOUS AKRASIA 
We become able to resist inappropriate pleasures through habituation. In addition to 
enkratic people, who are tempted by inappropriate pleasures, but capable of resisting 
them on account of their decent habituation, we can thus also conceive a person, who 
has had such a good habituation that inappropriate pleasures do not tempt them at all.   
Even this person does not, however, have to be a phronimos, because habituation 
does not develop the virtues of thought. But since only phronimoi ‘never do anything 
they need to regret,’ also the finely-habituated type of character should thus have 
some vulnerability to akratic acting.369 This may seem, however, contradictory: if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Gould 1994, 180–1, and Broadie 1991, p. 285. 
367  Now, an objector might comment that if enkratic (or finely-habituated) people who have 
successfully overcome their non-rational desire for pleasure were still vulnerable to anger, Aristotle 
would not have said in EN 2.3 1105a8 (R), quoting Heraclitus, that ‘it is harder to fight with pleasure 
than with anger’, but vice versa. This would not, however, be a powerful objection to my 
interpretation, since I acknowledge that learning to control one’s desire for pleasure might be a far 
more challenging developmental step to take than learning to control anger; I only claim that the latter 
step can only be taken after the former has been successfully taken. 
368 EN 2.2 1105a34–b1. 
369 See EN 9.4 1166a26-29, according to which phronimos never has to regret anything, i.e. he never 
acts badly. However, according Pol. 7.13 1332b6-7, ‘people’, which must thus refer to ‘the people 
apart from phronimoi’, i.e. also to the finely habituated, can act against their ‘habit and nature.’ 
Aristotle explicates in the passage of EN 9.4 that phronimos always acts well due to him enjoying and 
being pained at only right things. However, since already habituation develops such a disposition, and 
since not all our bad actions seem to be caused by unhabituated sensibilities to pain and pleasure (for 
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bad pleasures do not tempt a finely-habituated person, he should be invulnerable 
to acting akratically in the situations of most irresistible sensual temptations, in 
which even an enkrates may occasionally surrender. However, although sensual 
pleasures are the most typical motivations of akrasia, I show next that Aristotle does 
not think that only non-rational desire for them may motivate akratic acting. Perhaps 
even the most finely-habituated person remains vulnerable to some other varieties of 
akratic conduct, against which only phronesis can protect.  
 The philosopher thinks that apart from rational and non-rational desire, our moral 
motivation is affected also by a number of emotions. As Aristotle puts it in EN 2.5: 
‘by emotions (pathe), I mean non-rational desire (epithumia), anger, fear, confidence, 
envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, emulation, pity…’370 It may now seem 
possible that some of those emotions could motivate independently of non-rational 
desire, and thus, their motivating force may not depend on how finely one’s non-
rational desires have been habituated. Aristotle continues the previous sentence, 
however, by adding that emotions are ‘…in general, all feelings accompanied by 
pleasure or pain.’ 371  This addition may change our previous impression: by 
connecting emotions with pleasure and pain, the philosopher seems to deny that 
emotions can be independent from non-rational desire, the characteristic end of which 
is pleasure.372 He continues by denying that emotions (apart from the non-rational 
desire, of course) are morally evaluable: ‘we are neither called good or bad on 
account of our [other] emotions, but are so called on account of our virtues and 
vices.’ 373  Our non-rational desires result from chosen habits, but we are not 
responsible of our other emotions, because we cannot rationally choose them, they 
are in us by nature.374 If emotions are not morally evaluable as such, and if they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
some such actions can be due to mistaken deliberation or the lack of knowledge as well), that cannot 
be the whole explanation for why phronimos never acts badly. Just a few lines earlier, the philosopher 
has, however, already remarked that the phronimos’ moral beliefs are harmonious and he has a 
developed dianoetikon (1166a13-19), which could be taken to complement the previous explanation. 
370 EN 2.5 1105b21-2 (R). 
371 Ibid. b23 (R).	  
372 Aquinas offers this interpretation in e.g. ST IIaIIae q. 148 a. 1: ‘properly speaking, anger is the 
passion of sensitive appetite.’ Cf. IIaIIae q. 148 a. 2 and IaIIae q. 46 a. 1. 
373 EN 2.5 1105a30. See also the passages quoted in the next footnote below.  
374 EN 2.5 1105 8-10: ‘we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor baled simply on account of 
having the faculty of feeling emotions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made 
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motivate us to action by triggering a non-rational desire of pleasure (or aversion of 
pain) in us⎯then it may seem that non-rational desire is behind all akratic conduct.  
 However, in EE 2.7, Aristotle declares that besides rational and non-rational 
desires, thumos, or, the emotion of anger, is ‘one of the three species of motivation 
(orexis).’375 By placing anger in the same level with the desires, Aristotle may seem 
to signal that at least that emotion does not have only the role of triggering the non-
rational desire, which, in turn, actually causes our action, but can motivate also on its 
own. Even if other emotions motivated only through sensations of pleasure and pain, 
anger could thus perhaps be the emotional force that could motivate even a person 
with finely habituated non-rational desire to act against his rational desire, and thus 
only phronimos could fully control it with his virtue of though (I explain how 
phronesis could prevent akratic anger on pp. 148-9 below). But we should not be too 
hasty in drawing this conclusion. For in Rhet. 2.2, in contrast to EE 2.7, Aristotle 
seems to consider anger only a trigger for a non-rational desire and not a force 
capable of motivating action on its own. In that passage, the philosopher uses the 
word orge instead of thumos. Although not all scholars take orge be identical with 
thumos, in any case, these two concepts are so close that both can be, and very often 
are, translated as ‘anger.’376 Let me now quote the passage that defines anger: 
 
Anger (orge) may be defined as a motivation that involves pain (meta lupe) to an apparent revenge for 
an apparent slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what 
concerns one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some 
particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not 'man' in general. Anger must be felt because the other has 
done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends, and all anger is attended by a certain 
pleasure (pasei orgei epesthai tina hedone) - that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For 
since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, 
and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. Hence it has been well said about anger, 
‘Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness, and spreads through the hearts of 
men.’ It is attended by pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of revenge, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
good or bad by nature, as we have discussed before (i.e. in EN 2.1, in which Aristotle argues that we 
are made good or bad by habituation. In EN 3.5, the philosopher adds that our habituation is up to our 
choice in a great extent, for ‘the things contributing to the end we deliberated about and choose’ (EN 
3.5 1113b2-3) … and so ‘men are themselves responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent, in that 
they [have chosen to] cheat or spend their time in drinking dens and the like (EN 3.5 1114a5-6).   
375 EE 2.7 1123a26-7: ‘anger (thumos) is one of three species of motivation (orexis)’. Cf. Rhet 10.1 
1369a7: ‘irrational motivations (alogistikei orexeis) are anger and non-rational desire (epithumia).’  
376 Pearson (2012) argues for the equivalence of thumos and orge on pp. 111-16 by pointing out that in 
many places Aristotle uses those nouns and related verbs interchangeably (esp. in DA 1.1).  See Natali 
(2007), pp. 114, for the view that thumos is the faculty of anger of which actualization orge is.  
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phantasmata then called up cause pleasure, like the phantasmata called up in dreams.  
 
Aristotle first remark is that anger arises from an unjustified slight. Since slights are 
by particular people towards other people, anger cannot be felt towards people in 
general, but only towards particular people. Anger is a motivation to revenge377 the 
perceived slights of certain people to those people.378 The philosopher states next that 
anger is a painful emotion, but it is also attended by great pleasure that an angry 
person receives while contemplating realising his revenge. Clearly, this statement 
seems to imply that anger, after all, motivates through the non-rational desire of 
pleasure, which suggests that habituation to proper pleasures would also enable one 
to control his anger apart from other emotions. I think, however, that her Aristotle 
does not have to be watering down the statement of EE 2.7 that elevates anger as 
self-standing source of motivation, because his writing in the above passage reveals 
that anger is not pleasant as such. For the desire of pleasure that attends all anger 
comes from a judgement⎯from ‘thoughts dwelling upon the act of revenge’⎯not 
from anger itself. The phantasmata that these judgements conjure up cause the 
pleasure that attends anger. In itself, anger is only painful, a point that Aristotle 
makes many times in EE and EN. 379 Hence it is plausible to conclude that anger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Cf. Cooper (1999), which argues that instead of revenge, what in fact motivates anger is ‘the 
noble.’ For Aristotle says in EN 2.3 1104b30, ‘there are three objects of choice: the noble (to kalon), 
the useful (to sumpheron), and the pleasant (to hêdu).’ Provided that non-rational desire pursues 
pleasure, and rational one what is good, or useful, then anger, claims Cooper (pp. 255-6), should 
pursue the noble. I think this passage is, however, hardly sufficient for justifying Cooper’ 
interpretation (it is esp. doubtful if Aristotle would ever mean ‘good’ by the word ‘useful’), and even if 
we accepted Cooper’s claim, I would not need to change my interpretation about what for the angry 
person is motivated to act. As Pearson (2012) has remarked (on pp.135-6), anger can be a motivation 
only for revenge even if its end were the noble. Since Aristotle never claims that angry person is 
aiming at noble just because he is angry (only that anger helps courageous people in pursuing the noble 
in EN 3.8 1116b30–31), but only that the angry person aims at revenge – the noble, says Pearson, 
could at the most be only de re end of anger – of which the angry person is not even conscious; the 
angry person’s de dicto end, the end that he actually has in his mind and that motivates him to act, 
would be to only revenge the apparent slight.  
378 This definition is considerably narrower than the way in which the word orge and thumos were used 
in ancient Greek, or the word ‘anger’ is used today, so presumably Aristotle would consider the 
various other ways of using the word derivate from this use: e.g. if one says to be angry at the entire 
world, he is generalising his anger towards certain specific people.  
379 EN 7.6 1149b22. Cf. EE 3.3 1231b6 ‘…pains arise from thumos’ and b15 ‘we call that pain 
thumos’, Pol. 5.10  ‘…anger (orge) is accompanied by pain’ and Rhet. 2.2 1378a30-2 ‘anger is desire 
that involves pain (meta lupe) for a apparent revenge owing to an apparent slight.’ In 1378b2-9, 
Aristotle adds, however, that anger is ‘attended by a certain pleasure⎯that which arises from the 
 146 
could motivate action on its own, and without being only a trigger for a motivating 
non-rational desire, as his statement in EE 2.7 about the position of anger as the third 
species of moral motivation apart from rational and non-rational desire implies.380 
 Since we have seen that anger does not motivate action through triggering a non-
rational desire, we may now conclude that even the best of habituation of non-rational 
desires could not prevent one from acting against his rational desire while angry. The 
question that remains is what, if not habituation, then, is a guarantee against excessive 
anger that may lead even a finely-habituated person to act akratically. I have 
suggested above that phronesis gives this guarantee, because only a phronimos, we 
have concluded, never acts badly, and he differs from an only finely-habituated 
person insofar as he has the virtue of phronesis and that person does not. So as to see 
how phronesis enables one to handle his anger well in all situations, we might study 
EN 7.6, in which the philosopher describes akrasia with regard to anger in detail, 
illuminating the psychological relation between anger and reason: 
 
We will now consider the fact that akrasia related to anger (tou thymou) is less shameful than the form 
relating to desire (ton epithymion). For anger seems to hear reason in some way, but to mishear it, like 
swift servants who run off before they hear what is said in its entirety and then they err in carrying out 
the command, or, as dogs bark if there is merely a knock at the door, before examining it is a friend. 
So, anger, because if its heated and swift nature, hears something and though it does not hear an order, 
it sets off to revenge. For talk or phantasia has made clear that there is a hubristic insult or slight, and 
anger, as if it inferred from syllogism that one ought to wage war against such a thing, immediately 
becomes harsh. But as for (non-rational) desire (epithumia), if reason (logos) or phantasia merely says 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expectation of revenge.’ Anger is, however, not pleasant as such, because anger is not-rational and the 
accompanying desire of pleasure is rational, based on thoughts (Rhet. 2.4 1378b7-8: ‘[an angry 
person’s] thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the phantasmata then called up cause the 
pleasure’), and thus a finely habituated person can control that desire; it does not cause his anger to 
become excessive. 
380	  If not pleasure, perhaps, then, the pain involved in anger causes an angry person to pursue revenge 
so as to get right of the anger, which would still allow an angry person’s motivation to be a result of 
non-rational desire. However, fear, which seems to be the only exclusively painful emotion besides 
anger in Aristotle, causes non-rational desire to escape the source of pain so as to get rid of the pain as 
quickly as possible, while anger causes one to attack the slighting person, even if forgetting his slight 
was a quicker way to escape the pain of being angry than attacking him. In this respect, an angry 
person is quite unlike the fearful person, but resembles more a courageous person, who wants to stay in 
a battle despite his great pains. 
380 The courageous person stands, however, firm in the battle and faces pains thanks to his judgement 
to act well, but because anger does not involve any value judgement as such, an analogous explanation 
could not apply to the angry person. E.g. in Rhet. 2.4 1381a12, Aristotle denies that feeling injustice, 
lack of good sense, and hatred involves pain, but says that anger does. He does not consider any 
additional emotions as being potentially painful apart from fear, which, he says, is ‘pain or disturbance 
due to imagining some destructive or painful event in future.’ (Rhet. 2.5 1382a22-3) (RR). 
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that something is pleasant, it sets off after enjoyment. As a result, anger follows reason in a way, 
but desire does not. It is therefore more shameful; for a man who acts akratically with regard to anger 
in a way obeys reasoning, whereas the other sort is giving in to desire and not to reasoning. 381 
 
In the above passage, Aristotle seems to attempt to justify the lesser shamefulness of 
acting irrationally while angry to weak akrasia. Aristotle’s concern for defending the 
lesser shamefulness of excessive anger against pleasure-seeking may seem odd, as it 
is hard to see how displaying violence against others for no proportionate reason on 
their part, and perhaps even harming the others, would need to be any less shameful 
than, e.g., eating too many sweets.382 Provided that Aristotle permits, however, that a 
finely-habituated person, who is immune to weak akratic acting, could be excessively 
violent, he must also think that impetuous akrasia is less shameful than weak 
akrasia. Otherwise, he would have ended up with the unattractive conclusion that a 
person with a more finely-habituated character may have as shameful moral 
weaknesses as one with a less finely-habituated character. 383  Now, in order to justify 
the lesser shamefulness of the anger-related akrasia compared to ordinary akrasia, 
Aristotle presents an argument that mishearing reason, which is involved in 
excessive anger, is less bad than not having confidence in reason⎯as in the case of 
weak akrasia⎯because mishearing seems to be nevertheless hearing reason ‘in a 
way’. A person who acts badly due to mishearing his reason at least has a conviction 
to listen her reason, whereas a weak akratic lacks even this conviction due to her bad, 
non-rational desire. How the angry akratic, then, exactly fails to hear his reason?  
 Earlier in the passage, Aristotle stated anger to be ‘heated and swift’, and mishear 
reason just as ‘too hasty’ servants may mishear their orders. Interpreters tend to 
disagree about the point of this analogue, as the text is not decisive here. Recently, 
Irwin and Broadie with Rowe have suggested that the akratic’s anger may make a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 EN 7.6 1149a24–b1 (R).  
382 This is Aristotle’s classic example of ordinary akrasia in EN 7.3 1147a25-b5 
383 There might be also cultural reasons, because it seems that in a world before political correctness, 
even excessive anger did not label a person as outright bad: e.g. Achilles bursts into uncontrollable 
anger after the death of Patrocles, disregarding his personal honour or that of his polis, ending up in a 
defamation of Hector’s body and his own death (Aristotle mentions this as an example of impetuous 
akrasia in Rhet., 1.3 1358b38-59a5), Ajax kills himself after suffering public humiliation and Medea, a 
faithful wife, wants to revenge his unfaithful husband, but ends up killing his own children in rage. 
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misjudgement about the good course of action, and that is why he shall react 
excessively to the insult. 384  Alternatively, the akratic’s reason may make the 
judgement about the necessity of revenge, but ‘hears’ it as an order to act violently, 
and therefore rushes to excessively violent revenge without deliberation. On this 
reading, anger would motivate revenge without rational desire. The section that 
comes after the analogue clarifies that this latter option is probably right. According 
to Aristotle, ‘reason or imagination’ makes it evident for a person that there has been 
a slight, which deserves revenge. Anger does not thus seem to affect judgement, but 
reason or imagination affects anger; it hears an order to act, and bad action results.  
 Interpreters also disagree about Aristotle’s successive notion that an angry akratic 
behaves is as if inferring a mistaken conclusion from a syllogism. Recently, Richard 
Bodeüs has claimed that this may mean that anger makes the akratic to infer that he 
has been insulted. If this was right, it would be also the underlying cause of the 
akratic’s rational or imagined judgement, and so anger would motivate through 
rational desire after all. However, it would be perhaps closer to Aristotle’s ‘as if’ -
qualification to think that his talk about syllogism in anger is metaphorical. Giles 
Pearson has recently taken up this view, and suggested that anger differs from non-
rational desire insofar as it resembles a rational desire in a qualified way, whereas 
latter does not resemble it at all. This is how anger could be hearing a reason ‘in a 
way.’ Instead of reacting to the judgement of reason about the need for revenge by 
deliberating about how to revenge, anger ‘misses out’ this part of the ‘fully rational 
response’ and prompts the agent to impulsive violent reaction.385 Hence, for Pearson, 
anger seems to be a ‘quasi-rational’ desire, which, in the case of akratic, leads him to 
fail to deliberate before action. I think, however, that this conclusion according to 
which anger is prompted by rational judgement is no more plausible than assuming, 
with Bodeüs, that anger results the rational judgement. For Aristotle does not in fact 
say that anger is prompted by judgement, but only that it upon mishearing an order 
immediately sets after revenge. Carlo Natali has remarked that one can mishear that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 See Irwin 1999, p. 106, Natali 1999, p.  279 and Broadie & Rowe 2001, p. 127.  
385 Pearson 2012, p. 137.  
 149 
there is an order even before a judgement is made. 386 This is exactly what a too 
hasty servant does in Aristotle’s analogue. Hence it seems that in Aristotle, anger can 
fail to hear reason by neither causing wrong judgements, nor inferring hasty 
conclusions, but simply hearing an order to act, when there is not judgement yet.  
 The previous conclusion, than an angry person hears an order to act when there 
is no judgement for such acting yet, would imply that anger-related akrasia belongs 
to the type of akrasia that Aristotle mentions in EN 7.7, ‘impetuous akrasia’: 
 
One kind of akrasia is impetuosity, another weakness; some people deliberate but then do not abide 
by their deliberations on account of passions, while others, because they do not deliberate, are led by 
the passions.387 
 
In above passage, Aristotle differentiates the impetuous (propeteia) akrasia from 
weak akrasia by stating that while ‘some people’ deliberate before acting akratically, 
‘the others’ do not. As we have seen above, the former, that is, weak akratics, act 
badly because their non-rational desire undermines their confidence to their right 
judgement, but the philosopher claims that the latter, impetuous people act against 
their rational commitments because they have not deliberated. Evidently, angry 
akratics that act before having even formed a judgement must be among the latter.  
 This observation, I believe, is crucial for seeing how phronesis could make one 
invulnerable to akratic acting even if unjustifiably slighted. Although a finely-
habituated person does not desire bad pleasures, his habituation might not have fully 
ensured that he also deliberates before he acts, as habituation concerns the non-
rational (alogikon) aspect of soul, and deliberation is an activity of another, rational 
(logikon) aspect. Since deliberating well (to eu bouleuesthai), Aristotle tells us in EN 
6.7, is ‘the mark (semeion) of phronimos’,388 the finely-habituated person would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Natali 2007, p. 117. Aspasius thinks the same: ‘although reason has in no way said nor has there 
occurred an impression that it must take revenge, one’s temper leaps to it, as though it had been 
ordered to take revenge.’ (Comm. 127,11-12) 
387 EN 7.7 1150b19–21 (B & C).  
388 EN 6.7 1141b9–10; see also 6.5, 1140a25–8: ‘It is thought to be a mark of a person of practical 
wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some 
particular respect, for example, about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about 
what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.’ 
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need to also be phronimos in order to excel in deliberation. For the term ‘mark’ 
(semeion) probably signals here that a phronimos’ ability to deliberate well is the 
feature that renders him a distinct character-type. As Aristotle puts it, ‘a person who 
excels at deliberating has phronesis’.389 Hence it seems that a phronimos, or, a 
virtuous person, should thank his ability to take a time for deliberation before each 
potentially fatal action for his invulnerability to akratic acting even while angry.  
 Provided that his tendency of deliberating well separates a properly virtuous 
person from an only finely-habituated person, and that excessive, akratic anger is 
caused by a lack of deliberation, as Aristotle indicates in EN 7.7, then even finely-
habituated people are vulnerable to such anger, unlike virtuous people. The 
philosopher seems to admit this in Rhet. 2.14: ‘the youth are impetuous (thumikoi) 
and quickly angered (oxuthumoi)’, 390 and therefore they are ‘more courageous 
(andreioteroi)’391 than the old, ‘although intemperate.’392 As the youth cannot be 
properly virtuous, for young people do not have phronesis, they cannot have the 
virtue of courage, although they seem to be are akratic or enkratic neither⎯for in that 
case it would be too much to say they are courageous. In a demanding situation, an 
akratic would act like a coward, and an enkratic would at least desire to run away, 
which, Aristotle maintains in EN 2.3, prevents attributing courage even to him.393 So, 
Aristotle must mean that impetuosity⎯which is complemented by their noble desires 
and lack of fear, renders the finely-habituated youth close of being properly virtuous. 
They remain courageous, but become also patient and temperate, thus making their 
courage into a virtue, once they acquire phronesis to complement their fine character.  
 
4.6 THE SECOND AND FINAL STEP: PHRONESIS AND MORAL VIRTUE 
In this chapter, I completed my reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of moral 
development. The moral reason for the finely-habituated person to take the final step 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 EN 6.5 1140a30. 
390 Rhet. 2.14 1389a9. 
391 Ibid. 1390b5. 
392 Ibid. 1389a35-b1. 
393 See EN 2.3 1104b6-8: ‘he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this 
or at least is not pained is courageous, while the man who is pained (i.e. an enkrates) is coward.’	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in his moral development, I argued, to acquire phronesis is to become invulnerable 
to akratic acting. In section 4.3, I concluded that Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in 
EN 7.3 implies that anyone who does not understand why certain actions are good 
(orthos logos)⎯the moral understanding that a phronimos possesses⎯must be 
vulnerable to akratic acting to some extent; but less the more finely-habituated his 
character is. In 4.4, I applied this interpretation to EN 7.9 and enkrateia first, and 
showed that Aristotle could think that although an enkratic characteristically acts 
well thanks to his better-than-average moral habituation, even he may act akratically 
on occasion. After this, I continued to show how even a finely-habituated person 
might be vulnerable to akrasia, although not to the unqualified pleasure-related 
variety, but for example to the impetuous akrasia that Aristotle introduces in EN 7.6 
and 7.7. Habituating desires can prevent the former akrasia, but not impetuous 
akrasia. For impetuous akrasia results from a lack of deliberation, and fine 
habituation of desires does not yet have to make one’s moral deliberation excellent. 
The invulnerability of the virtuous person to akrasia must thus be the achievement of 




In my thesis, I have attempted to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of moral 
development. My aim has been to study it as a worked-out theory about development 
of character, rather than as a collection of insights that can provide useful guidance to 
our contemporary theories, if further worked-out by contemporary researchers. 
Recently, the latter approach has received significant attention from psychologists 
and education theorists. The former approach has, however, remained the province of 
only few Aristotle interpreters. It was first introduced in Myles Burnyeat’s 1980 
paper, Aristotle on Learning to Be Good. He attempted to study Aristotle\s theory of 
moral development without first asking how could we utilise it in contemporary 
theories of moral development. Since then, Burnyeat’s interpretation has been the 
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point of reference for most of those few interpreters, who have expanded it 
without questioning it. Only recently has Howard Curzer challenged Burnyeat.  
These interpretations are, however, only selective reconstructions of Aristotle’s 
theory of moral development, and omit certain important issues altogether: the 
questions of whether we need the rational aspect of our soul to discern good actions 
or only for instrumental reasoning, of how we become responsible for our actions, 
and of how developing reason can affect moral motivation, if it can at all. Unlike 
Aristotle’s theory of moral development as such, these questions have received 
considerable scholarly attention, but almost always in isolation from that 
theory⎯although it seems that they are tied to moral development. Therefore my aim 
was to create a reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of moral development that deals 
primarily with these questions. I endorsed an assumption that such a reconstruction 
might expose some unnoticed problems in Burnyeat and Curzer on one hand, and, by 
bringing Aristotle’s writings on moral development to bear on the above questions, 
also bring new insights into currently existing scholarship about them on the other.  
 In Chapter 1 of my thesis, I discussed the question of whether we need to use 
reason to identify good actions, which would determine whether we should consider 
Aristotle to think that acquiring virtue also requires training our rational capacities. 
Although most interpreters⎯’the rationalists’⎯think that according to Aristotle we 
need reason for identifying good actions, a significant minority of interpreters has 
traditionally argued that we do not need reason for this purpose. I pointed out that 
Aristotle might be read as supporting such ‘anti-rationalism’ in EN 2.1 and 3.5: in the 
former passage he says that we acquire moral virtue by habit, not by teaching, as 
opposed to the virtue of thought, and in the latter that we do not deliberate about 
what to pursue by acting. I also showed that there is, however, a reason why not 
many interpreters have supported this interpretation. For example, in EN 1.13, 
Aristotle seems to argue that cognising value is a task of the rational aspect of soul, 
and in 6.13 he claims that moral virtue presupposes practical wisdom (phronesis), 
which he would not presumably have said if he thought that we could identify good 
actions without involving the rational aspect, and acquire virtue by only habituation.  
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 This traditional defence of Aristotle’s rationalism turned out, however, to 
require further reinforcement. Recently, Jessica Moss has argued that the anti-
rationalist interpretation could accommodate EN 1.13, 6.13, and other seemingly 
rationalist passages with the help of some of Aristotle’s claims in DA 3. According to 
him, the non-rational mental faculty of phantasia receives all our appearances about 
the world, including those of goodness, and the rational aspect of soul may only be 
needed to conceptualise those appearances. Moss’ interpretation was, however, 
unable to account for Aristotle’s views on the psychological basis of moral 
responsibility. According to him, people’s becoming responsible for their actions 
presupposes that they have made, or at least could have been able to make, a choice 
to perform to either good or bad actions before being habituated to act in a certain 
way. However, if our conception of ‘a good action’ were only conceptualisation for 
the discernment of a non-rational faculty, as we saw Moss to have argued, its content 
would be determined by our habituation. In this case, we could not identify good 
actions before our character had been habituated, contrary to what Aristotle thinks. 
 In the beginning of Chapter 2, I had already concluded that identifying good 
actions, and, thus also becoming morally virtuous, presupposes having developed the 
rational aspect of the soul. In light of this conclusion, it appeared, however, strange 
that Aristotle nevertheless says in EN 2.1 that virtue comes from the habituation of 
the non-rational aspect. He also says, however, that this habituation involves a 
teacher. This may seem to indicate, as Myles Burnyeat has interpreted Aristotle’s 
theory of moral development to imply, that someone must first tell children about 
good actions, and on the basis of this externally-given knowledge, they can develop 
fine characters entirely through habituation (although for full moral virtue, phronesis 
is also required). I demonstrated that there is, however, a problem with Burnyeat’s 
interpretation. According to EN 1.4 and 10.9, a person can be receptive to moral 
instruction only if he already has a finely-habituated character. If a teacher tried to 
tell an unhabituated child about good actions, his effort would probably be wasted.  
 I sided with Howard Curzer so as to avoid this problem. I followed his recent 
interpretation in arguing that the teacher involved in habituation may not explicitly 
tell the child about good actions, but rather punish him for bad actions. Such concrete 
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guidance, which does not need to involve theoretical instruction, can eventually 
develop a sense of shame in a young person, which naturally motivates him to steer 
away from acting badly and act well instead. I discovered, however, that even Curzer 
does not avoid another problem that he shares with Burnyeat and also Moss. 
Provided that we develop our moral character through a form of habituation that is 
externally conditioned⎯whether through punishment or teaching⎯it is unclear how 
we could ever be able to develop an ability to choose how to habituate ourselves, 
which is needed for moral responsibility. It seemed to me, however, that Curzer’s 
interpretation could avoid this problem, unlike Burnyeat’s. For Aristotle thinks that 
avoiding bad actions is not the same as performing good actions. Therefore there was 
space in Curzer’s interpretation for an account how one could identify good actions 
with neither having been taught them nor having yet acquired a moral character.  
 Unfortunately Curzer’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of moral development 
fell short of noticing the above possibility. However, I discovered that in EN 6.10 
Aristotle may describe the ability to reliability identify good actions on the basis of 
other people’s opinions⎯an ability that most people come to have by nature. I 
interpreted that having this ability, synesis, does not, however, have to imply any 
motivation to act well, and thus it could be available also to people without 
habituated characters. Hence I concluded that they could thus use it to rationally 
choose the direction of their moral habituation, and become morally responsible.  
 In Chapter 3, I first focused on synesis. For I noticed that if good actions are good 
for different reasons in different situations, as they are for Aristotle, we may wonder 
how anyone could identify a good action without fully understanding why it is good. 
Since no cognitive ability short of phronesis can give such moral understanding, this 
concern favours interpretations, such as John McDowell’s, according to which a 
person needs phronesis, i.e. not only synesis, to identify good actions. However, I 
argued that those interpretations suffer from some exegetical inconsistencies and, 
moreover, that there is a plausible alternative to them. As the alternative, we could 
apply what Aristotle says about identifying instances of natural kinds to his moral 
epistemology. David Charles has concluded in his study of A. Po., in which Aristotle 
discusses this topic, that if we were uncertain about whether some material is, e.g. 
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‘gold’, or not, Aristotle would advise us to ask a master goldsmith. Whether he 
identifies that material as ‘gold’ or not suffices as the epistemic basis for our 
identification. The master is a reliable guide, because he has experience of the fact 
that only that certain material enable him to perform his work successfully. Likewise, 
I argued, we could also identify good actions by consulting other people, without us 
having acquired rational understanding of why certain actions are good.  
 In the second half of Chapter 3, I studied further how profound moral 
understanding, or, phronesis, is acquired to complement synesis. Because phronesis 
that perfects fine habits into moral virtue is a virtue of thought, developing it must 
require some teaching. In EN 1.4, Aristotle can be read as proposing that attending 
lectures on ethics may help a well-habituated possessor of synesis to acquire 
phronesis. Since phronesis is, however, a virtue of practical and not only theoretical 
knowledge, I pointed out that experience is also needed, as well as listening lectures 
on ethics. It is possible that experience and theory could work in a mutually 
reinforcing way for a person in the process of acquiring phronesis. Once a person has 
been taught that he should act well not only to avoid shame, but also to realise the 
human good, eudaimonia, and then experience that acting well indeed improves his 
life, his motivation to act well shall increase. This virtuous circle of moral learning 
could gradually develop also his phronesis⎯that Aristotle defines in EN 6.5 as 
excellence in deliberation⎯for increasing moral knowledge and growing experience 
in using this knowledge should enable one to deliberate more and more carefully.  
 We came to see how phronesis might be acquired, but the question that we were 
left with was why it even has to be acquired. A person becomes morally virtuous if 
and only if he has phronesis in addition to synesis and a finely-habituated character, 
but what exactly does phronesis add to this combination apart from enabling him to 
understand why certain actions are good? Evidently, phronesis should also bring 
some improvement to the person’s acting, or otherwise, if it brought about only 
epistemic benefits, it would not be necessary for moral, or, action-related virtue. I 
dedicated Chapter 4 to studying the moral benefits of having phronesis. My 
suggestion was that only phronesis could make a person invulnerable to any form of 
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akrasia, and that this is why it is necessary for moral virtue. For it appeared to me 
that Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in EN 7 could yield such a conclusion.  
 In EN 7, Aristotle clearly argues that an ability to identify good actions does not 
prevent a person from anticipating bad actions as pleasant. Provided that the person 
characteristically surrenders to his non-rational desire, and performs a bad action, he 
is akratic; if he resists the attractions of improper pleasures, he is enkratic. Aristotle 
does not, however, say that the enkratic could never act akratically⎯he only tends to 
resist his bad desires. I found in Aristotle no reason that even finely-habituated 
people, who do not desire bad pleasures, could not be vulnerable to akrasia with 
regard to anger, which is a passion different from non-rational desire. This akrasia is 
not caused by an uncontrollable desire for pleasure, but by tendency to not deliberate 
before acting, which allows one’s anger to result excessively violent acting. Since we 
found in Chapter 3 that only a phronimos is an excellent deliberator, as he can not 
only identify good actions, but also understands why they are good, I argued that 
probably only phronesis could prevent akrasia with regard to anger.   
 The last lines of EN 7.3 gave primary textual basis for my argument. In those 
lines, Aristotle briefly concludes that akratic acting is impossible in the presence of 
‘proper knowledge’ (kyria episteme). Most other interpreters, such as Broadie and 
Charles, have argued that this knowledge must refer to the akratic person’s 
knowledge of true moral beliefs, such as that ‘I should avoid sweet foods.’ I made 
clear, however, that Aristotle would not probably have casually called mere true 
beliefs, which are particular and contingent, as kyria episteme⎯that is, universal and 
unchangeable by definition. Instead, I proposed that ‘proper knowledge’ might more 
likely refer to the moral understanding of a phronimos. The ultimate reason why any 
good action is good is that performing it realises eudaimonia. Since a phronimos 
understands this, and is conscious that excessive violence would harm his own 
eudaimonia in the end, he is not prone to acting inappropriately⎯even if he is angry. 
 The above interpretation of the moral importance of phronesis completed my 
reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of moral development. In the course of my thesis, 
we saw that in order to become virtuous, we need the rational aspect of our soul to be 
able identify good actions⎯for which it needs the ability Aristotle calls synesis. This 
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ability, that most people can acquire by nature, explains why we are responsible 
for our actions despite the fact that they mostly derive from our characters, for it 
enables us to independently choose how to habituate the non-rational aspects of our 
souls. Even the fine habituation of the non-rational aspect is, however, only the first 
step towards virtue. It does not yet guarantee a morally virtuous character, since 
being virtuous is not only a firm motivation to perform the actions that synesis 
identifies as good. We also need excellence in practical deliberation, phronesis, to 
avoid virtuous motivation occasionally turning into impetuous and eventually 
harmful actions. This excellence, the second and last step, comes from moral 
experience and education of the rational aspect of soul, from the understanding of 
why identifiably good actions are good. Phronesis and full moral virtue may now 
seem to be an end that is hardly possible for anyone to achieve. The difficulty of 
becoming morally virtuous, and the rarity of virtue, makes, however, virtue 
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